From “special debts” to “marshalling yards” to “misappropriation”: The debate about the use of investments from the Special assets Infrastructure and climate neutrality (SVIK) has recently come to a head. The focus is on the question of additionality, i.e. whether the SVIK actually encourages new investments.
On closer inspection, three dimensions of additionality can be distinguished. Constitutional additionality is guaranteed if the investments, in accordance with the requirements of the constitutional amendment, make up at least ten percent of the federal budget. This requirement is met. Criticism of this regulation should be directed at the constitutional legislature, not the federal government.
Budgetary additionality, on the other hand, measures the additivity of investments in contrast to existing or planned budgetary approaches. It is about comparisons of budget positions between the core budget, the Climate and Transformation Fund (KTF) and the SVIK. In fact, there were shifts in investment funds here, which also helped to reduce consolidation pressures.
For example, the transfer of funds to the SVIK for the maintenance of railway lines or housing construction is criticized. However, such postponements are necessary under the Federal Budget Regulations if it is planned to expand approaches already budgeted in the core budget with new measures or investment funds. Expenditures and commitment appropriations for the same purpose cannot be budgeted for different titles. It is therefore logical to shift the entire approaches from the core budget to the SVIK.
The current debate will be shortened
However, these fiscally necessary shifts do not rule out additionality in fiscal policy. For this perspective, the investments in the current financial planning must be compared with the financial planning of the traffic light coalition. At this point the current debate is abbreviated. The impact of the infrastructure and climate neutrality special fund is often measured using a static comparison – for example, whether investments are increasing compared to the status quo or previous plans. Depending on the approach, it is assumed that the financial planning of the traffic light coalition could have been implemented or that the budgetary framework for 2024 could have been transferred to 2025. This approach ignores the fact that the original plans were subject to considerable consolidation pressures and could only have been implemented to a limited extent.
The decisive factor for financial policy additionality is therefore not simply a comparison of the absolute level of investment. Rather, the question is: How would investments in the initial fiscal situation likely have developed without the infrastructure and climate neutrality special fund? It is precisely this adapted reference path that we will use as a basis in a study that will be published shortly.
The starting point is the financial planning of the previous government, which is hypothetically financed under the most realistic assumptions possible. For example, the traffic light budget draft for 2026 envisaged global underspending of 30 billion euros in the core budget alone. However, a maximum of eight billion euros would have been realistic for expected reduced outflows and legally secured, which would have meant an expected consolidation of 22 billion euros. The new federal government had a marathon ahead of it when it came to the budget, in which it had to start several kilometers before the starting line because of the unfinanced traffic light budget.
Thesis about the marshalling yard is based on implausible assumptions
Part of this consolidation would have come at the expense of investments. This is not only politically plausible, but also empirically understandable in the financial literature: in historical consolidation phases of public finances, public investments were significantly reduced. As a rule, public investments – unlike social benefits, for example – are not legally bound and are therefore comparatively disposable.
The resulting finding is clear: A large part of the investments made by the special infrastructure and climate neutrality fund of around 177 billion euros by 2028 would not have been made under these conditions. From a financial policy perspective, around 95 percent of these funds are actually additional. This refutes the theses of a “marshalling yard” and “misuse”. They are based on implausible assumptions about the reference scenario, for example by ignoring the consolidation constraints or by implicitly updating the financial policy framework of the past few years.
When assessing the economy as a whole, it is less important to look in the rearview mirror than to look ahead, namely how the fiscal policy impulse translates into economic growth. That is why the federal government is developing goal- and impact-oriented monitoring of the progress and effects of investments. Monitoring is intended not only to create transparency, but also to form a comprehensive control element that contributes to the greatest possible impact of the investment funds.
