Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has dramatically changed some countries’ strategic positions on neutrality. The unilateral and illegal attacks by the USA and Israel on Iran have reinforced a turning point with far-reaching and long-term repercussions across wider Europe and, arguably, made the concept of neutrality obsolete at best, or tenuous at worst.
The concept of neutrality has existed as long as the advent of conflicts between states. The first mention of neutrality in Western writing was in Thucydides’ “The History of the Peloponnesian War” (431 BC). At that time, the island of Melos attempted to remain neutral throughout Sparta’s war with Athens but lost due to power politics.
The United Nations defines neutrality as non-participation in war, adopting an ‘openness’ or ‘impartiality’ to it. This focus on a wartime stance, however, overlooks concepts like peacetime neutrality, foreign policy neutrality, neutralisation, or ad hoc neutrality. So, in today’s multipolar world, which is increasingly characterised by constant wars, is neutrality still a viable and legitimate concept?
Malta’s neutrality has to be understood within the context of the time when Dom Mintoff forcefully promoted it in the early Sixties. The Cold War was raging. At that time, Malta had joined the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) with countries like India, Egypt, and Yugoslavia in espousing strategic autonomy and rejecting imperialist interests. Initially seen by many as a turn towards Russia, China, and communism, it eventually became the accepted mantra.
Today, neutrality does not mean that the state concerned just sits on the sidelines, simply that it isn’t drawn into power politics. The Russia-Ukraine war has made this very clear. India for example, has preserved its defence and energy ties with Russia, while at the same time nurturing close relations with the U.S.A and the EU too. Similarly, Malta has provided medical equipment, accepted refugees, reaffirmed its commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and enforced EU sanctions against Russia, but maintains diplomatic relations with the aggressor.
The neutrality we practise is not neutralisation. We have no international agreement which legally recognises our institutional neutrality, like Finland had in its post WWII treaty with the Soviet Union. What we have is a Declaration signed by Italy in 1980 which took note of Malta’s neutral and non-aligned status, and in which Italy undertakes to refer any threats to this status to the UN Security Council and to consider “other measures, not excluding military assistance, necessary to meet the situation.” Then we have an Aide Memoire with the USSR (inherited by Russia) signed in 1981 which makes more or less the same commitment. Our neutrality is recognised internationally, including in the EU accession treaty, but it is a de facto type of neutrality, like Ireland’s and Sweden’s, not a permanent one like that of Switzerland.
In Malta, the issue has risen again to the top of the agenda. On 31 March, Prime Minister Robert Abela stressed that the principle of neutrality remains as relevant as ever amid global instability. He claimed that “what had, until recently, been questioned by some, now stands as a prescient decision,” adding that “many were saying it no longer has value in the modern day.”
A more perceptive approach was that of the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ian Borg. In a live debate hosted by Mark Laurence Zammit on Il-Każin, Borg said that “the Maltese do not want Malta to invest in defence but want the EU to protect Malta if the need arises.” He also correctly remarked that different PN and PL administrations have managed to reach a balance between safeguarding the country’s neutrality and contributing to humanitarian aid.
It bears repeating Clause 3 of the Constitution. It describes neutrality as a policy of “non-alignment” and refusal to participate in any military alliance. In particular, it prohibits any foreign military bases in Malta and disallows the use of military facilities in Malta by any foreign forces “except at the request of the Government of Malta” in the event of any armed attack on, or threat to, the country’s neutrality, sovereignty, independence or territorial integrity, or for the purposes of measures or actions decided by the Security Council of the United Nations.
This may sound quite clear, but in fact is open to various interpretations. For example, while the clause provides that the Government itself may wayside the provision if Malta is attacked, it implicitly acknowledges that neutrality is no defence in itself. There is also no clear provision regarding the termination of any military alliances or facilities in the aftermath of such an attack, and this presumably depends on the good judgment of the government at the time.
Another question is the nature of any attacks or threats to our neutrality, independence, and territorial integrity. Attacks may be both physical (a bombardment or an invasion) and, in today’s world, virtual (a massive attack on our critical infrastructure or financial institutions, say). But while it may be easy to attribute physical attacks to some foreign power, virtual ones can be quite obscure. So, one can see the need for a military alliance in the case of the former, but how do we manage the latter? Can the government justify entering into one, even if no bombs have fallen on us or no foreign troops have set foot here?
Even more complicated is the issue of threats. By their very nature, threats can be very explicit, but they can also be very nebulous. Let’s imagine that President Trump was to say that he expects Malta to support the USA in its war on Iran by allowing American military aircraft to land here instead of at Sigonella, failing which he would blockade Malta on a certain date. That is very explicit. But what if he were to say that Malta could face serious consequences and might send a couple of 74+ Arleigh Burke-class destroyers just outside our territorial seas? That’s an implicit threat – it could be just his normal bluster, or it could be deadly serious. At what point would there be an unequivocal justification for a military alliance with somebody?
If one were to ask the politicians such questions, I can guarantee they would refuse to reply to “speculation,” like they have done in the past. However, such speculation is the bread-and-butter of strategic and logistical planning, and defence preparedness. “By failing to prepare, you are preparing to fail,” Benjamin Franklin once said.
The situation is becoming increasingly complicated by the fall-out from America’s uncoupling from Europe and the pressure to build a European defence capability as part of the Common Security and Defence Policy. The EU’s military strategy is being driven by the Readiness 2030 roadmap, which aims to build a robust defence union by 2030, invest €800 billion to bolster industrial capacity, enhance military mobility, and modernize armed forces. This includes deepening collaboration with NATO.
Our government fully supports the CSDP. Malta already participates in EU structures like the EU Military Staff (EUMS). Unlike neutral Ireland, we have balked at participating in Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and have not funded lethal weapons, but we remain ready to contribute to the EU’s defence readiness. Would any belligerent nations with an eye on Malta readily accept that such participation is consonant with our neutrality?
Over the centuries, there have been innumerable efforts to counter the brutality of war by securing a fair balance between a belligerent’s right to inflict damage on the enemy, and a neutral’s right to avoid the consequences of a war in which it is not involved. This balance, however, does not mean that neutrals will not be affected by the international situation in negative ways.
The inclusion of the rights of neutrals in Western legal doctrine was the work of the legal scholar Hugo Grotius, who addressed the subject in his “On the Law of War and Peace” published 400 years ago. He wrote that states could trade impunity for their territory, as well as security for their trade and navigation, in exchange for their impartiality and abstention from a conflict.
During the 19th century, neutrality played an essential role in the international system. Clarifying the regime of neutrality was discussed by some 40 countries from Europe, America, and Asia at the second Hague Peace Conference in 1907. Among other things, the conference agreed on an international legal framework for the rights and duties of neutrals.
However, the Second World War ushered a degradation of neutrality. Though some twenty European countries declared their neutrality in 1939, only six managed to stay out of the war. German invasions, pressure from Berlin, and specific interests drew a number of countries into the conflict. Moreover, the configuration of the war made it very difficult to maintain neutrality, abstention, and impartiality. This meant it was more accurate to speak of non-belligerence.
As a result, the Second World War marked a legal disintegration of neutrality, because relations between countries taking part in the war and those abstaining were no longer based on a common referent. Since 1945, the increasing forms of confrontation and belligerence, along with the increase in trade and international circulations, have made it difficult to apply a law of neutrality regulating an intermediary state between war and peace.
Conventional definitions of neutrality may seem outdated, but the concept of strategic autonomy is as salient as ever. In this 21st-century, neutral engagement is about being pro-active, rather than passive, while retaining the realistic ability to know when to engage, when to abstain, and where to preserve resilience in an increasingly disaggregated global order.
In an increasingly fractious and transactional world, where principles of international law are being flouted with impunity, Malta’s neutrality remains a key component of our foreign and security policy. However, there is a sore need for an intense consideration of the new world order and analysis of its implications for, and impact on, our neutrality. This should not be left to off-the-cuff remarks or haphazard statements in some time of crises, but should be the fruit of a deep analysis, including expert opinions of various issues, similar to that conducted in Ireland in 2023.
Frans Camilleri is an economist. He studied at Oxford and University of East Anglia, is a former corporate head at Air Malta, and has served on various public and private boards.
