Rise of China viewed through the lens of the “three worlds” nexus sheds light on the changing global political economy
China’s rise and its impact on global politics and economics have undergone profound changes since the late 20th century. Different frameworks can be applied to explain the stratification of global power, including today’s global power relations shaped by the competition between China and the United States. Three distinct yet historically interconnected articulations of the “three worlds” paradigm can be identified: the political “three worlds” framework advanced by Chairman Mao Zedong in the early 1970s; the economic “three worlds” stratification developed by US sociologist and historian Immanuel Wallerstein around the same time; and a contemporary “three worlds” configuration marked by strategic China-US rivalry, the constrained position of Europe and other middle powers, and the evolving role of the Global South.
These “three worlds” concepts should not be understood as sequential replacements of one another, but rather as interconnected analytical lenses — political, economic and technological, each illuminating a different dimension of the world system. Together, they underscore the extent to which China’s political and economic trajectory since 1949 has reconfigured the architecture of global politics and economics.
In the early 1970s, at the height of the Cold War, Chairman Mao advanced the theory of the “differentiation of the three worlds”. It was a distinctly geopolitical framework, reflecting the dynamics of bipolar confrontation. It classified states according to political alignment and their position in global power struggles. In Chairman Mao’s formulation, the first world consisted of the two superpowers — the US and the Soviet Union — both characterized as rival hegemonic and imperialist powers competing for global dominance. The second world encompassed the industrialized US allies, such as Western European countries and Japan, which, despite their economic strength, lacked independent influence in the bipolar order and were perceived as potential partners in resisting hegemonic domination on some issues.
The third world included most developing countries across Asia, Africa and Latin America, many of which had newly achieved independence and were associated with the Non-Aligned Movement. Chairman Mao positioned the third world as the principal force of global revolution, emphasizing its central role in opposing imperialism and safeguarding national sovereignty, while China sought to play a leading and mobilizing role within it.
After launching reform and opening-up in the late 1970s, China became embedded in a different configuration of global power stratification, as conceptualized by Immanuel Wallerstein’s World-Systems Theory. Rather than classifying state power according to political alignment, this framework analyzes the world economy as a single historical system structured by unequal exchange and hierarchical divisions of labor.
Within this model, the world economy is organized into three structural zones: core, semi-periphery and periphery. Core zones command advanced technologies, financial resources and high value-added industries. Peripheral zones are largely relegated to the provision of raw materials and low-cost labor under conditions of structural dependency. Semi-periphery zones occupy an intermediate, transitional position within this hierarchy.
China’s economic ascent since the new millennium can be interpreted as a dynamic upward progression through the stratified layers of the world economic system. China progressively incorporated itself into the world economy, emerging as a central destination for foreign direct investment and the relocation of labor-intensive manufacturing.
By leveraging its vast labor reserves and integrating into global value chains, China rapidly expanded its industrial base, export capacity and technological capabilities. Its development trajectory illustrates how participation in global production networks can support upward mobility of a nation within the world system, enabling the accumulation of industrial expertise, technological knowledge and competitive export strength.
However, structural barriers to upward mobility remain significant. Advanced technology, financial power and institutional influence are concentrated in the core Western economies, constraining the potential of late-industrializing states. Even when emerging states have industrialized successfully, they often remain dependent on external markets, foreign technologies and global financial systems. China’s rise challenges this pattern.
Over recent decades, China has become the world’s largest manufacturing hub and an indispensable node in global supply chains, while also developing strong capabilities in infrastructure, digital technologies and advanced high-tech industries. Widely regarded as a major non-Western economy to have significantly risen from peripheral and semi-peripheral status and taken a substantial share of the core economic sectors, China is reshaping the global balance of power and producing a new configuration of strategic competition.
Today, global economic and technological rivalry has increasingly centered on the US and China. This shift signals a partial evolution beyond the traditional core-semi-periphery-periphery framework toward a more concentrated configuration of global power.
The US continues to dominate global finance, high-technology innovation and military alliances. Its financial institutions, currency system and research networks remain central to the architecture of the world economy. China, by contrast, has developed an unparalleled manufacturing ecosystem with extensive logistics networks and large-scale infrastructure capabilities. Competition between these two countries increasingly shapes the trajectory of the international system. Trade regimes, technological development, digital infrastructure and energy transitions are all influenced by their strategic rivalry. As a result, the contemporary world economy is often characterized as a dual-core structure, with the US and China occupying dominant positions within the global hierarchy.
Beneath this dual core lies a group of advanced economies often described as “middle powers”, including most members of the European Union, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom. Although these states possess sophisticated industries and high levels of development, their technological capacity and political leverage to shape the trajectory of global competition remain limited.
The structural constraint facing middle powers stems from their deep integration into both systems. Many remain embedded in US-centered financial infrastructure and security alliances, while simultaneously maintaining strong economic ties to Chinese supply chains and trade networks.
At the same time, the Global South is gaining new opportunities within this evolving order. Countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America are gaining more bargaining power and leveraging great-power competition to attract investment, infrastructure financing and technological cooperation, as well as supply chain diversification. Many Global South economies control critical raw materials, and rising demand for these resources is increasing their geopolitical and economic importance.
In recent years, de-risking strategies, tariffs and trade restrictions led by the US and its allies have encouraged China to deepen its engagement with developing countries. As a result, trade between China and other Global South countries has expanded rapidly. Chinese exports to other Global South countries now exceed $1.6 trillion, accounting for around 44 percent of its total exports. For the Global South, China represents not only an inspiring model of development but also a source of upward mobility, enlarging their room for maneuver while providing an alternative source of investment and serving as a significant trading partner. This, in turn, broadens the range of economic opportunities and reduces exclusive dependence on traditional Western economies.
In conclusion, China’s rise is inseparable from its shifting position across different “three worlds” configurations over time — from Chairman Mao’s geopolitical conception of the “three worlds” to Wallerstein’s world economic stratification, and finally to the contemporary geo-technological configuration. The evolution of the “three worlds” nexus thus provides not only a framework for interpreting China’s development trajectory, but also a lens for understanding the ongoing transformation of the global political economy.
The author is a Yunshan leading scholar and the director of the European Research Center at Guangdong Institute for International Strategies at Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, and an adjunct professor of international relations at Aalborg University in Denmark.
The author contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.
Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.
