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    Home AMERICAS Peru

    Ukraine | Crimean Bridge: how it managed to bypass Russia’s defenses and destroy the Kerch Bridge | Vladimir Putin | Volodymyr Zelensky

    The Analyst by The Analyst
    November 20, 2026
    in Peru
    Ukraine | Crimean Bridge: how it managed to bypass Russia’s defenses and destroy the Kerch Bridge | Vladimir Putin | Volodymyr Zelensky


    He Crimean bridgealso known as Kerch bridgehas 19 kilometers long and connects the Crimean peninsula with the Russian region of Krasnodar, through the Kerch Strait. The Ukrainian action destroyed 270 meters of road.

    LOOK HERE: Putin raises his demands to end the war in Ukraine: what he asks now and why he puts Europe on alert

    Its road section was inaugurated on May 15, 2018 by the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, who participated in the ceremony driving a truck; while the rail connection came into operation in December 2019.

    A painting of Russian President Vladimir Putin's 2018 inauguration of the Crimean Bridge remains on display in an exhibition pavilion near the Kremlin. (EFE/ Ignacio Ortega).

    A painting of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 2018 inauguration of the Crimean Bridge remains on display in an exhibition pavilion near the Kremlin. (EFE/ Ignacio Ortega).

    / Ignacio Ortega

    Construction was promoted by the Kremlin after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The bridge is of strategic importance for Moscow because it constitutes a direct route to transport fuel, food, goods and military supplies to the peninsula.

    Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, it also became a fundamental route to supply troops deployed in Crimea and in the south of Ukraine.

    The location of the Crimean Bridge. (Image generated with AI, Chatgpt).

    The location of the Crimean Bridge. (Image generated with AI, Chatgpt).

    Russia had deployed a layered protection system to protect the Crimean bridge. The device combined long-range air defense systems, such as the S-300 and S-400, with short-range Pantsir-S1, Tor and Buk batteries, as well as surveillance radars and electronic warfare equipment to detect and jam Ukrainian drones and missiles. Added to this were floating barriers and maritime structures to prevent the approach of naval drones, as well as boat patrols, observation posts and land surveillance positions.

    Despite this deployment, Today a section of the road section, which is located at the height of the steel arches of the road, is at the bottom of the sea.

    How did Ukraine plan and execute the attack?

    Below, capture from a video published on November 17, 2026 showing the damaged Crimean Bridge (Kerch Bridge), and above, a view of the bridge taken on October 14, 2022. (Photo by Handout / various sources / AFP).

    Below, capture from a video published on November 17, 2026 showing the damaged Crimean Bridge (Kerch Bridge), and above, a view of the bridge taken on October 14, 2022. (Photo by Handout / various sources / AFP).

    / HANDOUT STRINGER

    An analysis of the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) emphasizes that the attack was not an isolated event, but the result of several weeks of preparation, weakening of Russian air defenses and application of new technologies.

    The president Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed that the destruction of part of the bridge was the seventh stage of an operation that took place over several weeks.

    On the night of November 16-17, Ukrainian forces attacked the bridge for the second consecutive day, destroying the metal arch that supported the section intended for vehicle trafficcausing the road to collapse for vehicles. They also damaged the railway section.

    Grateful to the Security Service of Ukraine, all units of Ukraine’s Defense Forces involved, Ukraine’s Minister of Defense, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the General Staff, and all our weapons manufacturers for an unprecedented operation in response to Russian strikes on our infrastructure. Today, everyone can see the consequences for the main military crossing from Russian territory into our Ukrainian Crimea. This is the result of the seventh stage of an operation carried out over several weeks, developed and coordinated by the Security Service of Ukraine together with the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Our warriors gradually destroyed air defense systems, radars, electronic warfare equipment, and other designated targets on the way to the final objective. For this, they used “Dovbush,” “Vendetta,” “Da Vinci,” “Sichen,” “Mich-2000,” “Ruta,” “Palianytsia,” “An-197,” “FP-1,” “FP-5 Flamingo,” and “R-360 Neptune.” Today, at the key stage, the “Palianytsia” drones performed exceptionally well, striking the road section of the bridge, while “Neptune” missiles, “Ruta” drones, and FP-5 drones struck the railway section. Using “Flamingo,” our warriors carried out a precision-guided strike – and the communications uplink worked flawlessly until the very last seconds. We have repeatedly offered Russia steps toward de-escalation – and every proposal has been met with loud rejection. Russia strikes our infrastructure every day, including bridges in Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Kyiv, and the Odesa region. We are restoring our infrastructure. But we are also reminding Russia that war will always return to where it began. Ukraine’s defensive capabilities are strong and will remain so, and we will never leave terror against our cities and people unanswered. I thank the true warriors of the Security Service of Ukraine, all our Defense Forces, our intelligence agencies, and EVERY manufacturer of weapons effectively used to defend Ukraine, Ukrainians, and our national interests. Glory to Ukraine!

    — Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) November 17, 2026

    In all phases of the operation Ukraine used 11 types of missiles and drones. Zelensky detailed that these are the Dovbush, Vendetta, Da Vinci, Sichen, Mich-2000, Ruta, Palianytsia, An-197, FP-1, FP-5 Flamingo and R-360 Neptune.

    The strategy consisted of progressively weaken Russian defenses before launching the final attack. To do this, Ukraine first attacked Russian air defense systems, surveillance radars, electronic warfare equipment, anti-aircraft missile launchers and mobile groups tasked with intercepting drones.

    The objective was to breach the Russian defensive shield around Crimea. and allowing Ukrainian missiles and drones to reach the bridge, the ISW noted.

    According to statements by Russian military bloggers collected by the ISW, the Ukrainian forces would have used several hundred drones to saturate the anti-aircraft defenses, followed by missiles that attacked the bridge with intervals of just four or five minutes.

    Video capture from November 17, 2026 showing a missile flying towards the Crimean Bridge (Kerch Bridge), which links Crimea to Russia. (Photo by Handout / Telegram / @V_Zelensky_official / AFP).

    Video capture from November 17, 2026 showing a missile flying towards the Crimean Bridge (Kerch Bridge), which links Crimea to Russia. (Photo by Handout / Telegram / @V_Zelensky_official / AFP).

    / HANDOUT

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    The ISW highlighted the technological innovation that allowed Ukraine to reach vulnerable points on the bridge. He noted that kyiv used signal repeaters operated by its Unmanned Systems Forces. These devices allowed communication and control of the missiles to be maintained until moments before impact.

    According to a Ukrainian official cited by The Times, The operation did not depend on the Starlink satellite connection, but from drones that retransmitted radio signals.

    This technology made it possible to direct the projectiles with greater precision towards structurally vulnerable points of the bridge.

    The ISW stated that Ukraine managed to attack sections of the bridge from distances greater than 250 kilometers from the front line.

    The ISW also received criticism from Russian military bloggers, who They questioned Moscow’s ability to protect its strategic infrastructure.

    Among the main vulnerabilities identified are: the absence of a unified national air defense command and control system, the fragmentation of responsibilities between the military, security forces and regional authorities, the differences in equipment and technology between air defense units in different regions and the priority that the Russian command gives to operations on the battlefront to the detriment of the protection of its rear.

    A strategic coup

    File photo of the Crimean bridge after suffering an attack in 2022. (EFE/Str).

    File photo of the Crimean bridge after suffering an attack in 2022. (EFE/Str).

    For the international journalist and analyst Carlos Novoathe Ukrainian attack represents an offensive of great strategic importance because “cuts the supply circuits that Russia uses to sustain its military presence in Crimea and southern Ukraine.”

    Add that The result also highlights the high degree of planning and coordination achieved by the Ukrainian forces. Consider that this is not an isolated action, but rather an operation in which different entities participated and that required a strategy prepared in advance.

    “It is a well-prepared, well-appropriate strategy that responds to a coordination policy that has several heads and not just one. There is a high level of coordination”he highlights.

    The analyst indicates that The Ukrainian ability to carry out operations of this nature must be understood in the context of a war that has dragged on much longer than Moscow expected. “Russia underestimated Ukraine’s resilience and the duration of the conflict. This situation has had important consequences for its military capabilities.”

    Novoa does not rule out that Ukraine has received intelligence support from some countries in the NATOwhich could explain part of its ability to identify Russian vulnerabilities and execute precision strikes against strategic targets such as the Crimean bridge.

    “Ukraine has been able to take advantage of the wear and tear of the Russian Armed Forces and the weaknesses of its command structure. “It has also managed to maintain its capacity to respond despite the difficult international political situation and the rapprochement between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin.”he maintains.

    “Ukraine’s counterattack is lethal. It has waited, it has endured and it has known how to capitalize on the weaknesses and fissures resulting from the wear and tear that the Russian Armed Forces may be experiencing”he states.

    Novoa also establishes a difference between the political and military leadership models of both countries. While Russia maintains vertical leadership, in which Putin concentrates final decisions, Ukraine presents a decision-making structure that it describes as more horizontal and oriented toward thinking about military operations in the medium and long term.

    An important victory, but not definitive for Ukraine

    Russian President Vladimir Putin visits the Kerch Strait Bridge, also known as the Crimean Bridge, on December 5, 2022. (Photo by Mikhail Metzel / SPUTNIK / AFP).

    Russian President Vladimir Putin visits the Kerch Strait Bridge, also known as the Crimean Bridge, on December 5, 2022. (Photo by Mikhail Metzel / SPUTNIK / AFP).

    / MIKHAIL METZEL

    Despite the magnitude of the blow against a fundamental infrastructure for Russia, Novoa considers it premature to affirm that the attack alone will modify the military balance in the region. He warns that Moscow retains its capacity to respond and that its historical experience in war forces it to avoid any prediction of defeat.

    “Russia may be in disorder, it may be beaten or attacked, but it cannot be considered defeated”, warns.

    He recognizes that the operation constitutes a victory of great importance for kyiv and that could force Russia to rethink its military and logistics strategy in Crimea. However, he insists that the result must be evaluated cautiously and based on Russia’s ability to adapt to new conditions.

    “This is a very important victory for Ukraine, which can rethink the balance in the region, but I would not consider it an absolute victory for the Ukrainians.””, he concludes.



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