Mr. Bujard, the pension commission’s reform proposals are on the table and are receiving a lot of support. What is not discussed, however, is the very low birth rate, which puts a long-term burden on the pay-as-you-go system. How serious is the problem in your opinion?
A birth rate of 1.35 children per woman, as we are currently observing in Germany, means massive pension problems for the next generation. Only two thirds of the current generation of parents are being replaced, one third is missing. This will have a very strong impact on the labor market and social system. These numbers are very, very serious – also for future economic growth and government finances.
Can the shrinkage process be compensated for by immigration?
In recent decades, Germany has had a lot of skilled immigration from southern and eastern European countries. That will hardly be possible in twenty years. The countries all have similar problems, some with birth rates of 1.2 like in Poland. We are talking about a similar development across Europe – you cannot simply compensate for this in the neighboring country through immigration.
When did this negative trend actually start in Germany?
The decline basically started in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1975 we had a birth rate of less than 1.5 for the first time in the Federal Republic, which is considered very low. Since then, the rate has been very consistent between 1.2 and 1.4 – for over four decades. For a long time, Germany was one of the bottom performers worldwide and in Europe.
Then was there a ray of hope?
In the 2010s the rate rose again and was 1.6 for several years. This was mainly due to the expansion of child care and parental allowance. This increase has placed us in the middle of the European rankings. This should not be underestimated – there were around 100,000 more births per year. Twenty years later, that means potentially 100,000 more well-educated young people entering the job market every year. However, the number of births has fallen sharply again since 2022. So we have a bearish trend again.
What has happened since 2022?
Birth rates have plummeted across Europe. I attribute this to the multiple crises. People were exhausted by the pandemic, then came the war in Ukraine, a war of aggression in Europe that had economic consequences – this interaction is unsettling. In Europe we now have a birth rate of 1.34. This is a historic low, even slightly below the German value.
The phenomenon now extends far beyond Europe. What major forces are at work?
You have to distinguish between different developments. One has been running in Western Europe since the 1970s and has continued to spread – this is called the second demographic transition. This has to do with the fact that there was an expansion in education, a strong emancipation of women and also a change in values. The separation between cohabitation, marriage and sexuality was increasingly eliminated culturally and things became more liberal. And of course, hormonal contraception became much safer. More or less all countries in Europe had these development strands – and they are now also very evident in Asian countries and South America.
Where are the rates lowest?
Korea shoots the bird with a rate of 0.7. China is just over 1.0, Turkey is 1.48, Brazil is 1.6. We see very low rates among Asian countries that have advanced economically. It’s this combination: women no longer want the classic housewife role, but also want to work professionally – and they often have to in order to earn enough money. And at the same time, the job market and society hardly take this into account.
Scandinavia has long been considered a role model.
In countries with developed family policies – comprehensive childcare, all-day schools, where fathers are also more activated through the fatherhood months – the rate there has not fallen so sharply. The Scandinavian model had significantly higher birth rates for a long time, and Germany has followed this. The idea was: If women want to work, there is good childcare and fathers take on more care work, then a balance will be achieved and the rates will rise again close to two.
Has this hope been fulfilled in Scandinavia?
Now there is no longer enough there either. For ten or fifteen years we have seen that the values are only 1.4 to 1.5. There are actually hardly any role models left today. This is largely attributed to the economic uncertainties, which have also increased significantly in Scandinavia.
What role does the housing shortage in big cities play?
The availability of living space varies greatly from region to region. However, a very special problem has arisen in Germany’s metropolises in recent years – there is a lack of affordable living space for families. Together with the income situation and the global crises that generate inflation, this leads to economic uncertainty.
Social media is now repeatedly cited as the cause of the decline in birth rates. Does that convince you?
This is a new theory that is being discussed very controversially. I’m not particularly convinced by correlations with any kind of broadband expansion – especially since it was precisely during this phase that the birth rate in Germany rose sharply, in the 2010s. What I tend to see is that nowadays media usage is such that many people are constantly preoccupied with negative news like a rabbit in front of a snake. This is a completely new dimension that makes the multiple crises have such an impact and unsettles young people.
Life is objectively good in Germany.
In fact, people still live very well in Germany; it is a very wealthy country. You have to ask yourself historically: When was it easier to have children? When did better conditions exist – health system, social system, education for children? This is actually a relatively good time if you compare it regionally and historically.
The birth rate is one thing, what about the desire to have children?
It’s very high. With our family demographic panel, called FReDA, we have shown that the desire to have children is around 1.8 children per woman, and even 2.1 is considered ideal. But we are actually at 1.35. Young people actually want children – and are constantly putting them off.
Is this also because there are fewer couples?
This is currently being researched. Most young people definitely have a relationship, and most of the singles are looking for one. Today, relationships are often initiated online – so this doesn’t just have to be a curse, because many people also find their partners via dating platforms. However, in some Asian countries it is a problem that young people do not come together in real life. But these are also countries where the workload is much higher.
Studies have often shown that parental allowance has no major effect on the birth rate, what do you think of that?
I would like to know who is doing these studies – I hear comments about parental allowance from colleagues who have not done any research on the topic. I did my own research on this: There was an effect among female academics; older female academics in particular had more children again. Above all, childlessness among academic women has declined – before the reforms it was 29 percent of those who were permanently childless and is now at 25 percent. These are worlds apart in demographics. You have to see parental allowance and childcare together, they belong together, and both together have been very successful.
Four points. Firstly: affordable housing for families, which is a huge problem at the moment. Secondly, childcare has to be reliable – it hasn’t been reliable for a few years, and any failure throws everyday life into disarray for parents who both work. Thirdly, families need more time in the phase with small children: care work is very time-consuming, so most couples don’t want to both work full-time, but both want to stay in the job. That means part-time with an increase, also for fathers – and companies that understand that this phase will pass and that it will quickly go back to full-time. And fourth: We have to do more for families who want a third or fourth child. The big lever lies not in reducing childlessness, but in ensuring that two children more often become three.
Should politics get involved at all? How many children someone has is a private matter.
In any case it should, because such a low birth rate causes massive pension problems. Even those who do not have or do not want to have children benefit greatly from more support for families. Politicians shouldn’t make wishes for children – but the wishes for children are there. It is intended to help young people find it easier to fulfill their wishes. The framework conditions are set anyway; you should actively shape it. Investing the money in a targeted manner in family policy, rather than in a watering can, is the best pension policy.
