Whatever decision Kosovo takes regarding the offer for LNG gas, its energy policy is without gas already strategically linked to the US
1.
Three things seem pretty clear to me from the beginning of the debate regarding the need or not to connect Kosovo to any network that would bring American LNG gas. The first is that the decision for or against would not save Kosovo from Russian dependence on gas. Unlike Germany, Slovakia, Hungary or Serbia, Kosovo has not bought gas from Russia and its economy and households do not use gas, so the purchase or not of American gas will not change anything in Kosovo’s energy security vis-à-vis Russia. In other words, Kosovo has no energy dependence on Russia, so there is no way to become independent. The second, therefore, is that since Kosovo has no infrastructure and tradition for the use of gas, the purchase or not of American gas is not about loyalty or not to the USA, but it is about a strategic decision for the development of the energy sector as part of the overall economic development. And third, and in line with the first two points, strategic decisions have long-term consequences, need comprehensive study and transcend the daily political fights, especially those that will reduce the entire debate to the shallowness of declaring orthodoxy: who is for gas and America and who is against gas and America.
Raising a loud voice in the debate does not raise the value of the arguments. These days, unfortunately, there is much noise, little argument.
2.
So, since we absolved that the issue of gas is not in this case geopolitical for Kosovo (the purchase of American gas to replace Russian gas), it is therefore not a matter of strategic partnership either.
The purchase of LNG gas is the purchase of a product mediated by an American company and is not the purchase of a certificate in which it is written that you are a strategic partner of the United States of America. In analogy, the one who buys the “Tesla” car has not bought the status of a partner of the USA, but a product manufactured in that country.
This does not mean that the issue does not have a geopolitical dimension. For Kosovo, geopolitics is not liberation from Russian dependence, because it does not exist. Geopolitics is choosing its position in the new energy architecture of the Balkans and Southeast Europe, in which the US is building new supply corridors, while Europe is looking for new paths of electrification and energy flexibility.
But, nevertheless, here are three more things that seem clear to me, as clear as they can be to a man who is not professionally connected with the subject, but has spent considerable time reading about the problem.
First, whatever decision Kosovo will take regarding the offer for LNG gas, its energy policy is without the gas already strategically linked to the USA. Kosovo has requested that the existing thermal power plants be restored with American technology and the coal gasification project. The latter could be one of the most serious industrial projects in the history of Kosovo, if its economic and technological feasibility is proven. State-of-the-art American technology can use Kosovo coal not only for synthetic gas, but for chemical industry, ammonia, methanol and even hydrogen, transforming lignite from fuel to industrial raw material.
Second, the decision on LNG is a strategic decision. The gas supply contract is typically for at least twenty years, and Kosovo should see itself as a consumer of gas at least until the middle of the century. Even if the decisions for LNG or gasification were taken on the first day of the work of the Assembly of Kosovo, the construction of the plants would exceed the time mandate of this legislature and a large part of the future legislature, namely the two American presidential mandates. So, even if the gap of the debate for or against America is left aside, the strategic decision requires a more in-depth debate than calling for an emergency (the window of opportunity will be closed) or speculative assessment (it is better to have gas than not).
And third, this debate does not take place on immovable ground. The USA has designed with Kosovo one way of its energy diversification with the MCC project and the donation of the battery system that should store the energy collected from renewable sources. This project can be seen as the forerunner of a new energy paradigm: not just adding production capacities, but creating a flexible system where batteries, renewable sources and small family producers (“prosumers”) become an active part of energy security
3.
And, in the course of all those things that seemed clear to me above, here are three more.
The first is that whatever decision Kosovo has to take will have to be measured against the future. Energy, like everything else, is changing dramatically and the decisions that are made must be made in this context. So, if Kosovo has not yet created dependence on gas, the technology of the second half of the 20th century, should the plants of the past be built for the energy of the future?
The second is that any decision should take conceptual analogical examples of technological challenges. Estonia, upon independence, made a conscious technological leap to modernize the administration, and created e-government. Some African countries, faced with the challenge of extending telephone cables, decided to switch to mobile technology. Bulgaria, dependent on Russian gas at the beginning of the Ukraine war, decided to create a favorable environment for solar energy, quintupling its capacity within a very short period.
Third, we live in a technological revolution, the speed of change is unprecedented in any innovative segment. The biggest transformation has not been made in gas and oil, but in renewable energy and the exploitation of coal. Photovoltaic panels at the beginning of this decade were ecologically reasonable, but not economical; today they can return the investment in a family home in 6-8 years. Coal gasification has found the formula for dramatically reducing pollution, energy production and artificial fertilizers simultaneously with the use of CO2 for industrial purposes.
4.
And, at the end of this flow of things that seem clear to me, here are the final three.
First, the LNG gas debate is not one of the topics for daily or weekly fandom. He should leave daily politics, conjectures on social networks, nightly TV debates and get down to economic analysis within the strategic development concept of the country.
Second, the decisions that Kosovo must make must identify the changes that are coming, or in the words of the American sociologist, Thomas Kuhn, “the paradigm shift”. The formula here is, in simplified form, that the technological solutions of the past are not required for the challenges of the future. In simplifying the dilemmas, for example, it would be: should we invest in the networking of LNG gas users or the networking of “prosumers” (such as “producers” and “consumers”, households that produce and consume their own electricity through photovoltaic panels)? This is no longer just an energy issue; it is a development paradigm choice for the second half of the XXI century.
And third, bad decisions aren’t just those that smack of corruption or that don’t make economic sense. Among the bad decisions is not making decisions, spending time in unfinished debates, as this quarter of a century has passed.
