Within its tutelage, the White House has imposed a transition strategy that is articulated in a gradual and flexible roadmap of three stages: stabilization, recovery and transition. In it, democratization was subordinated first to the achievement of internal political control and to the geopolitical objectives of USA and then to economic reactivation, with preferential access for American companies to the Venezuelan market.
The White House’s strategy for political change does not aim at an abrupt dismantling of the Chavista model, but rather at a progressive reform promoted from within the regime itself, with Delcy Rodriguez at the helm as an operational figure under the direct supervision of Washington.
Until June 2026, the process of political change in the country has been advancing through direct conversations between representatives of the White House and Miraflores, around verifiable goals defined by Washington and agreed upon with the interim. As the Secretary of State has warned, Marco Rubiofailure to comply with these commitments could lead to economic and political consequences, and even reopen the possibility of the use of force.
These bilateral conversations have been markedly opaque, outside public scrutiny and without the Venezuelan people knowing precisely the scope of the goals and commitments assumed in their name by the interim. Some of these agreements have led to legal reform projects automatically sanctioned by a National Assembly, totally controlled by the ruling party and lacking legitimacy, both nationally and internationally.
This dynamic has just been altered with the formal incorporation of the representation of the National Assembly elected in 2015 (AN 2015), headed by its president Dinorah Figuera, as a third actor within the US strategy of political change for Venezuela. This turn raises questions about what could have motivated it and what its real scope will be.
The questions that the bilateral scheme could not answer
Although in early February of this year, the White House—including trump and Rubio—gave some indications that the strategy of political change in Venezuela could incorporate representatives of the democratic oppositionthe truth is that this intention did not materialize, nor were explanations offered as to why no progress was made in that direction. Instead, the bilateral scheme between the White House and Miraflores was maintained.
However, the development of this strategy has generated, in recent months, questions and pressures that the bilateral scheme has not been able to respond to satisfactorily and that could explain the current turn of the Trump administration. Among them stand out: the growing distrust within Venezuela about whether the process was really moving towards a democratic transition or towards normalization of postmaturism; the demand from sectors of US politics for a clear route to the elections in Venezuela; and the persistent legal uncertainty in the country that holds back American investors.
The first question arises within Venezuela. While Trump publicly expresses his satisfaction with the performance of Delcy Rodríguez as head of the interim office, the questioning of her legitimacy as the person in charge of the Presidency has grown in the country, a position that, according to the Constitution, has a maximum term of 180 days and expires on July 3. Delcy Rodríguez does not have her own electoral mandate. His position derives from the appointment of an illegitimate president, and ultimately, from American tutelage.
Added to this are discontent with the results of his administration and high distrust in his conduct of a democratic transition process that has not met the expectations of Venezuelans. This rejection has translated into growing social conflict, in citizen demands for the end of the interim term and in the demand to call elections.
The second question comes from US domestic politics. In his appearances before the United States Congress, Rubio has had to face the demands of legislators who complain of a lack of clear deadlines, political openness, verifiable progress and a concrete electoral route for Venezuela.
These claims have been recently ratified through a joint communication, dated June 8, signed by Senator Jeanne Shaheen and Representative Gregory W. Meeks, Democratic leaders of the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs committees, respectively. In it they demand a detailed explanation of the policy towards Venezuela, as well as a specific strategy to ensure that the political change in the country results in a democratic transition real and not a continuity of authoritarianism.
The third question comes from the world of North American investors. For any company willing to commit to Venezuela in the long term, the initial question is: who has legitimacy to sign on behalf of the Venezuelan State? Washington has attempted to respond to this question through administrative means: it lifted personal sanctions on Rodríguez, treated her as a Venezuelan authority in litigation within the United States, allowed her to reestablish ties with Western banks, and facilitated her readmission into the United States. IMF.
However, although these efforts by Washington give Rodríguez some functional authority in the international system and have reduced some of the immediate risk for investors, they have not dispelled the underlying doubts. Analysts warn that the agreements signed by an interim government without democratic origin, as well as the legal reforms sanctioned by a National Assembly whose legitimacy has been questioned even by the North American government itself, could be questioned by future Venezuelan administrations.
What changes with the incorporation of the AN in 2015?
By formally introducing the representation of the AN 2015 within its strategy of political change for Venezuela, the White House attempts to offer an answer to one of the fundamental questions that the bilateral scheme could not answer: the absence within that scheme of an institutional actor that would represent the interests of Venezuelans with democratic legitimacy.
Although it is still too early to evaluate the real scope of this change, among other reasons because opacity persists and the information available is very general, it is possible, based on the official statements of the actors involved, to identify some relevant aspects.
From their coincidences it is clear that the parties preliminarily agreed on a work format for the discussions: a technical table of a political nature, with a balanced composition, in charge of defining a work agenda with milestones and schedules, oriented towards a democratic transition of the country (although the official statement refers to this objective as “the strengthening of democracy”).
Regarding the specific topics to be discussed, the AN 2015 establishes specific priorities—among them the strengthening of the CNE, the restitution of political parties and guarantees for all political actors, priorities that are also included in the State Department’s statement— while the ruling party’s text is deliberately generic, avoiding publicly committing to any specific objective at this time. One aspect that the statements do not specify is whether the support of the United States in these discussions implies a formal presence at the technical table or only external support.
The incorporation of the AN 2015 representation constitutes an implicit recognition by Washington that the bilateral scheme followed until now was insufficient to provide legitimacy to the process of political change in Venezuela.
With the redesign, an institutional space is opened so that the demands and interests of Venezuelans are represented in the discussion on the worksheet. route to democracycontributes to reducing the opacity of the process, and introduces an additional element of control over the continuous drift of postmaturity. It remains to be seen whether this shift will translate into verifiable progress towards free elections and a true transfer of power, or whether, on the contrary, it will end up legitimizing a reformed authoritarianism under the tutelage of Washington.
