Thursday, May 7, 2026
    The GeoStrategic Consensus
    No Result
    View All Result
    • Login
    • HOME
    • AMERICAS
      • Argentina
      • Brazil
      • Canada
      • Chile
      • Colombia
      • Costa Rica
      • Cuba
      • Dominican Republic
      • Ecuador
      • El Salvador
      • Greenland
      • Guatemala
      • Honduras
      • Mexico
      • Nicaragua
      • Panama
      • Paraguay
      • Peru
      • United States
      • Uruguay
      • Venezuela
    • ASIA-PACIFIC
      • Australia
      • Brunei Darussalam
      • Cambodia
      • China
      • Federated States of Micronesia
      • Fiji
      • Indonesia
      • Japan
      • Kiribati
      • Laos
      • Malaysia
      • Marshall Islands
      • Mongolia
      • Myanmar
      • Nauru
      • New Zealand
      • North Korea
      • Palau
      • Papua New Guinea
      • Philippines
      • Samoa
      • Singapore
      • Solomon Islands
      • South Korea
      • Taiwan
      • Thailand
      • Timor-Leste
      • Tonga
      • Tuvalu
      • Vanuatu
      • Vietnam
    • CARICOM
      • CARICOM – Non-English
        • Haiti
        • Suriname
      • CARICOM Associates
        • Anguilla
        • Bermuda
        • British-Virgin-Islands
        • Cayman-Islands
        • Curacao
        • Turks-and-Caicos
      • CARICOM English
        • Antigua and Barbuda
        • Barbados
        • Belize
        • Dominica
        • Grenada
        • Guyana
        • Jamaica
        • Montserrat
        • Saint Kitts and Nevis
        • Saint Lucia
        • Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
        • The Bahamas
        • Trinidad and Tobago
    • EURASIA
      • Armenia
      • Azerbaijan
      • Balarus
      • Georgia
      • Kazakhstan
      • Kyrgyzstan
      • Moldova
      • Russia
      • Tajikistan
      • Turkmenistan
      • Ukraine
      • Uzbekistan
    • EUROPE
      • Albania
      • Andorra
      • Austria
      • Bosnia and Herzegovina
      • Bulgaria
      • Croatia
      • Cyprus
      • Czech Republic
      • Denmark
      • Estonia
      • Finland
      • France
      • Germany
      • Greece
      • Holy See
      • Hungary
      • Iceland
      • Ireland
      • Italy
      • Kosovo
      • Latvia
      • Liechtenstein
      • Lithuania
      • Luxembourg
      • Malta
      • Monaco
      • Montenegro
      • Netherlands
      • North Macedonia
      • Norway
      • Poland
      • Portugal
      • Romania
      • San Marino
      • Serbia
      • Slovakia
      • Slovenia
      • Spain
      • Sweden
      • Switzerland
      • United Kingdom
    • MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
      • Algeria
      • Bahrain
      • Egypt
      • Iran
      • Iraq
      • Israel
      • Jordan
      • Kuwait
      • Lebanon
      • Lybia
      • Morocco
      • Oman
      • Palestinian Territories
      • Qatar
      • Saudi Arabia
      • Syria
      • Tunisia
      • Turkey
      • United Arab Emirates
      • Western Sahara
      • Yemen
    • SOUTH ASIA
      • Afghanistan
      • Bangladesh
      • Bhutan
      • India
      • Maldives
      • Nepal
      • Pakistan
      • Sri Lanka
    • SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
      • Angola
      • Benin
      • Botswana
      • Burkina Faso
      • Burundi
      • Cabo Verde
      • Cameroon
      • Central African Republic
      • Chad
      • Comoros
      • Cote d’Ivoire
      • Democratic Republic of the Congo
      • Djibouti
      • Equatorial Guinea
      • Eritrea
      • Eswatini
      • Ethiopia
      • Gabon
      • Gambia
      • Ghana
      • Guinea
      • Guinea Bissau
      • Kenya
      • Lesotho
      • Liberia
      • Madagascar
      • Malawi
      • Mali
      • Mauritania
      • Mauritius
      • Mozambique
      • Namibia
      • Niger
      • Nigeria
      • Republic of the Congo
      • Rwanda
      • Sao Tome and Principe
      • Senegal
      • Seychelles
      • Sierra Leone
      • Somalia
      • South Africa
      • South Sudan
      • Sudan
      • Tanzania
      • Togo
      • Uganda
      • Zambia
      • Zimbabwe
    • HOME
    • AMERICAS
      • Argentina
      • Brazil
      • Canada
      • Chile
      • Colombia
      • Costa Rica
      • Cuba
      • Dominican Republic
      • Ecuador
      • El Salvador
      • Greenland
      • Guatemala
      • Honduras
      • Mexico
      • Nicaragua
      • Panama
      • Paraguay
      • Peru
      • United States
      • Uruguay
      • Venezuela
    • ASIA-PACIFIC
      • Australia
      • Brunei Darussalam
      • Cambodia
      • China
      • Federated States of Micronesia
      • Fiji
      • Indonesia
      • Japan
      • Kiribati
      • Laos
      • Malaysia
      • Marshall Islands
      • Mongolia
      • Myanmar
      • Nauru
      • New Zealand
      • North Korea
      • Palau
      • Papua New Guinea
      • Philippines
      • Samoa
      • Singapore
      • Solomon Islands
      • South Korea
      • Taiwan
      • Thailand
      • Timor-Leste
      • Tonga
      • Tuvalu
      • Vanuatu
      • Vietnam
    • CARICOM
      • CARICOM – Non-English
        • Haiti
        • Suriname
      • CARICOM Associates
        • Anguilla
        • Bermuda
        • British-Virgin-Islands
        • Cayman-Islands
        • Curacao
        • Turks-and-Caicos
      • CARICOM English
        • Antigua and Barbuda
        • Barbados
        • Belize
        • Dominica
        • Grenada
        • Guyana
        • Jamaica
        • Montserrat
        • Saint Kitts and Nevis
        • Saint Lucia
        • Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
        • The Bahamas
        • Trinidad and Tobago
    • EURASIA
      • Armenia
      • Azerbaijan
      • Balarus
      • Georgia
      • Kazakhstan
      • Kyrgyzstan
      • Moldova
      • Russia
      • Tajikistan
      • Turkmenistan
      • Ukraine
      • Uzbekistan
    • EUROPE
      • Albania
      • Andorra
      • Austria
      • Bosnia and Herzegovina
      • Bulgaria
      • Croatia
      • Cyprus
      • Czech Republic
      • Denmark
      • Estonia
      • Finland
      • France
      • Germany
      • Greece
      • Holy See
      • Hungary
      • Iceland
      • Ireland
      • Italy
      • Kosovo
      • Latvia
      • Liechtenstein
      • Lithuania
      • Luxembourg
      • Malta
      • Monaco
      • Montenegro
      • Netherlands
      • North Macedonia
      • Norway
      • Poland
      • Portugal
      • Romania
      • San Marino
      • Serbia
      • Slovakia
      • Slovenia
      • Spain
      • Sweden
      • Switzerland
      • United Kingdom
    • MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
      • Algeria
      • Bahrain
      • Egypt
      • Iran
      • Iraq
      • Israel
      • Jordan
      • Kuwait
      • Lebanon
      • Lybia
      • Morocco
      • Oman
      • Palestinian Territories
      • Qatar
      • Saudi Arabia
      • Syria
      • Tunisia
      • Turkey
      • United Arab Emirates
      • Western Sahara
      • Yemen
    • SOUTH ASIA
      • Afghanistan
      • Bangladesh
      • Bhutan
      • India
      • Maldives
      • Nepal
      • Pakistan
      • Sri Lanka
    • SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
      • Angola
      • Benin
      • Botswana
      • Burkina Faso
      • Burundi
      • Cabo Verde
      • Cameroon
      • Central African Republic
      • Chad
      • Comoros
      • Cote d’Ivoire
      • Democratic Republic of the Congo
      • Djibouti
      • Equatorial Guinea
      • Eritrea
      • Eswatini
      • Ethiopia
      • Gabon
      • Gambia
      • Ghana
      • Guinea
      • Guinea Bissau
      • Kenya
      • Lesotho
      • Liberia
      • Madagascar
      • Malawi
      • Mali
      • Mauritania
      • Mauritius
      • Mozambique
      • Namibia
      • Niger
      • Nigeria
      • Republic of the Congo
      • Rwanda
      • Sao Tome and Principe
      • Senegal
      • Seychelles
      • Sierra Leone
      • Somalia
      • South Africa
      • South Sudan
      • Sudan
      • Tanzania
      • Togo
      • Uganda
      • Zambia
      • Zimbabwe
    No Result
    View All Result
    Agentially
    No Result
    View All Result
    Home MIDDLE EAST and NORTH AFRICA Iran

    Monetary and banking policy recommendations in crisis and war

    The Analyst by The Analyst
    May 7, 2026
    in Iran
    Monetary and banking policy recommendations in crisis and war


    According to the report of Economy Online, Valiullah Saif, the former Governor of the Central Bank, addressed the policy makers in the “Businesses in Crisis” conference, which was held in cooperation with Economy Online and the National Organization of Entrepreneurship of Iran, and made suggestions in the field of monetary and banking policies, which you can read below:

    READ ALSO

    The deadline for announcing the final list of teams to participate in the 2026 World Cup

    monetary and banking policy in crisis and war; The central bank’s hands are tied

    The subject of monetary policy during the crisis, especially in war conditions, is one of the most complex areas of economic policy. In such a situation, classical goals such as inflation control conflict with more urgent requirements such as maintaining survival and economic stability. It is important to pay attention to the fact that, in spite of extensive sanctions, even before the military attacks, Iran’s economy was far from normal conditions and was facing various crises, the severity of which, of course, increased after the military attacks.

    In other words, the monetary policy in this situation does not seek optimization, but seeks to prevent collapse.

    In the following, I will try to present an analytical framework of monetary policy requirements in crisis conditions, focusing on the characteristics of Iran’s economy.

    1. Structural characteristics of the economy on the verge of crisis

    Iran’s economy was facing important structural imbalances even before entering the war conditions, which have intensified in critical conditions after the military attacks:

    First, chronic inflation and unstable expectations

    Chronic double-digit inflation has greatly increased society’s sensitivity to price shocks. As a result, hedging behaviors such as moving towards alternative assets and a form of informal dollarization have developed.

    Second, financial dominance over monetary policy

    Chronic budget deficits have created a significant dependence between the government and the central bank, and the financial dominance of the government has severely limited the independence of monetary policy.

    Third, the inadequate banking system

    Accumulation of non-productive assets, non-current claims and bank overdrafts have reduced the capacity of the banking system to play a stabilizing role in the economy.

    Fourth, external restrictions

    Sanctions have limited access to foreign exchange sources, foreign financing and even money transfers. In sum, it must be admitted that monetary policy in a crisis practically starts with closed hands.

    2. Redefining monetary policy objectives in crisis

    In a war situation, classic targeting needs to be redefined and the main focus should be on more operational targets:

    • Preventing uncontrollable inflationary spikes. Failure to pay attention in this matter will quickly cause our economy to face serious hyperinflation.
    • Maintain minimum government funding. In the conditions of a war crisis, part of the government’s financing is inevitably done through the monetary base and increasing liquidity. The danger is where we are indifferent to its amount. We should try to limit the contribution of this type of financing as much as possible.
    • Guaranteeing the performance of the payment system and banking network. Continuity of the banking system and payment network is very important. In this situation, it will not be possible to carry out fundamental reforms and resolve banking disputes completely, and its expansion should be prevented as much as possible.
    • It is very necessary to manage the currency market with the aim of preventing the collapse of expectations, which should be done carefully by using past experiences and avoiding trial and error.

    To be clear, the goal in this situation is crisis management, not a complete solution to structural problems.

    In the meantime, the existence of a nominal anchor, even implicitly, is vitally important; Because its lack can lead to extreme instability of expectations. The proposed options can be exchange rate, monetary base or inflation target.

    3. Government Financing: Designing a Middle Path

    One of the most sensitive points is how to finance the government. In the absence of extensive access to external sources, the risk of monetizing the budget deficit is very high.

    The suggested solution is to move in a middle path. Includes:

    First, targeted development of the debt market

    Issuing bonds at rates that are neither suppressed nor completely free, and focusing on institutional buyers.

    Second, controlled monetization

    Setting a transparent quantitative ceiling for monetary financing, along with regular reporting.

    Third, the use of complementary tools

    such as pre-sale of resources or clearing in the conditions of currency restrictions.

    The key point is that predictability is more important than the amount of monetization.

    4. Interest rate policy should be based on avoiding excesses.

    In times of crisis, interest rate policy should move away from a purely prescriptive mode and move towards a managed framework. This policy can be implemented using methods such as:

    • Creating an interest rate corridor
    • Preventing the real interest rate from becoming extremely negative.
    • And the use of open market operations should be applied as much as possible and in a controlled manner.

    It is important to note that:

    • A very low interest rate leads to a rush to the asset and currency markets
    • Very high interest rate aggravates recession and banking crisis

    5. Liquidity management should be done by focusing on the composition of liquidity, not just on its volume.

    In crisis conditions, it is not enough to control the volume of liquidity; But its composition is also important.

    The increase in uncertainty causes the conversion of pseudo-money into money and increases the speed of money circulation. This process can intensify inflationary pressure even without a strong growth of the monetary base.

    Therefore, the policymaker should carefully monitor the changes in liquidity components.

    6. In the management of the banking system, priority will be given to survival and ensuring continuity of activity.

    In crisis and war conditions, deep banking reforms and solving important imbalances that exist in banks, such as income-cost imbalances, asset-liability, liquidity and low capital adequacy ratio, are practically not possible; Therefore, the main focus should be on maintaining minimal stability. including:

    • Providing targeted liquidity to prevent systemic crisis
    • Temporary regulatory flexibility
    • and directing credit to critical sectors such as food, medicine, energy and transportation.

    It can bring positive results.

    This approach has been experienced in many economies in war conditions.

    7. Currency policy: curbing the cycle of instability

    In the crisis, the currency market plays a decisive role in the formation of expectations.

    The fact is that in the short term, multi-rate is inevitable and we cannot implement the main goals such as managed floating and single rate regime of the currency, but we must:

    • Its scope is limited and targeted
    • Be allocated to absolutely necessary goods
    • And there should be a plan to gradually reduce the rate gap and gradually move towards a single rate.

    At the same time, the formation of a dangerous cycle should be avoided by controlling the demand and strengthening the currency supply:

    Exchange rate jump = increase in inflation = increase in expectations = currency jump again

    Controlling this cycle is one of the most important tasks of monetary policy in the short term.

    8. Informal economy and weakening of monetary policy channels

    In times of crisis, the share of the informal economy increases. Examples of destructive activities of unauthorized institutions active in the money market can be mentioned. The volume of their activity, which was carried out outside the regulatory umbrella of the central bank and regardless of monetary regulations, included more than 25% of the country’s liquidity volume, which resulted in chaos in the money market. We remember what problems we faced at that time in order to organize and put them under the statistical coverage of the Central Bank, which finally came to a conclusion with the efforts of the employees of the Central Bank.

    In general, the high share of the informal economy causes:

    • The effectiveness of monetary policy instruments will decrease
    • And the transfer of policies will be disrupted

    This fact should be taken into account in policy design.

    9. Management of expectations as the most important policy maker tool

    One of the missing links in economic policymaking is the weakness in communication with society.

    In times of crisis, transparency can play a decisive role.

    This goal can mainly be achieved with actions such as:

    • Regular publication of monetary policy reports
    • Explicit declaration of financing policies
    • and avoid surprising decisions.

    Finally, the most important asset of the central bank in this situation is its credit, which should always be strengthened.

    10. Social considerations

    Monetary policy in a crisis is not just a technical tool. Rather, its distributional consequences can be:

    • exacerbate inequality
    • and even lead to social instability

    Therefore, minimal coordination with supportive policies is necessary.

    11. Institutional coordination

    One of the key requirements is to establish a coordinated mechanism at the highest level:

    • Central Bank
    • Ministry of Economic Affairs and Property
    • Program and budget organization
    • and other related institutions

    With the aim of making quick decisions, reducing conflicts and prioritizing resources.

    12. The necessity of designing an exit from the crisis

    One of the common mistakes is the persistence of emergency policies. From the very beginning, the way out of these policies should be done with measures such as:

    • Gradual reduction of monetization
    • Removal of price and currency controls
    • and the movement towards the restoration of the central bank’s independence should be designed.

    Final summary

    In Iran’s war situation, the monetary policy has to change its direction from a purely anti-inflationary approach to a survival-oriented stabilization policy.

    A policy whose goal is not to eliminate inflation, but to prevent multi-digit inflation and the collapse of the macro economy.

    The success of this policy will not be measured by the immediate reduction of inflation, but by three key indicators:

    1. Preventing the collapse of the national currency
    2. Continuity of government and payment system
    3. Maintain a minimum of public trust

    And finally, the most important asset of the policymaker in this situation is not only monetary instruments, but also his credibility and predictability.



    Source link

    Related Posts

    The deadline for announcing the final list of teams to participate in the 2026 World Cup
    Iran

    The deadline for announcing the final list of teams to participate in the 2026 World Cup

    May 7, 2026
    monetary and banking policy in crisis and war; The central bank’s hands are tied
    Iran

    monetary and banking policy in crisis and war; The central bank’s hands are tied

    May 7, 2026
    Israel seeks to defeat the agreement
    Iran

    Israel seeks to defeat the agreement

    May 7, 2026
    It takes 2 years to return to before the war; The government is a burden to rule
    Iran

    It takes 2 years to return to before the war; The government is a burden to rule

    May 7, 2026
    China believes that Iran’s international status has improved compared to before the war
    Iran

    China believes that Iran’s international status has improved compared to before the war

    May 7, 2026
    Analysis of Iran’s situation and economy after the war; We have no choice but to free energy prices
    Iran

    Analysis of Iran’s situation and economy after the war; We have no choice but to free energy prices

    May 7, 2026
    Next Post
    The consolidation of the Sahrawi presence within African institutions and the increasing isolation of the Moroccan occupation

    The consolidation of the Sahrawi presence within African institutions and the increasing isolation of the Moroccan occupation

    POPULAR NEWS

    Justin Bieber fans flood Coachella festival for headlining show – Entertainment

    Justin Bieber fans flood Coachella festival for headlining show – Entertainment

    April 20, 2026

    Over 600 flee homes as Army, NPA clash in Negros Occidental

    April 21, 2026

    Ex-DPWH exec recalls P800-M ‘delivery’ to Zaldy Co 

    April 20, 2026

    Former PM Paluckas suspends party membership, to waive immunity over criminal probe

    April 24, 2026
    Pres. Ali challenges CARICOM to transform into health research powerhouse

    Pres. Ali challenges CARICOM to transform into health research powerhouse

    April 23, 2026

    EDITOR'S PICK

    PLA conducts naval exercises near Philippine waters

    PLA conducts naval exercises near Philippine waters

    April 24, 2026
    Death penalty for terrorists

    Death penalty for terrorists

    May 2, 2026
    Security Council: Russia and China veto resolution on Strait of Hormuz

    Security Council: Russia and China veto resolution on Strait of Hormuz

    April 21, 2026
    “You are not the real architect of Armenia, you are the director of the Turanian dream.” Lilit Galstyan

    “You are not the real architect of Armenia, you are the director of the Turanian dream.” Lilit Galstyan

    April 23, 2026

    Recent Posts

    • Finland falling short in helping exiled journalists, study finds | Yle News
    • Wage, salary increase by 2.6% in March Y-on-Y
    • Íslandsbanki is reducing the number of employees by 50
    • “It would be a huge disappointment if that were the case.”

      © 2026 Agentially - Navigating shifting sovereignties and global risk .

      Welcome Back!

      Login to your account below

      Forgotten Password?

      Retrieve your password

      Please enter your username or email address to reset your password.

      Log In
      No Result
      View All Result

        © 2026 Agentially - Navigating shifting sovereignties and global risk .

        This website uses cookies. By continuing to use this website you are giving consent to cookies being used. Visit our Privacy and Cookie Policy.