For years, Iran’s presence in Latin America barely made headlines. It was a peripheral issue, more linked to diplomatic relations than to security dynamics. That panorama changed in 2026. The combination of the war in the Middle East and political transformations in the region, especially in Venezuela, put the Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) at the center of the debate.
However, it is advisable to avoid a simplistic reading, since the new context does not mean the end of Iranian influence in Latin America. On the contrary, it reveals your ability to adapt.
The most visible turning point was the Argentine government’s decision, in April 2026, to declare the Revolutionary Guard a terrorist organization. Beyond its legal effects, the message was unequivocal in confirming that Iran was no longer perceived as a distant actor and had become a security issue. This decision responds to pressure from the United States and Israel to limit Tehran’s global projection. At the same time, it accentuates a regional reality in which networks linked to the IRGC are no longer marginal.
Therefore, the framework of analysis has changed. The Iranian presence is no longer interpreted in a diplomatic key, but in terms of security, intelligence and illicit economies.
Hezbollah: less hierarchy, more network
The main instrument used by the IRGC to extend its influence in Latin America has been Hezbollah. The organization of Lebanese origin and linked to Iran developed a flexible, informal structure in the Western Hemisphere that contrasts with the hierarchical character it maintains in Lebanon. Here it operates as a flexible constellation of groups with operational autonomy, integrated into local dynamics. In practice, this implies their participation in activities such as smuggling, drug trafficking or money laundering, which constitute the basis of their financing and the key to their resilience.
Hezbollah’s main focuses of action in the region are the Triple Border between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, and Venezuela, which for years offered a particularly favorable environment for its expansion. Added to this is the existence of communities of Lebanese origin in different Latin American countries that in some cases have served as a support or coverage environment.
This decentralized model has a decisive advantage in that it is very difficult to dismantle. Even if Hezbollah suffers setbacks in the Middle East, its networks in Latin America can continue to operate, confirming an economic logic that moves away from the military conception.
Venezuela: from strategic ally to uncertain scenario
For more than twenty years, Venezuela was Iran’s main point of support in Latin America. The alliance with the Chavista regime allowed Tehran to access infrastructure, financial networks and diplomatic coverage. That balance has changed, the departure of Nicolás Maduro and the new orientation of the Delcy Rodríguez government towards the United States introduce clear uncertainty about the Venezuelan government’s support for the Iranian presence.
However, networks established over years are not dismantled by decree. Logistical, commercial and financial connections continue to exist, although from now on they will have to face a new scenario with less political protection and greater external pressure. In this way, Venezuela stops being a safe haven and becomes a disputed space, where different actors seek to reposition themselves.
Organized crime, where everything converges
The factor that best explains the persistence of the Iranian presence in Latin America is its convergence with organized crime with which it has developed functional alliances. Criminal organizations provide routes, infrastructure and the ability to operate clandestinely, while networks linked to Iran offer international connections and financing mechanisms aimed at money laundering.
The result is a gray area where the criminal and the geopolitical intertwine. And it is precisely in that space where States find it most difficult to act. Furthermore, this convergence reduces Iran’s dependence on allied governments. Even in scenarios of loss of political support, such as the Venezuelan case, these networks allow them to maintain their presence.
More pressure, but no less presence
The current international context does not favor the Revolutionary Guard either. The war that began in February 2026 has increased pressure on its structure through selective attacks, the weakening of its leadership and greater diplomatic isolation. However, this pressure has a paradoxical effect, since far from reducing its presence in Latin America, it increases the value of its external networks. The region is not a priority front, but it does offer financing, mobility and less visibility.
Added to this is an emerging dimension such as cyberspace. Recent incidents suggest that the IRGC has expanded its actions beyond the physical terrain, favoring Iranian projection in digital spheres.
In this context, the key to understanding the presence of the Revolutionary Guard in Latin America focuses on understanding that it does not depend on a single factor. The IRGC relies on the combination of state actors, illicit networks and decentralized structures. Therefore, when one of these pillars changes—as is happening now in Venezuela—the network does not collapse, but rather transforms.
This is the real challenge for Latin American States. They do not face a rigid structure, but rather a flexible framework, capable of adapting and operating on the margins. The question is not only how much power Iran has in the region, but what capacity states have to respond to threats that do not follow traditional logic. In today’s world, networks move faster than states. And the Revolutionary Guard has learned to operate in that space.
*Text originally published in Political Dialogue.
