The same in social networks, the media or academic forums of the social sciences, irreducible premises circulate that distort the past, the present and, therefore, the future options for Cuba. Unfortunately, these theological dogmas, formulated from absolute categories of good and evil, are reinforced among Cuban and Cuban-American politicians.
The first of these premises has a disjunctive formulation: either, after January 1, 1959, the Cuban Revolution produced the best social model, not only of Cuba but of all of Latin America and the Caribbean and the majority of the Third World, or it produced the worst dictatorship of all time in the region: Castroism. According to that premise, those two things, called by contradictory names, the Revolution and Castroism, continue to be in force.
The second theological premise is the one that attributes resounding culprits to each good and evil. Not specific causes and more or less responsible actors, but absolute culprits: Fidel Castro or Yankee imperialism, communism or the US blockade, the inability of the Cuban people to govern themselves or the voracity of global powers.
The third theological premise, derived from the first two, assumes that like all good and all evil, their design and execution must be considered heroic feats or horrendous crimes. For supporters of the supposedly current Revolution, the Cuban government and its historical leaders, Fidel and Raúl, would have to be revered as idols of Latin American emancipation. For the detractors of Castroism, which would be as alive as in 1960, 1980 or 2010, said regime and its representatives are murderers who should be brought to justice.
This theological-legal discourse has always underlain the tense relationship between the governments of the United States and Cuba and the no less tense link between the island and the diaspora. The mutual claims between Havana and Washington add up to millions and millions of dollars and potential or actual prosecutions, such as the one now being attempted against Raúl Castro, have been very frequent throughout the history of this dispute of almost seven decades.
In the end, each of these three premises and their legal projections do nothing more than distort the history of the country and its international relations. According to these premises, for example, it would be inconceivable that between 1970 and 1990, Cuba, under its registration in the Soviet system, would have achieved human development indices among the highest in Latin America and the Caribbean. It would also be inconceivable that the deepest drop in these indicators, from 2018 to now, which place Cuba at the level of Haiti, does not come, fundamentally, from the sanctions of the Trump administration or the energy blockade, complied with by Russia, China, Mexico and other supposed allies of Cuba.
The weight of these imaginaries tremendously complicates the search for practical solutions to the island’s paralysis. For example, the Cuban government seems incapable of promoting initiatives in its Latin American embassies and consulates that go beyond the call for “solidarity” or the continuous or immobile promotion of the Cuban model. For their part, the traditional exile and a good part of the island’s opposition do not want, or cannot, distance themselves from confrontational or fratricidal scenarios such as military intervention.
If what each side faces is an epiphany of evil, nothing more logical than extreme options being predominant. On the one hand, the perpetuation of the same repressive model. On the other, the destruction and redesign of a regime, which will be suffered by the same majority that now must face the worst consequences of this prolonged conflict. Perhaps, it is time to suspend the theology of history and the judicialization of politics and agree on the least costly solution for the citizens of the island.
*This article was originally published in The Reason of Mexico.
