From the Defense Forces’ statements over the past two weeks about the war‑drone crisis, one gets the impression that, in tense times in terms of the drone threat, we are forced to choose between two bad messages: either to present our capability as greater than it really is and claim that drones are not being shot down for reasons other than a lack of capability, or to admit that against a diffuse and sporadic threat, such as an attack drone that has veered off course, our capability is still insufficient.
In the meantime, a more reasonable middle ground has also been voiced: our surveillance and defense capability is not non-existent, but it is still limited and full of gaps.
The real sore point is drone defense outside Estonia’s military defense area of operations.
Not shooting a drone down in peacetime does not automatically mean inaction – detection, tracking, issuing warnings, and securing air policing are also forms of response, and in peacetime the use of live fire can reasonably be considered the last resort. The risk of collateral damage is too great.
A question of substantially greater importance than our inevitably limited peacetime response capability is whether the new national defense development plan, which is to reach the government in April, will foresee resources not only for protecting the Defense Forces themselves, but also for drone defense of vital infrastructure and cities (including the capital).
