The entire structure of NATO is built around the American leadership /FOTO:X@siyahsancakx
To deal with the wave of criticism coming from United Statesa new form of alliance will have to emerge — and quickly, argues in Politico Ivo Daalder, former ambassador of US TO natocurrently a researcher at Harvard University’s Belfer Center.
Can NATO be saved? This is the increasingly frequent question of political and military leaders and analysts as US Pres Donald Trump repeatedly criticizes the alliance and even threatens to withdraw from it.
The answer is yes. But not the same NATO that we have known for the past decades. To resist the pressure coming from Washingtona profoundly different alliance will have to be shaped — and soon, notes Ivo Daalder.
Some of the American leader’s hostility was predictable. He has consistently criticized US security alliances over the years, dating back to 1990 when he suggested that partners should pay for the protection provided. From his perspective, the costs outweigh the benefits — a belief he has maintained as president.
In 2017, at the beginning of his first term as US president, he said that NATO was “outdated”. He later described it as “useless” and ineffective. The refusal of some allies to support US actions against Iran — including restricting access to bases or airspace — has heightened tensions.
For the White House leader, the conflict with Iran was a test for NATO — one that the alliance failed. The message was clear: The United States will remember the lack of support, and mutual commitments are called into question.
There is a belief that a formal US withdrawal would require congressional approval. A law passed in 2023, also supported by Marco Rubio, limits this possibility. However, precedent shows that US presidents have denounced international treaties before, and a possible legal challenge would have an uncertain outcome.
Even without a formal withdrawal, there are multiple ways NATO can be weakened from within. Constant critical statements undermine confidence in the principle of collective defense. Reducing troops in Europe, withdrawing from command structures or blocking the decision-making process can affect the functioning of the alliance.
Article 5, the cornerstone of NATO, states that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all. However, the wording leaves each state free to decide the nature of the response — which, in practice, may mean minimal contributions.
Europeans have limited options
In this context, the European allies face a difficult reality. Efforts to convince Washington of NATO’s importance — through increased defense budgets, intensive diplomacy or political concessions — have not produced the desired results.
Thus, the options are limited. The first would be to wait for a political change in Washington, hoping to return to traditional commitments. But confidence has been damaged, and a comeback is not guaranteed.
The second option — the development of a fully autonomous European defense — raises major difficulties. The lack of infrastructure, operational experience and institutional coherence makes this scenario difficult to achieve in the short term.
Thus, the third way remains: the transformation of NATO into a different alliance, less dependent on the United States, claims the former diplomat.
Replacing the US won’t be simple, but it won’t be impossible either
Over the decades, NATO has been not only led, but structured around the US. American contributions — military, logistical, and diplomatic — formed the basis of its operation.
Replacing this core will not be simple, but not impossible either. Europe and Canada they have the resources, industrial capabilities and political will to assume a more central role.
Member states have already begun to increase defense budgets, expand their armed forces and accelerate military production. Although there is a technology gap with the US, it is gradually closing, including through cooperation with Ukrainian industry.
In parallel, complementary NATO initiatives emerged, such as rapid reaction forces led by Great BritainEuropean joint procurement programs or discussions on expanding nuclear deterrence.
The major challenge remains time. Turning these ambitions into real capabilities takes years—not months. The pace of change will depend, to a large extent, on the level of cooperation of the United States.
However, a reconfiguration of NATO towards greater European involvement was inevitable. The current context has accelerated this process — and in the long run, both Europe and the alliance could emerge strengthened.
