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Washington’s reported lifting of the U.S. travel ineligibility measure against Albania’s former president and prime minister reopens one of the most controversial chapters in U.S.-Albanian relations at a moment when Albania’s streets are demanding an end to the old post-communist order.
Tirana Times, June 11, 2026 – For Sali Berisha, few words could carry more symbolism than the ones he chose outside Albania’s parliament: “I returned.”
The former president, former prime minister and current opposition leader was responding to reports that the U.S. State Department had lifted the travel ineligibility measure imposed on him in 2021. In Albania, the decision was widely referred to in political language as a “non grata” designation, but the official State Department terminology was different: Berisha and members of his immediate family were publicly designated under Section 7031(c) and declared ineligible to travel to the United States.
Berisha himself insisted he had never been formally “non grata,” saying instead that he had been subject to a travel restriction. But the political meaning was clear: one of the most consequential and controversial decisions Washington had taken toward an Albanian political figure in the post-communist era appeared to have been reversed.
For Albania, the decision is more than a personal victory for Berisha. It reopens the question of Washington’s role in Albanian politics, the limits of American influence and the unfinished nature of the country’s democratic transition.
Berisha is not just another Albanian politician affected by a U.S. visa measure. He was one of the central figures in Albania’s break with communism and, in many ways, one of the architects of the country’s post-1991 relationship with the United States. As president in the early 1990s, he helped reorient Albania from one of Europe’s most isolated Stalinist regimes toward the West. During his years in power, relations with Washington deepened, Albania joined NATO and U.S. support became a defining pillar of the country’s foreign policy.
Berisha visited the White House several times over the decades, meeting U.S. presidents including George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama. In 2007, President George W. Bush visited Albania, a historic moment that symbolized the peak of the U.S.-Albanian strategic relationship and the broad pro-American consensus that had taken root after the fall of communism.
That is why the Biden administration’s 2021 public designation of Berisha was never seen in Albania as a routine visa matter. It was received as a political earthquake.
In its official statement on May 19, 2021, the State Department said Berisha was being publicly designated “due to his involvement in significant corruption.” Then-Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Berisha, particularly in his official capacity as prime minister, had been involved in corrupt acts, including the misappropriation of public funds and interference with public processes, and had used his power for his own benefit and to enrich political allies and family members.
The language was severe. But the case immediately became controversial because the State Department did not make public any concrete evidence to support the accusations. Berisha denied all allegations and challenged Blinken in court. His lawyers repeatedly demanded that evidence be produced. Western journalists also sought clarification. Yet no detailed file, documents or factual basis was ever publicly released.
According to people familiar with the debate in Washington, one diplomat privately described the Berisha file as containing “zero facts.” For Berisha and his supporters, that only reinforced what they had argued from the beginning: that the decision was political, not legal, and that it had been influenced by the government of Prime Minister Edi Rama through lobbying networks and the political influence of George Soros.
The State Department, under the Biden administration, rejected such claims and presented the measure as part of a broader anti-corruption policy. U.S. diplomats in Tirana defended the public designation and made clear that Washington would not cooperate with politicians designated for corruption. The message was blunt, and its political consequences were immediate.
For five years, the designation shaped Albanian politics. It split the Democratic Party, pushed Berisha into a confrontation with former party leader Lulzim Basha and contributed to one of the deepest opposition crises since the fall of communism. American officials repeatedly insisted that the decision was institutional, not personal or political. They also argued that it reflected Washington’s commitment to accountability and democratic reform.
But Berisha did not leave politics. He did not retire. He did not accept the role of a defeated former leader. Instead, he fought against isolation, against rivals inside his party, against the government, against legal pressure and against the belief that Washington’s decision had ended his career.
In that sense, Berisha’s political story has followed a familiar pattern. He was widely considered finished after the collapse of 1997. He returned. He stepped down after losing power in 2013 and was widely seen as retired. He returned. After the U.S. public designation in 2021, many again concluded his political career was over. He remained the dominant figure of the opposition.
The paradox of Berisha’s career is that every political obituary has been followed by another chapter.
The reported reversal by the State Department now raises uncomfortable questions. If the 2021 decision was based on a serious institutional process, why were no facts ever made public? If the designation was effectively irreversible, as several U.S. officials had suggested for years, why has it now apparently been undone? And if the measure was meant to strengthen democracy in Albania, did it instead deepen the crisis of the opposition and increase the perception that Washington had entered Albania’s domestic political battlefield?
For Berisha’s supporters, the answer is simple: a great injustice has been corrected. For his opponents, the allegations of corruption remain politically relevant, regardless of Washington’s travel decisions. For the broader Albanian public, however, the issue may now be part of a deeper fatigue with the entire post-communist political class.
The reported U.S. reversal does not answer the larger question facing Albania. It may close one chapter in Berisha’s personal battle with Washington, but it does not resolve the crisis of the Democratic Party, nor does it offer a way out of Albania’s wider post-communist exhaustion.
For more than three decades, the Democratic Party has lived in Berisha’s orbit. Even when he formally stepped aside, he remained its center of gravity. Even when he lost, he remained its point of reference. The lifting of the U.S. travel restriction gives him a personal and moral victory, but it also revives an uncomfortable question: Can Albania’s main opposition build a future that is not permanently tied to its past?
That question comes at a moment of extraordinary political tension. Albania is facing one of the largest civic awakenings in years. Tens of thousands of protesters have filled the streets of Tirana and other cities, initially angered by controversial development projects and the conduct of authorities, but increasingly united around broader demands: the resignation of the government, a technical cabinet, early elections and an end to a political system they see as corrupt, closed and exhausted.
Significantly, many protesters are not calling only for Prime Minister Edi Rama to leave. They are also demanding the departure of Berisha and the political class that has dominated Albania since the early 1990s.
That makes the timing of Washington’s reported decision especially important. For Berisha’s supporters, it is proof that a grave injustice has been undone. For the Democratic Party, it removes a major obstacle that had long shadowed its leadership. For the government, it weakens a political argument used for years against the opposition.
But for the streets of Tirana, the issue may already belong to a passing political era.
Independent analysts say the new civic movement may mark the beginning of the end of Albania’s long post-communist transition, not simply by replacing one leader with another, but by challenging the entire structure of a system many Albanians view as kleptocratic, personalized and incapable of renewal.
If that is true, then Berisha’s return to Washington’s good graces may be less a final victory than a final test.
The test is not whether he can survive politically. He has already proved that more than once. The test is whether he can help open the way for a post-Berisha era and whether Albania’s opposition can transform a personal rehabilitation into a broader democratic alternative.
The United States has long been central to Albania’s democratic story. It supported the fall of communism, backed democratic reforms, helped anchor the country in NATO and remains its most important strategic ally. But Albania’s future will not be decided in Washington. It will be decided in Tirana, by a society increasingly impatient with old political scripts.
Berisha may have returned. But Albania’s streets are asking whether the country itself can finally move forward.
