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In Suriname the word strategic is losing its meaning. It is used all the time: strategic planning, strategic cooperation, strategic partnerships, strategic resilience and strategic national security. It sounds important, modern and decisive. But anyone who asks about the concrete goals, responsibilities, timelines, budgets and results is often met with silence.
That problem comes up again in the report on the 2026 National Security Conference. The theme was: ‘strategic resilience and integral cooperation’. Representatives from police, defense, civilian actors and other security stakeholders met to discuss transnational crime, cyber security, maritime security, energy, critical infrastructure, economics and food security, among others.
“A society that wants to strengthen security must not simultaneously create a climate in which citizens, journalists or civil servants are afraid to report abuses.”
The leadership of the National Security Directorate emphasized that risks must be recognized in a timely manner, that organizations must break through their silos and that information must be used jointly. There is little to argue against that. On the contrary: a modern state must look ahead, analyze risks and not react only when a crisis has already escalated.
But that is precisely where the critical question begins: when does a conference become a strategy? And when will it remain merely a meeting at which policy generalities are expressed?
A strategy is more than an ambitious word for a serious problem. Strategy means that a government makes a political choice, sets priorities, mobilizes resources and organizes responsibility. It must answer at least five questions: what is the problem, what goal is being pursued, who does what, with what means and within what time frame? Without those elements, “strategic resilience” is mainly rhetoric. Then it becomes a kind of administrative deodorant: it masks the unpleasant smell of lack of implementation.
Suriname’s national security is not just a matter of police, defense and secret information. It also includes food prices, unemployment, poverty, health care, education, corruption, climate change, water management, energy dependence and the protection of citizens against organized exploitation. A child growing up without good education, a family that does not have access to affordable food or a community that loses its livelihood due to floods is also in a state of insecurity.
Anyone who views national security primarily through the lens of threats, crime and state protection runs the risk of losing sight of the citizen. Security should not be interpreted solely as protection of institutions, infrastructure and positions of power. It must first and foremost be human security.
A critical look at the power structure is necessary. In many developing countries, national security is still too easily linked to foreign models, foreign training and foreign threat assessments. Suriname is then presented with policy jargon that does not always match local reality.
This does not mean that international cooperation should be rejected. Cross-border crime, cyber attacks, drug trafficking and maritime risks indeed require regional and international cooperation. But cooperation must not degenerate into dependence.
When foreign states or security services determine which threats are given priority, which information is shared and which resources become available, there is a danger that Suriname will be treated mainly as a security buffer for other people’s interests. Is this a colonial legacy in 2026?
Strategic autonomy therefore does not mean isolation, but the ability to determine for yourself what national interests are. A small country can form partnerships without outsourcing its own judgment.
1. The first pragmatic solution is simple but politically inconvenient: every conference must end with a public implementation document. No general final statement, but an action plan with concrete measures, responsible authorities, budgets and deadlines.
For example:
- publish a national risk register within six months;
- designate one coordinating body per security threat;
- establish a legal framework for information exchange;
- report annually on progress;
- organize parliamentary control and independent evaluation.
It must be made clear what information must remain secret and what information society is allowed to know. National security is not a license for administrative secrecy. Unsupervised secrecy actually increases the risk of abuse of power, political profiling and violation of fundamental rights.
2. The second solution is a permanent national security platform that includes not only security services, but also experts from public health, climate science, economics, food supply, digital technology, human rights and local communities. After all, threats do not arise in separate policy tubes. A cyber attack can affect the energy supply; an economic crisis can increase crime; climate change can cause migration and social tensions.
But integral cooperation must also be truly integral. It is not enough to put the same people in the same room. There must be joint procedures, shared data sources, clear powers and joint exercises. Otherwise, “silos” will continue to exist, even if the word collaboration is used a hundred times.
3. The third solution concerns trust. Police, defense, justice, intelligence services and civilian institutions do not automatically share information because a conference recommends it. Trust is created by legal certainty, professional standards, mutual control and demonstrable integrity. Trust is not a slogan.
It is therefore necessary to establish protocols about what information is shared, who has access, how data is protected and who is liable in the event of misuse. Whistleblower protection and independent complaints mechanisms are also indispensable. A society that wants to strengthen security must not simultaneously create a climate in which citizens, journalists or officials are afraid to report abuses.
Finally, the government must avoid the temptation to call every policy initiative strategic. A government does not demonstrate its strategy through words, but through consistent behavior. It makes priorities visible in the budget, appoints competent people, sanctions failures and provides accountability.
Suriname has no shortage of conferences, policy papers or strong formulations. The country lacks institutional continuity, implementation discipline and political courage. The real challenge is therefore not to formulate yet another strategy, but to finally determine which existing strategies are being implemented, which have failed and who is responsible for them.
A national security conference can be valuable. But only when the recommendations leave the Congress Hall and become visible in legislation, budgets, training, crisis plans and protection of citizens, can we speak of strategic action. Until then, we must be cautious with the word strategic. Because if everything is called strategic, ultimately nothing threatens to be truly strategic anymore.
Colvin Overdiep (Criminologist/Autonomous thinker)
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