He fujimorism It has been consolidated as the political expression of our establishment. Although during the campaign several of his agents distrusted that Keiko Fujimori could emerge from the streak of electoral defeats, we can say that, currently, the economic elites are satisfied with the security and stability that this government offers in terms of economic direction. Popular Force (FP) is not a wayward right that can cloud the business climate; nor a “cowardly right” that steps on the caviar stick and assumes some progressive themes. Orange pragmatism has a limit when it comes to defending the 1993 Constitution and the respective economic chapter. More than neoliberals, they are Fujimorists, in the foundational sense that that identity has.
To govern, Keiko Fujimori has tested a coalition that represents the best of that pro-establishment right: conservative lawyers (expepecistas), “young Turks” (former young people, in reality, although immature as in the past), political operators without a party (but with desire). The technicians are rented, said Luis Bedoya Reyes, because the right has been unable to generate its own quarry of technopolises, perhaps from the SODE founded by Manuel Moreyra and Raúl Salazar in the eighties (at the time two partners of the same consulting firm from which the current head of the MEF comes). As you can see, it is a short alliance, a team without a bank, a ‘remake’ without surprise.
Illustration: Víctor Aguilar Rúa
Having the establishment happy and full of joy is not enough. Since García II, the political conditions had not existed to govern as the elites wanted: the Executive in tune with the business community and with a legislative arm. García II believes, erroneously, that this is enough. Keiko Fujimori’s government is, above all, a new possibility for the economic establishment to legitimize itself socially, to have roots and long duration, so that there are no more shocks every five years. But from what we have seen in the first 100 days of Fujimori’s return to power, the government is very alone politically and socially. And this five years could become a new failure of our elites.
Politically, Fuerza Popular is a parliamentary party. A composition of congressmen, advisors, office officials, where there is a political career, shared institutional culture and high doses of loyalty to the shirt. Throughout the years of legislative bustle (uninterrupted since 2006), Fujimorism has deployed a network of links with social organizations and local economic centers, in many cases corresponding to their electoral districts, rather than to large national business. That explains his populist background at the congressional level (remember votes in favor of withdrawals from AFP and extensions of Reinfo, for example). Now as a government, we will see if the Fujimoriism of Plaza Bolívar really aligns with that of Plaza Mayor. In any case, we are very far from that political machinery that crossed levels of government with ease. FP was barely able to win two provincial mayoralties (out of almost 200), 35 districts (out of almost 2,000). They are going to a single regional second round, in Lambayeque. His candidate for mayor in Lima (his stronghold?) did not reach 3% of the valid votes. Those who maintain that they have a clientelist apparatus as their axis are left with impressions from the nineties.
In social terms, FP is a brand with antibodies. A chronic citizen distrust has been established with the political class, in general, and with Fujimorism, in particular. His discredit has alienated potential collaborators from the Executive; Without political machinery to solve people’s problems, they also distanced themselves. Then Fujimori began to lose social touch, both with its former specialty (the informal world) and with the symbolic rival of the establishment (the Andean south). This explains the brief honeymoon and a reality in which presidential approval only exceeds disapproval in the NSE A. The president has tried to close the gap that separates her from the country with an intense travel schedule throughout the territory and with five ‘lives’ on virtual social networks (207 minutes in total). It seems that it is not enough.
The problem with Fujimorism is not its supposed authoritarian vocation, but its lack of social connection. There is no political project without followers, without conquering the minds and hearts of ordinary people. This cannot be achieved either with useless cultural battles (which only excite Dasso’s Trumpists) or hackneyed communication strategies. The recipe is very simple: bring the State to the people who need social protection (those at the bottom) and not exclusively to those who demand legal stability (those at the top). But not only incidentally (in the event of a catastrophe or emergency), but permanently; with narratives that mark a horizon and do not focus on blaming the past. Don’t we Peruvians know the caliber of the disaster that is the state service that we historically suffer?
The success of the current government (and the establishment) will depend on reconnecting the State with the people. Paradoxically, those who most influence the current administration are our Creole liberals, bearers of ideological ideas that stigmatize the State (confusing it with statism) and that serve to polarize social networks and play mileism. We need a functional State without falling into the social democratic temptation inapplicable to Latin America, nor into the libertarian fantasy. Time is of the essence because a ‘momentum’ of irreversible breakdown of popular trust could take shape, when cases of frivolity, inefficiency and corruption – common to any government – end up marking the public agenda.
*El Comercio opens its pages to the exchange of ideas and reflections. In this plural framework, the Diario does not necessarily agree with the opinions of the columnists who sign them, although it always respects them.
