The dramatic assault and hostage taking of a television station in Guayaquil in 2024, the murder of presidential candidates in Colombia and Ecuador, as well as prison riots, and escalations of homicidal violence are some of the most public expressions of the impact of crime in Latin America. But along with these demonstrations that receive extensive media coverage, organized crime, and various forms of illegality, are transforming, also in a hidden way, the social, economic and political life of Latin American societies. What decades ago seemed like a peripheral phenomenon, limited to drug trafficking in limited geographical areas such as the Northern Triangle (Mexico and Central America), Colombia and the English-speaking Caribbean, today extends to dozens of areas of illicit economies – from human trafficking to illegal mining to cybercrime and corruption – to all corners of the continent.
According to recent estimates, in the region more than 100 million people live under criminal governance schemes, where illicit organizations seek to replace the State. These are geographical areas, including entire cities or sectors of large Latin American cities, where basic services, the maintenance of order and the administration of justice are not under the control of state institutions, but of criminal groups. A phenomenon that is not always expressed in an increase in homicides; In fact, the recent report “Crime and Democracy in Latin America”, from IDEA International warns that the criminal business usually operates better without visible violence, being more lucrative.
Illicit and informal economies represent more than 20% of the regional GDP, which gives criminal groups economic and coercive power that directly competes with that of the State. This generates what researchers Juan Pablo Luna and Andreas Feldmann call “criminalized politics,” where criminal organizations infiltrate and corrupt key institutions for the rule of law (such as police, courts, prosecutors, among others) to ensure their interests. A dynamic that results in a strong deterioration of politics and democratic regimes.
This is observed in the capture and penetration of campaigns, parties and candidacies through the financing of political and electoral activity at the local and national level. When crime fails to control politics through cooptation, it resorts to violence, persecution, intimidation, and even the murder of candidates and authorities who try to confront it.
The expansion of crime also weakens democracies when, from politics and authorities, efforts are made to combat it based on the false and dangerous dichotomy between security and democracy. Faced with the expansion of crime, narratives emerge that promise quick but authoritarian solutions that weaken the institutions of the rule of law, the balance of powers and access to justice.
The “iron fist” mantra sacrifices structural solutions that require multidimensional approaches and must work over the long term to deliver immediate criminal punitivism. It uses law enforcement and states of exception both to combat crime and insecurity and to persecute opponents, critics and dissidents. It transforms extraordinary measures of restriction of freedoms and guarantees into permanent states of control, and electoral democracies into hybrid authoritarian regimes.
Thus, the real and urgent need for protection and security is the fuel that powers the emergence of anti-system leaders, often populist, with little commitment to democracy, the rule of law and the protection of freedoms achieved over decades of democratic construction. The example of the Salvadoran president is an icon of this trend, but his narrative and strategy are widely spread among political leaders in the region.
In this way, the expansion of crime in Latin America is not only a threat to security and economic development. It is, above all, a threat to the construction of democratic, prosperous and inclusive communities. Hence the urgency of confronting crime by strengthening the institutional capacities of States, particularly the justice and penitentiary systems, together with mechanisms of transparency, accountability, combating corruption, tax evasion and money laundering, among others.
But these public policy agendas, no matter how robust and consistent they may be, will be insufficient without protecting, at the same time and with equal priority, the politics and electoral processes, those who supervise the elections, make the decisions and direct the states, both against violence and infiltration.
A democratic security agenda requires effective States and institutions. Although effectiveness, by itself, does not ensure the survival of democratic processes and regimes. Beyond sectoral security agendas, democratic actors in Latin America must recognize that it is urgent to build alternatives to the i-liberal iron fist. This requires evidence-based policies and international cooperation. But, above all, articulate narratives that avoid the path of no return of false dichotomies that force citizens to exchange democracy and the rule of law in exchange for security. Only in this way can we dismantle criminalized politics, protect the integrity of the elections and rebuild the bond between citizens and the State.
*This article is based on the findings of the report “Criminality and Democracy in Latin America”, prepared by International IDEA.
