The government must urgently use the promises from the Summit in Tivat and ask the members of the Union to double the resources of the European Commission for the Montenegrin portfolio. At the same time, drastically better quality acts must be sent to Brussels, in order to end the months-long administrative “ping-pong” that slows down the closing of chapters. Montenegro’s problem is not the lack of political support from the EU, but the inability to turn that favorable momentum into measurable results. The current political dynamics are not conducive to the finalization of negotiations, and there is a lack of internal unity and a serious focus on the commitments undertaken.
That is, in an interview with Victoryassessed Dina Bajramspahić, political scientist and civil activist. She says that, taking into account the fact that elections are next year, “the deadline for the completion of negotiations is no longer a political slogan but a test of the state’s institutional capacity.”
When it comes to the demands from the platform, which was offered to the government by a part of the opposition parties, Bajramspahić says that they are in the public interest and that they are monitoring the reforms that the government is postponing or delaying.
“There are no party interests in them, because they benefit everyone, and a few items mostly benefit the Europe Now Movement itself,” Bajramspahić points out.
An example, she states, is the suppression of abuse of state resources for electoral purposes.
“That institutional advantage is currently being usurped by other parties in power, mostly to the detriment of PES, while the opposition’s electorate is stable,” says the interviewee of Pobjeda.
However, as Bajramspahić points out, PES shows short-sightedness and the inability to think strategically about even its own development, let alone the state interests for which it has assumed responsibility, and which it is unable to deliver.
In the conclusion of the conversation, Bajramspahić states that the demands of the opposition and the ongoing reforms are interrelated processes, and that without a political agreement some reforms will not be adopted in the Parliament, and without implemented reforms there will be no closing of chapters.
The government and the negotiating team continue to insist that all negotiating chapters be closed by the end of this year. How realistic is that deadline today, taking into account the remaining obligations and the need for the agreement of all the member states of the European Union?
BAJRAMSPAHIC: The summit in Tivat was a great success for the state and encouragement for the completion of the negotiations. The key challenge is to translate the chance, which is real, into realistic results. There is a gap between declarative statements and the practical situation on the ground. Negotiations have slowed down to the limit. The fact is that this year, so far, is very unsuccessful when it comes to closing the negotiation chapters. We wasted the first six months, during which we closed only two chapters, in a most unreasonable manner. The announcements are that we will close only two more during June, a maximum of four. We have a whopping 15 to 17 chapters left until the end of the year.
It just doesn’t seem realistic that we will succeed. It is no longer a question of political will but of administrative feasibility. The goal is not unattainable, but its realization requires a significant acceleration of dynamics both in Montenegro and in the EU institutions during the coming months.
It is a well-founded concern and needs the careful attention of all who want to see Montenegro as a full member of the EU. The pace is unsatisfactory both on the part of Montenegro and in Brussels, where the formal and essential fulfillment of obligations for closing the chapter is being evaluated very slowly.
Referring to the promises from the Tivat Summit, the Government should urgently send an initiative to the member states and the highest bodies of the EU and ask that the European Commission’s resources on the Montenegrin portfolio be doubled in order to help Montenegro meet the set pace. At the same time, the quality of the acts that the Government sends to Brussels should be drastically better, so that time is not wasted on months-long ping-pong, which slows down the closing of chapters. Today, Montenegro is not faced with a lack of political support from the European Union. On the contrary, the problem is primarily in converting the favorable political momentum into measurable results on the ground. The current political dynamics in the country do not favor the finalization of negotiations. Greater unity and a more serious focus on obligations is needed, which is lacking. It is necessary to close as many chapters as possible this year, because next year parliamentary and local elections are in one day. The dirty campaign is already gaining momentum and there is no doubt that everything will get quite complicated. The deadline for the completion of negotiations is no longer a political slogan but a test of the state’s institutional capacity. If we fail to take advantage of the next six months, there is a real risk that the European agenda becomes hostage to the pre-election campaign, which would lead to uncertainty about the finalization of the negotiations.
How much does the opposition platform represent a real attempt at political consensus on the European agenda, and how much pressure on the ruling coalition to accept certain rules of the game before the continuation of negotiations on key reforms?
BAJRAMSPAHIC: The platform of the opposition is the only attempt to solve the political crisis that realistically threatens the European integration process of Montenegro. We don’t have a better one, and the problem is pressing. The ruling majority, for its part, has not offered another platform, nor does it show that it understands the seriousness of the situation. By doing so, she showed her scope and lack of political responsibility. The government is the main bearer of responsibility for capital processes, not the opposition, while it is extremely legitimate for the opposition in every country to submit requests to the government. The opposition should deliver demands continuously and put pressure on the government to be better. That’s her job. I would even say that the list of demands had to be more ambitious and daring.
All the demands listed in the platform are in the public interest and in line with ongoing reforms that are being postponed or delayed. Nothing was requested that would be in the particular interest of any party or individual. On the contrary, what is on the list of demands is in the interest of the opposition party and independent MPs who did not participate in the creation of the platform. Moreover, several items on the list are particularly in the interest of PES. For example, the suppression of misuse of state resources for electoral purposes, because the institutional advantage, which is massively usurped by parties in power, is mostly to the detriment of PES. The parties of the majority cannot harm the opposition’s large but stable electorate even through abuses. The spillover is happening within the ruling majority and mostly to the detriment of PES. However, PES is short-sighted to consider the development of its own party, let alone the strategic state interests, for which it has formally assumed responsibility. Not ready or able to deliver results.
The democratic government has the obligation to be in constant communication with the opposition and to search for the best solutions on all issues. This should be her manner throughout her mandate, and we see how this attempt to ensure that the government does not just exercise its will, ignoring the objections of the opposition and civil society, is going well.
The adoption of constitutional amendments and European laws directly depends on the resolution of the political crisis, and the government has the primary responsibility to find a solution to bring the accession negotiations to an end. If they don’t have a solution and this is the end of their potential, they should admit and take responsibility. The time that the state cannot afford is wasted unnecessarily.
Dialogue does not mean automatic acceptance of every demand of the opposition. But in a democratic system there is an obligation to seriously discuss such proposals, especially when they relate to relevant issues already recognized as controversial in European and other international reports. Many of the demands of the opposition should be a practice that will be valid permanently, as a “gentleman’s agreement” between each government and each opposition. The biggest danger is not that the government and the opposition do not agree. The problem arises when the political conflict becomes more important than the state goals on which there should be a minimum agreement.
If the ruling majority accepts the demands from the platform related to the electoral legislation, the security sector and appointments to the judiciary, could this speed up the closing of the negotiation chapters or are the biggest obstacles still in the implementation of reforms and not in the political dialogue?
BAJRAMSPAHIC: Fulfilling the demands from the platform would favor the democratization and Europeanization of Montenegro and give momentum to the conclusion of the negotiations. The EU, above all, wants to see a mature approach of all political actors and the capacity to negotiate and solve complex issues. Instead, we see a classic Balkan inversion.
By rejecting the demands of the opposition outright, the government shows that it is not working on reforms that are certainly its obligation within the accession negotiations. Here is an exact example. It is reported in the media that one of the key obstacles to an agreement is the opposition’s request to amend controversial laws from the security sector. However, changes to the Law on Internal Affairs are already an accepted obligation in the dialogue with the EU, which is already seriously delayed. Without the fulfillment of this specific reform, it will not be possible to close Chapter 23, which refers to the judiciary and fundamental rights.
Can you clarify that? What exactly does this change in the law mean and where did it get stuck?
BAJRAMSPAHIC: The state has undertaken as an obligation to implement eight Operational Conclusions that should be fulfilled by the end of the third quarter of this year, as part of the criteria for closing Chapter 23 in the field of public administration reform. The fourth conclusion refers precisely to changes to the Law on Internal Affairs in order to “re-establish centralized employment in this area”. The aforementioned reform should prevent further mass employment under special procedures beyond the Law on Civil Servants and State Employees and beyond the Human Resources Administration. Since the updated version of the Law on Internal Affairs has not yet been put into procedure, it follows that by the end of the third quarter we will not have a functional centralized employment system in the MUP. In other words, the government is not making full efforts to close Chapter 23, but is refusing to implement formal obligations.
Also, it is worth reminding that both the Law on Internal Affairs and the Law on the National Security Agency must be harmonized with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in order to complete the negotiations. The stated obligation also falls under Chapter 23, the fundamental rights segment. The authorities’ public promises were that harmonization with personal data protection standards would be ready by June so that the improved versions of the law would enter into force before the deadlines for the evaluation of the implemented reforms expire, on the basis of which the EU will assess whether Montenegro has fulfilled the obligations in Chapters 23 and 24.
Despite all of the above, although the obligations have already been taken to correct the mistakes made and return the laws to their original state, we hear a decisive refusal to accept the opposition’s demands to amend the said laws. The damage is multiple. Due to non-fulfilment of the obligations in Chapter 23, we will not close this chapter, while on the other hand, constitutional changes that have the potential to sink the entire negotiations and the closure of all other chapters that depend on the adoption of European laws in the Parliament have been called into question.
The demands of the opposition and the ongoing reforms are interrelated processes. Without a political agreement, some reforms will not be able to be adopted in the Parliament, and without the implemented reforms, there will be no closing of chapters. Today, Montenegro has political capital in Brussels that no one in the region has. The paradox is that our biggest obstacle is no longer European institutions, but the ability to organize and implement at home what we have promised ourselves.
