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By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, June 9 (Yonhap) — China appeared more focused on countering U.S. regional influence than on addressing North Korea’s nuclear program, given the absence of any public reference to Pyongyang’s denuclearization in either country’s readout of their summit this week, experts said Tuesday.
The summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Pyongyang on Monday underlined a deepening strategic alignment between the two countries and their unity amid an intensifying Sino-U.S. rivalry over trade, security and other areas, they pointed out.
Xi visited the North Korean capital on Monday and Tuesday on his first trip to the country since 2019, as Beijing was seen striving to strengthen relations with Pyongyang, which has drawn closer to Russia through deepening military, diplomatic and economic cooperation.
“China is more focused on denying U.S. influence than denying North Korea nuclear weapons,” Patrick Cronin, chair for Asia-Pacific security at the Hudson Institute, told Yonhap News Agency via email.
“Kim is fixated on tactical victory, thinking every time a big power omits a reference to denuclearization that confers legitimacy on North Korea’s claim to be a permanent nuclear-weapon state,” he added.
This photo, carried by North Korea’s official Korean Central News Agency on June 9, 2026, shows the North’s leader Kim Jong-un (R) and Chinese President Xi Jinping posing for a photo as they held summit talks in Pyongyang the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
Andrew Yeo, SK-Korea Foundation chair at the Brookings Institution’s Center for East Asia Policy Studies, said that the absence of any reference to denuclearization on the summit day suggested that denuclearization is not a top priority for China as it once may have been a decade ago.
Xi’s high-profile meeting with Kim came after he held summit talks with U.S. President Donald Trump in Beijing last month, during which the White House said the two leaders confirmed their “shared goal” of denuclearizing North Korea.
But there was no public reference to denuclearization or anything to that effect in reports by the two countries’ state media, raising questions over whether there has been a shift in China’s approach to the reclusive state’s nuclear quandary.
During Xi’s trip to Pyongyang in 2019, Xi pointed out China’s support for efforts toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
China had openly backed the denuclearization of the peninsula as North Korea’s nuclear adventurism could trigger nuclear armament in South Korea and Japan, the two core Asian allies of the U.S., its key strategic rival.
But China’s policy ambiguity on the denuclearization issue started emerging in 2024, driven by several factors, indicating China’s new priority on advancing its strategic interests in the region, Ellen Kim, director of academic programs at Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI), said.
Those factors include China’s move to avoid actions that might provoke North Korea amid concerns that closer Pyongyang-Moscow ties could weaken China’s influence over North Korea.
Cronin noted that through the summit, China drove home a key message: unity with its traditional ally.
“Unity is the message, and the united front has the latent capability to stand up to the United States and its allies,” the scholar said.
The two leaders’ display of unity masked their divergent interests in some areas, but they showed their determination to create a “more favorable balance of power” in Northeast Asia, the expert said.
In a geopolitical context, Kim of the KEI said that the North Korea-China summit was part of Beijing’s efforts to reassert its influence over Pyongyang, and enhance strategic alignment with the North and Russia, and counterbalance pressures from the U.S. and Japan.
For the North Korean leader, the summit came as he wants to burnish his regime’s identity as a member of the nuclear-power club, a move meant to send messages to both domestic and foreign audiences, Cronin said.
The KEI scholar struck a similar note.
“Kim was seeking China’s endorsement of North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, and he got it through China’s silence on the denuclearization issues,” she said.
She also noted that China’s silence on North Korea’s denuclearization will inadvertently push South Korea to reassess China’s strategic value as a partner.
Yeo highlighted that for Kim, the Pyongyang meeting underscored North Korea’s growing relevance in regional affairs.
“The regime entered the summit from a position of greater security and diplomatic confidence than in previous years,” he said.
“Xi Jinping’s visit to North Korea, his first overseas trip of 2026, reflects Pyongyang’s increasing strategic importance within Northeast Asia and reinforces Kim’s standing as a leader courted by both China and Russia.”
Rob Rapson, former acting U.S. ambassador to South Korea, cast the Xi-Kim summit largely as another “notable data point in the continuum of evolving Northeast Asia geopolitics/economics.”
“In a year marked by a burst of summitry in the region, Xi essentially reminded Pyongyang that North Korea matters to Beijing. Kim reciprocated that sentiment,” Rapson told Yonhap News Agency via email.
Noting that Xi did not appear to have raised the denuclearization issue during the summit with Kim, Rapson stressed that the nuclear issue will have to be finessed for any prospect of future reengagement between the U.S. and North Korea.
“With or without Xi’s help, I still believe Trump will make one more strong push to meet with Kim, if only for legacy purposes,” he said.
But time and opportunity are running out, he added, apparently referring to the limited time remaining in Trump’s presidency, which runs until January 2029, and a range of domestic and foreign policy challenges that he faces.
Pyongyang has also shown little interest in resuming dialogue with Washington, particularly as it has deepened cooperation with Moscow.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
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