Major General (ret.) Veiko-Vello Palm, former commander of the Estonian Defence Forces Division, said that Estonia has missed the drone revolution and is not prepared to counter potential large-scale drone attacks from Russia.
“It is fair to say that we have missed the drone revolution both in military terms and in comprehensive national defense. Our steps have been small and cautious, and their impact and visibility have so far been almost nonexistent,” Palm noted in the NGO Põhimõtte Koda report “Development Directions for Estonia’s National Defense: Adaptability, Innovation, and Human Capital.”
According to Palm, Estonia has not transformed its armed forces or its broader defense system to a degree that reflects an understanding of the ongoing shift, nor is it capable of responding adequately to the extensive changes in the Russian Federation.
“While one may choose not to use drones, countering the enemy’s drones is mandatory. According to various estimates, the Russian Federation will produce millions of different types of drones in 2026 — that is, thousands, if not tens of thousands, of lethal drones per day. Our military defense is currently not ready to cope with such masses of Russian drones,” Palm said.
Palm pointed out that although counter-drone defense is not solely a technological issue — tactics, unit structures, and training must also change — technology remains at the core of any breakthrough.
“The current situation in Western militaries’ counter-drone defense is typical of bystander reactions to a major shift, with two extremes prevailing — either total apathy or unjustified optimism. On the one hand, everyone sees that an affordable, mass-producible solution does not yet exist, but on the other hand, they comfort themselves with the idea that a NATO conflict with Russia would somehow be different and unfold differently,” Palm explained.
He emphasized that this is not purely a matter of technological lag, since counter-drone solutions do exist in the West, but often involve a combination of some technological shortcomings and — crucially — a lack of solutions suitable for mass production.
According to Palm, even early-generation products in mass production are inadequate, but the choice is whether to innovate in peacetime or postpone development and attempt it under enemy fire.
Palm added that Estonia’s broader national defense system is equally unprepared for counter-drone operations, both in internal security and in ensuring critical services.
“In 2025, the Russian Federation launched about 54,000 Shahed-type attack drones against Ukraine, and as mentioned earlier, it will be capable of producing even more in 2026. If Russia decides to attack NATO and Estonia militarily, we would certainly face several hundred attack drones in the first wave, and hundreds, if not thousands, of targets would need to be defended. Although the intensity would likely decrease over time, even a few hundred drones pose a major challenge. The situation is further complicated by the obvious fact that while an attacker does not need to strike every target, the defender must protect everything, all the time,” Palm said.
Palm acknowledged that the initial and simplest reaction would be to use the armed forces and allied troops to protect civilian infrastructure, but from a military standpoint this is the most dangerous option and clearly illustrates why Russia continues relentless drone attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, despite most drones being shot down.
“Military units assigned to protect civilian infrastructure directly reduce the combat power that should be fighting Russian armed forces. At the same time, there does not appear to be any alternative solution other than using the armed forces for infrastructure protection,” he noted.
In addition to technological shortcomings, Palm said the legal framework is also severely inadequate.
“Only this year — about four years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began — a draft law was submitted to ministries for approval that would give police greater authority to shoot down unmanned aerial vehicles. However, given the number of defended targets and the expected attack intensity, it is clear that even combined military and police forces would not be able to handle this while also fulfilling all other duties effectively,” Palm said.
“If providers of critical services are expected to be ready to deal with counter-drone defense, then as of today this responsibility is unfunded, and there are no regulations governing their possession of counter-drone weapons,” he added.
“Leaving aside the lack of readiness to repel massive waves of attack drones — for example, against our power infrastructure — we are largely incapable of even resisting smaller-scale deliberate disruptions to air traffic. This is a particularly striking shortcoming, as this has been a problem affecting airports worldwide for years and cannot be considered exceptional or unexpected,” Palm said.
“It cannot be denied that despite strong messaging and promises to learn from Russia’s war, progress has been, to put it mildly, modest and certainly slow. It seems we only want to change when all other solutions have been fully exhausted,” Palm concluded.
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