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When politicians directly interfere with legal proceedings or the administration of justice, the rule of law is not only threatened. It can also be slowly eroded by laws and institutional changes that can make the judiciary dependent on political decision-making. What makes this issue urgent again is the recent warning from court president Iwan Rasoelbaks.
At the opening of the new legislative year, Rasoelbaks warned of proposed changes within the judiciary and the Public Prosecution Service (OM). In his view, the establishment of a third higher judicial authority, the position of the Public Prosecution Service and the organization of the judiciary in particular require care. Without sufficient guarantees for expertise and independence, reform can actually lead to a weakening of the legal system.
That is a warning that should not be dismissed lightly.
Suriname needs a strong, expert and accessible judiciary. The introduction of a third judicial body can be an important step in this regard. But the question is not just whether there should be a third authority. The much more important question is: how can this body be prevented from becoming politically dependent on political decision-making?
Judges must be able to perform their duties independently, without political pressure and without being dependent on those in power whom they sometimes have to monitor. This requires not only good laws, but also clear institutional guarantees. This brings us to a more fundamental problem: who monitors the creators of the rule of law?
A government can have a strong political majority today, but be an opposition party tomorrow. Anyone who makes laws that make institutions dependent on political power relations can ultimately become a victim of the same construction. That is precisely why the structure of the rule of law should not depend on the interests of the government of the day. That is why Suriname must also look critically at the mixing of state power and party power.
The president and ministers are political office holders. They may of course have political beliefs and be members of a political party. But the question is whether it is desirable that someone who simultaneously exercises state power also has formal management responsibility within a political organization.
After all, anyone who combines both functions is constantly at the intersection of party interests and state interests. Therefore, it deserves consideration to legally exclude presidents and ministers from formal management positions within political organizations during their terms of office. This is not a ban on party membership or political beliefs. It concerns a clear institutional separation between the management of the state and the day-to-day management of a political organization.
It is precisely this separation that can strengthen citizens’ confidence in the government. The position of the Public Prosecution Service also deserves special attention. The Public Prosecution Service has a crucial task in the rule of law: it must prosecute criminal offenses and be able to act professionally and independently. When appointments, dismissals or management become too dependent on political power relations, citizens’ confidence in an independent judicial process can come under pressure.
That brings us back to the core of the hostage-taking of the rule of law. A constitutional state is held hostage when its institutions are no longer sufficiently free to carry out their constitutional task. This does not always have to be done visibly. No judge needs to be put under public pressure. It can also be done more subtly: through appointment procedures, financial dependence, organizational powers, inadequate legislation or too much mixing of party interests and state interests.
That is why Rasoelbaks’ warning is important. He does not argue against modernization of the judiciary. It is precisely about reform that actually strengthens the judiciary and does not unintentionally make it dependent.
Suriname is therefore faced with a fundamental choice: do we want institutions that are dependent on the political rulers of the moment, or do we want institutions that are strong enough to also hold the government to the law?
The answer should be clear. With every proposed change in the law, the question should therefore not only be asked: “What do we want to change?” But above all: “Which power gains more influence as a result, which power loses influence and what safeguards protect citizens?”
This requires a broad discussion. The judiciary, the Public Prosecution Service, the legal profession, legal experts, parliament and society must actually be heard before major reforms are implemented. The rule of law does not belong to a government, a political party, parliament or the judiciary. She belongs to society.
Anyone who weakens the independence of the rule of law today for political reasons may discover tomorrow that the same weakened rule of law is used against himself. The ‘boomerang effect’ that Rasoelbaks warns about.
Suriname therefore does not need laws that further concentrate power, but laws and institutions that limit power. The best reform is not the reform that makes the government stronger, but the reform that better protects citizens against any government that becomes too powerful.
RA Boldewijn, LBB
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