Al-Quds newspaper

Questions have been rising recently about the future of the hierarchy of power in Iran, especially with the frequency of reports about the health condition of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. These questions go beyond the personal dimension and touch upon the essence of the position of ‘Revolutionary Guide’ and his pivotal role in formulating the country’s supreme strategies, at a time when Tehran is facing increasing international pressure.

The position of Supreme Leader is not just a passing political function, but rather an entity formulated according to complex religious requirements that are consistent with the doctrine of the Awaited Mahdi in Imami Shiite thought. Although this position represents the highest authority in the country, the structure of the Iranian regime is characterized by an institutional interconnection that may absorb the shock of the absence of any figure, regardless of his weight.

Historically, the problem of governance among Shiites began with the ‘Great Occultation’ in 941 AD, when a vacuum arose in political and religious leadership. In the beginning, the idea of ​​delegation was limited to minor religious and social affairs, while major powers and the establishment of the state remained exclusive to the awaited imam according to the traditional perspective.

The Safavid period witnessed a fundamental transformation, as jurists began to tend towards accepting the legitimacy of the existing authority as a de facto position to serve the sect. The investigator al-Sabzwari in the seventeenth century represented this trend, emphasizing the legitimacy of political authority other than the imam, which marked the beginning of a separation between temporal and religious authorities.

The theory of public prosecution was developed in the sixteenth century by the second investigator, who was given a mandate to rule as the ‘deputy imam’. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, jurists such as Ahmad al-Naraqi called for jurists to take charge directly under the name of the ‘Grand Imamate’, rejecting the idea of ​​passive waiting.

On the other hand, Iran witnessed the beginning of the twentieth century ‘Conditional Revolution’, which demanded an end to royal tyranny and the establishment of the rule of law. This revolution represented a break with traditional Imami thought, as it called for the necessity of having a constitution that governs the relationship between the ruler and the ruled, away from absolute divine mandate.

The scholar Muhammad Hussein Al-Naini emerged as one of the most important theorists of the constitutional state, considering that power must be entrusted to the people and not individual ownership. Al-Naini warned that the absence of ‘infallibility’ from the jurist makes the concentration of power in his hands a gateway to injustice, suggesting that the constitution be an alternative to the infallibility of the absent imam.

Despite these liberal ideas, the absolute guardianship of the jurist movement resurfaced in the 1960s under the leadership of Khomeini, who argued that the jurist had all the powers of the infallible imam. With the success of the revolution in 1979, this theory was constitutionally codified, so that the final say on state affairs was in the hands of the Supreme Leader.

The Iranian regime has created a unique combination of absolute jurisdiction and democratic mechanisms such as electing Parliament and the President of the Republic. However, these institutions ultimately remain subject to the supervision of the Leader and the Assembly of Experts, ensuring that strategic decision-making remains within the narrow religious circle.

This model has faced serious challenges in recent decades, manifested in waves of massive popular protests that shook the foundations of the regime. Despite the severe repression these movements were subjected to in 2009 and 2022, the roots of popular discontent remained dormant, waiting for the moment of explosion.

Current political readings indicate that Iran is experiencing a state of suppressed tension due to the decline of its regional influence and the economic consequences of wars. Observers believe that the end of the current military crises may open the door to a popular explosion that is not satisfied with living demands, but rather demands a radical change in the structure of the regime.

Historical experiences confirm that military defeats or existential crises often lead to the downfall of major ideological narratives. In the Iranian case, the erosion of the legitimacy of the ‘Guardianship of the Jurist’ in the face of a young generation aspiring to citizenship and the law may hasten the end of this unique model of governance.

The conflict between the constitutional state and the religious state still exists in the Iranian political conscience, and it is a conflict fueled by successive crises. As the gap grows between the aspirations of the people and the intransigence of the ruling establishment, the regime appears to be approaching a historic crossroads that will determine the fate of the country for decades to come.

In conclusion, the Guardianship of the Jurist remains a controversial political experience that combined religious holiness and political pragmatism at the same time. While the ruling elites are trying to preserve their gains, the question remains about this regime’s ability to withstand the winds of change that are blowing across the region and within Iran.