By Abdullah Alkabir, political writer and commentator
With all due respect to the efforts of all national figures participating in the structured dialogue, and appreciation for these efforts spanning six months across the governance, economic, security, and reconciliation tracks, culminating in the agreement on final recommendations and proposals, we now have a purely Libyan framework that decision-makers can use as a guide and reference, and develop further if necessary to serve as a genuine catalyst for resolving the crisis.
Separating the four tracks was a crucial step, allowing each track to be examined individually, enabling experts to identify shortcomings in Libya’s transition process across the most critical issues, and then to devise appropriate solutions for implementation to overcome all obstacles to progress and transformation.
Despite UNSMIL’s announcement and the statements of the UN envoy, Ms. Hanna Tetteh, that the recommendations and proposals of the structured dialogue are non-binding and will not be imposed on the governing authorities, these statements do not negate the importance of this effort or dismiss it as a marginal endeavor with no impact. It is not merely a pressure tactic on the relevant parties to expedite the implementation of the remaining requirements. Rather, it is an essential part of the UN initiative, and the recommendations of the structured dialogue could receive support from the UN Security Council to serve as a framework for any political dialogue forum or constituent assembly, establishing rules for implementation across all tracks.
However, the most striking aspect of the outcomes of the first track, concerning governance (the most crucial file upon which the other tracks are based) is its proposal for a new transitional phase. This phase would involve restructuring the executive authority with the same current composition established by the Geneva Forum, but with broader powers for the head of the Presidential Council. These powers would include the authority to approve the budget and the right to appoint two individuals to the Ministries of Defense and Interior, in consultation with the Prime Minister. The House of Representatives and the High Council of State, along with their affiliated bodies, would continue to function for a maximum of 18 to 24 months.
It seems to me that the initiative of US President’s envoy, Massoud Boulos, is resurfacing under the guise of structured dialogue. His initiative, in its political aspect, proposes restructuring the Presidential Council and granting its presidency to Haftar’s son, while Dbeibah remains head of government—in other words, extending the transitional period. He made no mention of elections or the path to them in his statements regarding his initiative, which has already been rejected by most political and civil institutions.
In parallel, the UN mission continues to sponsor the smaller four-party dialogue, hoping for a breakthrough on the issues of the High National Elections Commission’s board of directors and the constitutional framework for presidential and parliamentary elections. This reflects a strange insistence on the UNSMIL’s refusal to consider the other proposals from the legal committee, even though they are more feasible than the proposal for simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections.
The outlines of the international process are not entirely clear, but this does not mean that it has not made any progress toward a political solution. The success of the structured dialogue and its important recommendations on security, the economy, and reconciliation should not be ignored. However, the proposal to restructure the executive branch in the political process is unacceptable to influential forces and broad segments of the population because it would move the country into a new transitional phase with no clear path towards elections. In fact, it appears to be a transition that consolidates the status quo and imposes a fragile, consensual stability, paving the way for investments by American oil companies, which the US envoy, Boulos, is seeking.
Insisting on repeating past experiences will not end the crisis; rather, it will reproduce it through the same forces controlling the scene, while the people and their demands continue to be ignored, as does the draft constitution. The Sukhirat Accord was based on establishing a temporary authority for one or two years, after which elections would be held. The authority that emerged from it lasted five years, ending in a violent war in Tripoli. After Haftar’s war on Tripoli, his defeat, and the undermining of his project to control the country by force, the existing authorities refused to resolve the conflict through elections or a referendum on the draft constitution. They insisted on entering a new transitional phase to pave the way for elections. The authority resulting from the Tunis-Geneva agreement remains in place to this day, and elections have not yet taken place. So, what will make this repeated experience different this time? And what guarantees can the United Nations or any mediating country offer for holding elections after this new transitional phase?
Considering that the key to solving the Libyan crisis is changing the executive authority is an approach that has proven to be a failure, because it produces a new temporary authority shared by the existing legislative authorities and influential military actors, so that it appears that a change has taken place, but the mechanisms for sharing positions and resources continue without change. Therefore, the crisis remains in a circular motion in which it returns after a few years to the same point of origin. Breaking this cycle requires rebuilding the political scene with a new elected constituent body or returning to the constitutional path as adopted in the Constitutional Declaration by holding a referendum on the draft constitution.
