A legal process initiated by former Metropolitan Tychikos with which, among other things, he requested the suspension of the decision of the Holy Synod to implement the decision dated May 26, 2026 to fill the Metropolitan Throne of Paphos with a parallel suspension of the process of ordination and enthronement of the elected Metropolitan Gregory.
The decision shows, once again, that the state does not interfere in the administrative acts of the Church of Cyprus.
The relevant application had been filed before him Supreme Court on June 10, i.e. one day before the scheduled ordination and enthronement of Mr. Grigorios, and the Court took up the case on the same day.
Mr. Tychikos had submitted a sworn statement in which he claimed that on 23.2.2023, he was elected by the Holy Synod of the Church of Cyprus, Metropolitan of Paphos. He was ordained and enthroned as such, on 12.3.2023. On 22.5.2025, by decision of the Holy Synod of the Church of Cyprus, he was declared deposed from the above position, while by decision of the same Holy Synod, on 8.1.2026, the penalty of indefinite leave was imposed on him. He himself disputes the legality of the above-mentioned dismissal and holiday decisions, and to this end, other applications and legal remedies are pending.
In the same statement he recorded that on 26.5.2026, by decision of the Archdiocese through the Holy Synod of the Church of Cyprus, the Metropolitan throne of Paphos was paid and a new Metropolitan of Paphos was elected.
Mr. Tychikos also argued that the decision to elect the new Metropolitan (26.5.2026) was taken under the regime of the new Charter of the Church of Cyprus, without publication of the latter and without meeting the legal procedural conditions for its amendment. Decision which, according to the Applicant, suffers, having been taken, among many others, in excess and/or lack of jurisdiction and/or abuse of power, in violation of the principle of impartiality and/or fair trial, fundamental and/or Constitutional rights and the principles of natural justice.
In the decision of the Supreme Court, it is noted that, as emerges from the timeless jurisprudence of the Courts, the jurisdiction to issue Privileged Warrants is exercised with particular sparing. Decrees of this kind are granted exceptionally. Permission to register an application for the issuance of a privileged warrant is granted where there is a lack of or excess of jurisdiction, manifest error of law, fraud, prejudice and non-observance of the rules of natural justice.
In the same decision, it is stated that the priority concern is the possibility of controlling the decisions of the Holy Synod of the Church of Cyprus and the procedures it follows, through Privileged Warrants.
He also refers to the application registered by Archimandrite Nektarios Georgiou, adopting the decision at the time, in which the following was recorded:
“The Church of Cyprus is an institution that existed centuries before the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. The Autocephalous, Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus, as its name is defined in the Constitution (Article 110), over time, has received and continues to receive, a more special treatment in relation to its responsibilities and powers (see, among others, the study of the former Attorney General of the Republic, Kr. Tornaritis “Church and State relations according to the Law in force in Cyprus” Review of Public and Private Law, Volume A, 1967, where a more specific reference is made to the relations between the State and the Church from the recognition of the latter as autocephalous by a decision taken during the Third Ecumenical Synod in Ephesus, in 431 AD, until and after independence and the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus).
Article 110.1 of the Constitution is also invoked, which provides that:
“The autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus will continue to have the exclusive right to regulate and manage its internal affairs and its property in accordance with the Holy Canons and its current Charter. The Greek Community Assembly cannot, as it does, act contrary to the elected right of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus.”
The following is also recorded in the decision:
Given and well-established jurisprudence, according to which the Church of Cyprus is not a statutory authority of the Republic, nor a government body, nor a legal person of public law, on the contrary, it has been characterized as a special organization of private law, which does not exercise state or state power in a way that is subject to state control, the decisions of its organs, including the Holy Synod, do not constitute acts of exercise of public power nor do they amount to execution public duty as such is required to activate the jurisdiction of the Court, to grant or not to cure by way of a writ of Mandamus.
As a result of the above, from the facts, the possibility of issuing the requested privileged mandates, type Mandamus, which are related to the specific decisions and minutes of the Holy Synod of the Church of Cyprus, is not provided.
The failure of the applications for leave to enter by summons the application for the above Writs of Mandamus, in itself, seals the fate of the applications for interim orders until the final adjudication of the application for the relevant Writs of Mandamus, for which leave was not granted.
Nor is the present jurisdiction offered for the issuance of interim orders, as sought for, autonomous and detached from the prerogative writs of Mandamus at issue herein, referring generally to questions of legality of the decisions of the removal of the Petitioner from the Metropolitan throne and his holiday.
The search, in a general way, for a declaratory and/or cognizable decision, as presented in Petition D of the present application, without it being connected to the privileged jurisdiction of the Court and any privileged warrant that may be issued in its context, renders its promotion and discussion, in the context of the present procedure, ineffective and impossible.
The inevitable result of all the above is that the Application under discussion cannot have a successful outcome. It has not been demonstrated, to the extent even required in applications of this kind, that there are reasons for the requested intervention of the Court.
The Application is rejected.
