A record number of people in Estonia were detained last year for assisting Russian special services. Ukrainian military psychologist Oleh Pokalchuk outlines the typical methods used by the Federal Security Service (FSB).
According to Estonia’s Estonian Internal Security Service (ISS), the FSB is increasingly targeting vulnerable Russian-speaking youth online.
In intelligence terminology, individuals are broadly divided into two groups: “operators” and “assets.” Operators are professional intelligence officers who recruit others, while assets are those they recruit—treated as expendable tools, Ukrainian expert Pokalchuk said on an ERR program.
Recruitment usually unfolds in stages. It often begins with seemingly harmless requests — such as taking a photo of a residential building or writing graffiti — offered in exchange for small payments, he explained.
From small favors to serious crimes
“Then they offer the chance to earn more. The person gradually gets drawn in and is offered something more serious. Say, setting something on fire for €100,” Pokalchuk continued. “Such ads are distributed online. And because this is done on a large scale, about 30 percent of young people respond.”
According to the expert, some people themselves break off contact with recruiters, but others continue because of psychological factors.
“And the reason isn’t only money. A young person may perceive this as a quest or a game. In addition, they are singled out from their peers, their uniqueness is emphasized, they are flattered and complimented. They are treated like a friend. Eventually they are asked to do a small favor — like delivering a package. They see nothing wrong with it, but some time later it turns out they were transporting explosives. Then they are given more concrete assignments. At some point they’re told: ‘You’ve been working with us for half a year.’ At the same time, for the ISS it doesn’t matter that the young person did not realize the illegality of their actions.”
National identity as leverage
According to Pokalchuk, there are basically four recruitment methods: vanity, ideology, material interest, and blackmail.
“Recruitment may be built on national feelings: ‘You’re Russian, you’re one of us.’ Recruiters can also find or create compromising material on a person. For example, an addicted person might suddenly have problems with drug delivery, and then ‘good’ people appear who offer help,” he said.
“There are many forms of compromising material: phone hacking, nude photos of teenagers. Sometimes teenagers send such photos themselves, sometimes they are pressured into it. Sometimes young people start cooperating out of shame. In some cases they are threatened. A sense of self-worth, superiority, and competition is very important for adolescents, so anything that undermines their self-image can become an instrument of pressure,” Pokalchuk continued.
According to the military psychologist, potential victims are studied in advance.
“With young people, communication at first focuses on neutral topics — movies, sports. Social communication among young people is generally very intense. Those who show pro-Russian views, anti-Estonian attitudes, or conspiracy thinking are immediately moved into the category of potential recruitment targets. Then ‘acquaintances’ appear — interesting people who offer compliments and have some loose connection to the potential target. After that, they ask for help,” he explained.
“If a person realizes that someone is trying to recruit them, they should report it to the security services. Not everyone falls for recruitment, but it is a widespread phenomenon,” the military psychologist added.
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