India’s nuclear doctrine has remained largely unchanged for over two decades, even as its security environment has shifted dramatically. Since its operationalisation in 2003, China’s military rise has accelerated, Pakistan’s nuclear posture has evolved, disruptive technologies have reshaped deterrence, and geopolitical competition has become more multipolar. Yet, the doctrine’s core principles — credible minimum deterrence and a declared No First Use (NFU) posture — have endured, albeit with a specific provision retaining the option of nuclear retaliation following a major biological or chemical attack on India or Indian forces. The question is whether a framework crafted for the early 2000s remains fully aligned with the security challenges of the mid-2020s.
A doctrine for another era, strategic shifts
India’s nuclear doctrine emerged from the distinct strategic context of the late 1990s. The 1998 Pokhran-II tests established India as a nuclear weapons state, while Kargil (1999) showed that nuclear deterrence did not rule out conventional war. The 1999 Draft Nuclear Doctrine and the Cabinet Committee on Security’s January 4, 2003 decision sought to reconcile deterrence with restraint. The 2003 decision operationalised a posture based on credible minimum deterrence, No First Use (NFU) and massive retaliation to a nuclear attack, supported by a survivable second-strike capability and firm civilian control. Judged by its original objectives, the doctrine has provided continuity, predictability and strategic stability for more than two decades. The question is whether the assumptions underpinning it remain stable.
The strategic environment underpinning the framework has changed in three important ways. First, China and Pakistan have grown more strategically aligned. When the doctrine was formulated, the two nuclear-armed neighbours posed distinct challenges; today, those challenges are increasingly interconnected. China has expanded and modernised its nuclear forces, strengthened military infrastructure along the Line of Actual Control and deepened defence cooperation with Pakistan. Pakistan has diversified its nuclear capabilities, including tactical nuclear weapons intended to offset India’s conventional advantage. India must therefore account for the possibility that pressures from two closely aligned nuclear adversaries could interact during a crisis.
The second shift is technological. Artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, space-based surveillance, hypersonic weapons and ballistic missile defence are reshaping deterrence by shortening decision-making timelines, increasing the vulnerability of command-and-control networks and complicating assumptions about assured retaliation. These technologies do not invalidate the doctrine’s core principles, but they alter the environment in which they must operate. Nuclear deterrence ultimately depends on the alignment of doctrine, capability and survivability.
The third shift is geopolitical. The Indo-Pacific has become a key arena of great-power competition, while the international system has grown more multipolar. U.S.-China rivalry, closer China-Russia coordination and India’s expanding partnerships have reshaped the security environment. Nuclear doctrine can no longer be viewed solely through bilateral deterrence; regional crises are increasingly shaped by wider geopolitical competition.
Review, not revision
Strategic doctrines are policy instruments, not immutable documents. In India’s case, a review could examine emerging technologies, command-and-control resilience, second-strike capabilities and the continuing relevance of existing concepts, including the doctrine’s approach to retaliation.
The issue of massive retaliation deserves scrutiny. Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons were intended to complicate India’s response options below the level of strategic exchange. A review could assess whether India’s declaratory posture provides sufficient deterrent clarity across nuclear contingencies, without necessarily changing its core principles.
There are, however, reasons for caution. India’s doctrine has reinforced its image as a restrained and responsible nuclear power while providing continuity in deterrence. Ambiguity over established principles, particularly NFU, could create uncertainty, encourage adversaries to recalibrate and complicate crisis management. The priority, therefore, should be to strengthen operational capabilities, modernise delivery systems and improve command-and-control resilience rather than reopen declaratory policy.
A review of NFU need not mean abandoning it. It could reaffirm its rationale, clarify its scope and ensure that supporting capabilities remain credible. Reviewing a doctrine is not the same as revising it.
Building credible capabilities
For India, any doctrinal review should also assess survivability, command and control, intelligence, early warning, cyber resilience and the nuclear triad. The aim should be to ensure that India’s declared policy remains backed by credible capabilities in a changing strategic environment, while aligning nuclear policy with its broader diplomatic objectives and strategic autonomy.
Ultimately, a nuclear doctrine is an instrument of statecraft, not an immutable policy. India’s commitment to restraint, credible deterrence and responsible nuclear stewardship remains an enduring strategic asset.
Advitya Madan, an analyst on geopolitics, international and defence affairs, commanded 15 Punjab in Lebanon under the United Nations Flag, commanded 27 Sector as DIG in Churachandpur, Manipur, and was Brigadier Operational Logistics in HQ Western Command
Published – September 26, 2026 12:08 am IST
