Two closely related journalistic observations as a result of a one-day editorial-journalistic collegium of “Nova Makedonija”
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Are there any messages about Macedonia from the memorandum between the USA and Iran?!
- The second political-analytical observation of the editorial board of “Nova Macedonia” does not claim that Macedonia and Iran are comparable in terms of power, geopolitical weight or international position, but uses the comparison as a framework for thinking about negotiation strategy, state endurance and positioning in international relations.
There is a cruel rule in international politics: you are not respected because you are right, but because you cannot be ignored. That is why one of the most interesting lessons from the current Middle East crisis is not only related to Iran, but also to all small states that have been under various forms of external pressure for years. Macedonia is among them.
At first glance, the comparison between Macedonia and Iran seems impossible. One is a small Balkan state that wants EU membership, the other is a regional power in the Middle East with 90 million inhabitants, huge energy resources and its own geopolitical weight. But the essential lesson is not in size. The point is in negotiation psychology.
While Iran has been exposed to sanctions, threats, isolation and attempts at political weakening for years, today it is at the table where it is being negotiated as a factor without which stability cannot be achieved.
Macedonia, on the other hand, despite all the concessions it has made in the last two decades, is still in a position where new demands are constantly appearing before the old ones are fulfilled.
Here an essential question arises: How can Macedonia stop being subject to conditions and become an equal interlocutor again?
First message: One must never create the impression that there is no alternative
In diplomatic theory, the weakest negotiator is the one who shows that he needs an agreement more than the other side. Macedonia has been sending exactly that message for years. In Brussels, there has long been a belief that Skopje will accept almost anything just to continue the European path. When one side believes that the other has no alternative, then a compromise ceases to be a compromise and becomes a series of unilateral concessions.
Therefore, Macedonia’s greatest diplomatic task is not to abandon European integration, but to show that European integration is not the only pillar of its foreign policy. Not to give up on Europe, but to stop looking dependent on a single door.
Second message: Great powers respect those who can endure
Iran did not win negotiations because it was the strongest. He wins negotiations because he has shown that he can endure.
In international relations, endurance is often more important than strength.
Until recently, until a few years ago, Macedonia created the impression that any new external pressure must be resolved immediately, regardless of the cost. This is precisely what encourages the logic of new demands. If each request results in a new concession, then the system produces more requests. If the request is met with patient, calm and principled resistance, then the other side begins to calculate its costs.
Third message: One’s identity is not negotiated!
One of the biggest mistakes of small states is when they allow their identity to become a subject of political bargaining. Borders are negotiable. Economic models are negotiable. Deadlines and procedures can be negotiated. But the state that begins to negotiate its own historical self-perception enters an endless process without a clear end. That is why Macedonia must make a clear distinction between European standards and identity issues. The clearer that line is, the less likely it is to keep moving.
Fourth message: Internationalization, i.e. turning your problem into
European, in a world problem!
For years, the Macedonian issue has been treated as a bilateral dispute. This is where the strategic weakness lies. If a candidate country can be blocked due to historical, linguistic or identity issues, then it is not only a Macedonian problem. It is a question of the credibility of the whole enlargement policy. Skopje must constantly raise this question before the European public, the academic community, the media and the institutions. Not as a conflict with neighbors, but as a European precedent.
Fifth message: Creating a national consensus
No country can successfully negotiate if every change of government brings a new strategy! In many European countries there are issues over which the government and the opposition have deep disagreements. But there are also red lines. Macedonia needs exactly such a consensus. Not for daily politics. But for state policy. Because external actors always use internal division as an additional instrument of pressure.
Sixth message: Economy is the strongest diplomacy
A state that depends on other people’s decisions can hardly be an equal partner. The stronger the economy, the stronger the diplomacy. Therefore, the right response to external pressures is not only political. It is economic. More investments, greater energy independence, better infrastructure, national economy, stronger institutions and better education create a state that can be more difficult to condition.
Seventh message: Respect is not earned by leniency
This is perhaps the most unpleasant truth in international relations. Small states often believe that if they are cooperative enough, they will be rewarded. History shows that it doesn’t always work that way.
Respect does not come from leniency. Respect comes from foresight, principledness and the ability to calmly say “no” when one’s own red lines are crossed.
The Macedonian matrix
If there is a lesson from the Iranian example, it is not that Macedonia should confront Europe. On the contrary. The lesson is that no country should enter negotiations from a position of fear. The goal is not to abandon the European path. The goal is to negotiate it as a self-reliant state. Not as a supplicant, but as a partner. Not as the OBJECT of the process, but as the SUBJECT. Because the real strength of a small state does not lie in its size, army or any “hard power”… It lies in the ability to define its own interests, to stay true to them and not to let others convince it that it has to give up itself in order to be accepted. History shows that states that know who they are and what they want can be small in territory but big in negotiations. And countries that constantly soften their positions to please others, risk being left without a position that they can defend at all. That’s why some of us fear that “any new proposal will be worse for us than the previous one.” No, it’s not like that! Only weak negotiators get such a weaker package. We sincerely hope that they have already gone down in history. PR
