Writer and political analyst Wissam Afifa to Al-Shorouk:
The Israeli occupation continues to violate the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, through raids, assassinations, and military operations, at a time when the files of withdrawal, reconstruction, and a permanent settlement are still at a standstill, which puts the agreement to an increasing test of its ability to actually stop the war. While the mediators focus on preventing the return of widespread escalation, Palestinian writer and political analyst Wissam Afifa believes that the scene is moving towards redefining the truce, so that it transforms from an agreement to end the war into a framework for managing the conflict at a low pace, with the occupation maintaining what it considers “freedom of military action” within the Strip.
In an interview with Al-Shorouk, Afifa warns that the continuation of violations without clear deterrence mechanisms gradually weakens the meaning of the ceasefire, and makes each new crime more likely to turn into a fait accompli, criticizing the limited tools of mediators and the American administration to oblige the occupation to implement the agreement. It also links part of the escalation to internal political calculations in Israel, especially with the approaching elections, without reducing military operations to the electoral factor alone, and addresses the possibilities of repeating the truce model in Lebanon inside Gaza, international guarantees, and the future of the agreement in light of the continuation of military operations.
Has Israel practically evaded its ceasefire obligations?
The problem is no longer a single violation that can be contained, but rather the repetition and expansion of military operations until a ceasefire no longer means an actual ceasefire. Nearly a year after the agreement, raids and assassinations are still continuing, while the files of withdrawal, reconstruction, and permanent settlement remain unresolved. Estimates indicate that more than 1,300 Palestinians have been martyred in Gaza since the beginning of the truce, while the number of martyrs since the beginning of the war is close to 74,000 martyrs.
Will these violations lead to the collapse of the truce?
So far, we are facing a gray area: the agreement has not collapsed, but it does not exist in practice, and is rather eroding from within. The continuation of assassinations and war crimes raises the possibility of field responses that will re-escalate. Therefore, the real danger is not a declared decision to cancel the truce, but rather its gradual collapse under the weight of the accumulated violations, or the continuation of killing under the pretext of calm, which is a dangerous situation.
Why does the action of sponsor states appear limited? What are its tools?
Unfortunately, because the priority of the mediators has shifted to preventing a return to a wide-scale war, and not entering into a political confrontation with the occupying state to stop violations and breaches. Today, they appear helpless and do not have actual tools, even at a minimum, such as: political and diplomatic pressure, linking cooperation and aid to the implementation of the agreement, exerting direct American pressure on the occupation, and activating clear oversight mechanisms for violations. The problem is not the lack of tools as much as it is the will to use them and take a decisive decision to prevent the continuation of crimes in Gaza.
Have mediators shifted from ensuring agreement to simply containing its crises?
Right…this is what it shows in practice. The mediators often move on the basis of containing the widespread escalation and bypassing the explosion of the entire scene, and with time the criterion for success becomes preventing the collapse of the truce, even in its formal form, without ensuring its implementation on the ground. This is a dangerous equation imposed by the occupation, and it turns into a fait accompli, in which those who mediated and sponsored the agreement accept. While they exerted accumulated pressure on the resistance and the factions.
Where are the peace council and international bodies?
The main headline is the failure of the American administration to implement the Trump plan and Mladenov’s map, even though they are generally subject to the conditions of the occupation. The dilemma is that institutions and intermediaries can issue warnings and make plans, but they do not automatically have enforcement power on the ground. The reconstruction of Gaza itself is still far away, while the occupying state requires Hamas to advance its disarmament files, despite the latter’s agreement to collect and neutralize heavy weapons. That is, the political path and the agreement that the American president promoted as his achievement has not yet turned into a clear binding mechanism for the occupation, which rejects, obstructs, and imposes a new reality.
What is the impact of internal Israeli political calculations?
Of course, the scene cannot be separated from the Israeli elections scheduled for October 27, 2026, and from the intense competition within the political arena in the entity. In such an environment, the Gaza and security issues become part of the electoral discourse and political bidding, but it is difficult to reduce all military operations to the electoral factor alone. There are also military and security considerations declared by the government and the army, in addition to external and regional factors and conflict in other arenas in the region, because the leadership of the occupation government sees in Gaza the easiest arena to present achievements compared to failures or risks facing the entity in other arenas.
Does Israel want to impose an equation: a ceasefire with freedom of military action?
There is no doubt that this is a central goal at this stage, and it is a condition that I emphasized to the American administration. Accordingly, the cessation of large-scale operations becomes in exchange for the occupation army retaining the right to assassinate, bomb, and incursion under the pretext that there is a security threat. Based on this equation, we are today faced with a redefinition of the agreement: not an end to the war, but rather a low-tempo management of it.
Can the Lebanon model be replicated in Gaza?
There is a relative similarity, and this scenario is possible in terms of the goal… a broad cessation of fighting does not prevent intermittent strikes that are justified by security.
But Gaza is more fragile and complex; The population density, the extent of the destruction, the presence of the occupation forces over an area of 65%, and the issues of withdrawal, weapons, and reconstruction make any breach there more likely to quickly turn into a broader confrontation, especially in light of the occupation’s ease in penetrating the bases in Gaza.
What remains of international guarantees if this equation takes hold?
Unfortunately, this is a fall and a failure for the international community, as a guarantee that is not accompanied by a clear political price for violating it gradually loses its value.
Then the agreement turns from a framework for ending the war into an umbrella for managing the conflict and rearranging the field, while the population remains under the threat of strikes, reconstruction remains suspended, and the occupation has free hands. And challenges the world.
Are we facing a test of the agreement or the beginning of its collapse?
Finally… we are facing a serious test of the ability of the agreement, the mediators, and the American administration to put limits on war crimes. There is no data yet to suggest that a return to all-out war has become inevitable, but the most dangerous indicator is the habit of violations and violations, as a fait accompli. Every crime committed by the occupation takes place without a clear response mechanism that makes the next operation easier, and gradually weakens the meaning of the ceasefire, which has turned into unilateral exhaustion. The occupation against the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.
