By Almahdi Hindi, political activist
The remarks made by the British ambassador to Libya, Martin Reynolds, regarding the “encouraging indicators” in Libya were not merely a passing diplomatic statement. Rather, they reflected a noticeable shift in how major capitals are beginning to view the Libyan file. The approval of the country’s first unified budget after more than thirteen years of division was understood not only as a financial step, but also as a political signal pointing toward an attempt to restore at least the minimum idea of a functioning state and unified institutions.
What is particularly striking is that even the British themselves have begun speaking about Libya in a more optimistic tone — a tone that has been largely absent in recent years, especially amid emerging signs related to unifying public spending and financial institutions.
For years, the international community remained preoccupied with questions of legitimacy, elections, and power-sharing. Yet the Libyan experience has shown that politics alone is insufficient to create stability. Every settlement that ignored the economy and the management of resources proved fragile, quickly stumbling at the first political or security crisis.
Today, however, a different approach appears to be quietly taking shape. Instead of focusing entirely on complex political tracks, attention is increasingly shifting toward practical matters: public expenditure, the management of the Central Bank, institutional unification, and the regulation of resource distribution. It is as though the priority has become creating a minimum level of institutional stability before moving toward major political settlements.
In this context, the unified budget no longer appears to be merely a collection of figures and spending items, but rather an attempt to reorganize the relationship between Libyan institutions after years of financial and administrative fragmentation. It also reflects an implicit recognition that the continued existence of multiple financial decision-making centers has been one of the key drivers behind the deepening of the crisis and the depletion of state resources.
What is also notable is that this shift is not confined to Libya’s internal dynamics alone. It extends to the European approach toward the crisis. The European Union’s announcement of an expanded partnership with Libya’s Development and Reconstruction Fund in the eastern region, alongside engagement in infrastructure, border management, and port-related projects, suggests that Europe is becoming increasingly inclined to deal with realities on the ground rather than waiting indefinitely for a comprehensive political settlement that may take years to materialize.
There is a growing awareness among Europeans that Libya’s stability is directly tied to Mediterranean security, energy interests, and migration concerns. As a result, economic and service-related issues have increasingly become intertwined with broader security and political calculations.
Over recent months, it has become evident that the economy and security in Libya are no longer treated as separate files. Discussions about protecting oil fields, stabilizing the Libyan dinar, or controlling public spending have become part of the broader equation of political stability itself. Perhaps for the first time in years, the economy is being viewed as a primary gateway to security, rather than merely a separate technical issue.
Despite this, it would be premature to suggest that the road ahead has become easy. Political divisions, overlapping spheres of influence, and the continued presence of weapons outside state institutions all remain factors capable of obstructing any progress. What has truly changed, however, is the order of priorities. After years in which discussions revolved almost exclusively around elections, the focus has now shifted toward strengthening institutions, improving services, and restoring a minimum level of financial governance.
This is why terms such as “financial discipline,” “reconstruction,” and “border security” are increasingly appearing in international discussions as essential elements for preventing a return to chaos. Experience has shown that economic collapse and the absence of development may pose an even greater threat to state stability than armed confrontations themselves.
Ultimately, the central question is no longer simply: When will the politicians reach an agreement?
Perhaps the more important question has become: Can the state gradually build a degree of stability through the economy, reconstruction, and institutions, even before a full political settlement is achieved?
In a country exhausted by division and conflict, the budget may no longer be just a financial document, but rather the beginning of a real test for the very idea of the state itself.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the writer, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Libya Observer
