Nicaragua does not fit the mold of the external pressure that the United States exerts on Cuba and Venezuela. Unlike the other two countries, the key to political change is having a mature, organized, legitimate political group that reflects the credibility necessary to mount a true democratic transition.
His absence is a disincentive for the United States and the international community to continue pushing towards an exit from the dictators.
The factors of change
Among the things that change little in international politics are the factors that influence political transformation. A crisis, economic, social, or environmental, can provoke a social uprising strong enough that a regime cannot withstand. The other is a change within the repressive system, in which some members of the power circle conspire to overthrow the autocrat. Third, there is the presence of an organized political resistance movement, with the capacity to alter the balance of power unfavorable to the dictatorship. Finally, external pressure, through diplomatic, economic and political means, that weakens the repressive structure and brings them to the table to negotiate a transition.
The active combination of these determinants weakens the dictatorial system, in which one of them acts as a triggering factor, paving the way to initiate a transition with its interlocutors.
Murillo and his team are very clear about this, and everything they do revolves around guaranteeing the durability of the dictatorship, preventing these elements from slipping out of their hands. Therefore, a crisis as a trigger for change is absent. Economically, the country remains relatively stable through a strategy in which the regime has compartmentalized the economy into three groups: street consumers, remittance recipients, and the informal sector; free zone, mining and agro-export; and state capture by the ruling elite. By having them disconnected, you can exercise better control over the performance of each one.
The expectation of a so-called implosion shows very low risks of occurring because Murillo has a small circle of collaborators surrounding her, with well-defined roles, canceling and censoring any of their prominence, except that of her son Laureano.
The criminalization of democracy resulted in the nullification of a civic opposition, which was imprisoned and exiled, and is now non-existent, except in groups with little or no political capital and highly fragmented and toxically polarized.
International pressure has hit the dictatorship on several occasions and continues to be the most important factor against Murillo. But the perception that, after Cuba, it is Nicaragua’s turn requires, first, understanding the differences and what is needed to pressure the regime.
Trump’s decision to remove Maduro is not a well-considered calculation, but it coincides with an unsustainable economic crisis, and an extremely weak opposition, a situation that leaves the administration to deal with one of the three legs that controlled the Maduro regime. In Nicaragua, the monopoly of power is almost absolute and there is no fragmented circle of power.
On the other hand, the pressure on Cuba occurs after extreme social wear and tear and obsolete leadership, in which the institutional structure of GAESA is the establishment that, once violated, will be the interlocutor of change. But Nicaragua also does not have a parallel structure of the economy—there is state capture. And the United States is clear about this, so the domino theory is not so simple, and the importance of an opposition movement becomes a dominant factor.
The role of the United States and its perspective towards Nicaragua
The Trump administration follows the advice of the bureaucratic team that has known the Ortega Murillos for decades. And their reading is that, this being an economically stable government, they recommend applying pressure, temporarily and slowly, unless Murillo creates complications for them—such as Chinese and Russian interference, complicity in drug trafficking or responsibility for another wave of migratory expulsion—or a change in the balance of power occurs with the death of Daniel Ortega.
The policy scope includes three options. The first is the gradual pressure to put the government in check (sanctions, Trade Office 301, reduce China’s economic presence, abort the Russian presence through sanctions), meanwhile, observe if the inertia of the internal environment, with the death of Ortega, will open an additional alternative. The second is the immediate pressure to cut commercial and financial ties, and threaten to extract a power figure in a sudden manner. Some opposition puppeteers believe it is Daniel Ortega, but there is someone else in their sights. The third is bilateral meetings, which require specific political changes to achieve reforms in the future; The Army is not part of these exchanges.
Faced with this framework, the decision is to continue pressing, while the clouds of the day clear up. The United States has a timeline that includes responding to Murillo’s electoral offer for November 2027, with the purpose of consolidating itself through a new electoral farce.
Nothing is static and Marco Rubio can reconsider these options, advancing changes before November 2026, after the approval of the new Nica Act 2.0, and veto Murillo being elected sole co-president.
What is stopping the administration, however, is the international crisis spanning the Middle East, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, Ukraine and other countries and regions. But, in particular, they are ‘set back’ by the absence of an opposition, because for them there is no viable intermediary within the regime and Laureano Ortega does not convince anyone. The Army does not have anyone willing to show their face, and Rosario Murillo only wants to remain in power.
Hence, by default, having a democratic interlocutor would legitimize and further motivate external action to sit them down to negotiate with Murillo about his departure from power.
Murillo’s strategy: promising elections with stilt parties
Murillo knows this and has instructed his operators to revive the FSLN, activate volunteer police as electoral promoters, and deputies to review laws that resurrect a new electoral and party registry, opening the door to negotiating a partial collaborationism, of which even some in exile can entertain the idea of being part and, in this way, strengthen their proposal.
Murillo, with the frying pan in his hand (and the police in front), wants to show the world that there is electoral openness in this country, something that the United States will not validate and that the European Union is analyzing. For her, the issue is not whether they believe her or not, but rather putting on a show to become president and she assumes that the political risk of being pressured will be much lower in these post-electoral circumstances, and that what she has to endure is the pressure that occurs from February 2027 to November 2027. Right now, the dictatorship estimates that any pressure between June and December 2026 will be manageable.
Continuity in power for her is a very probable scenario.
However, the formation of a legitimate group, organized and in internal and external resistance, would change Murillo’s positioning in the midst of a pre-electoral environment.
This environment will coincide with a complicated economy—the number of deportees and returnees to Nicaragua will rise to more than 30,000 people by early 2027, in a country in which the annual increase in labor is 60,000 workers and an additional slowdown in remittances to 4% (this year they will grow by 8%), the export dynamics will show less growth (the price of gold will stabilize at $4,000 an ounce).
For the United States, the critical mass of democratic leaders and followers, with preponderance instead of figure, presents the viable scenario for change in Nicaragua, instead of a Delcy Rodríguez in Venezuela or GAESA in Cuba.
This is the time to relaunch the opposition movement; because time moves on and no one is going to wait for them and these 18 months are existential for the Ortega-Murillos. The photos of Brooklyn Rivera are not a reminder, they are the moral demand and responsibility that the fight against evil is now because dictators will follow the same route.
The truly committed are not those who take photos in the OAS, Congress or the hallways of the State Department; but those who have a way to connect with the Nicaraguans, speak their language, have their solutions, mount the strategy of resistance and transition (no, Mr. from Miami, they still don’t have it even if you believe it), build an inclusive political consensus with rules of the game and penalties, even if it excludes some (but not all) who belong to the ‘past’—which is not only that of the eighties and its confiscations and repressions, but includes treacherous liberalism, collaborationist businessman, who chose to pray instead of caring for his flock, and opportunistic narcissists.
The sign is visible, let’s stop ignoring it.
