Matthew Samuda is probably well-meaning. But his proposal that the review of wealth declarations by members of Parliament’s Integrity Commission (IC) Oversight Committee be removed from the IC is a bad idea.
But worse is the agency to which he suggests these income, assets and liability filings should be sent: the Financial Investigations Division (FID). As Mr Samuda must be aware, giving FID this job would be highly controversial. It would reopen old wounds over FID’s leadership; likely lead to questions about motive; and possibly ignite claims that this is an ongoing attempt at weakening the IC.
Matthew Samuda would not wish that.
The IC, a commission of Parliament, is the independent anti-corruption body to which legislators, public officials who earn at least J$12 million a year, as well as specified civil servants, have to file annual reports for assessments of whether their reported wealth comports with their known incomes. It also reviews the award and implementation of government contracts.
Previously, these functions were handled by three separate agencies, all of which were subsumed into the IC by a 2017 law that gave the commission its own, independent prosecutor to handle breaches of the legislation, as well as cases of illicit enrichment under the Corruption Prevention Act.
While the law provides the commission significant operating independence, it prevents the agency from speaking publicly about its investigations prior to reports being tabled in Parliament. Further, the House of Representative established a special oversight committee, which reviews the IC’s reports and has the power to summon commission officials to answer questions.
ANTAGONISTIC RELATIONSHIP
In recent years, government members of that committee have developed an often-antagonistic relationship with the IC, stemming mainly from investigations by the commission with negative determinations against members of the administration, including Prime Minister Dr Andrew Holness.
Separately, government members of another committee that undertook a review of the Integrity Commission Act, frequently proposed changes to the law that would effectively weaken the independence of the commission and place it under direct control of politicians.
Mr Samuda, a relatively new member of the oversight committee, was not part of those contentious deliberations.
However, in his intervention at a meeting of the oversight committee last week, he suggested it to be “an odd arrangement” for the integrity declarations of members of the committee to be reviewed by the body for which they have monitoring obligations.
He claimed that some parliamentarians, on either side of the aisle, shied away from serving on the committee for “fear of victimisation, whether real or imagined”.
However, the reporting regime that he finds troublesome worked well for several decades, including under the commissions that preceded the IC. There is no evidence, credible or otherwise, of the victimisation of legislators, or anyone, by the IC.
Indeed, the IC operates within discreet and independent operating structures that provide significant insulation against groupthink, or a herd approach to its actions.
For instance, the director of information and complaints receives the annual filings from the specified people. These are assessed for compliance with the law and for accuracy.
SHORTCOMINGS
It is only in the event of shortcomings, and after declarants have had opportunities to correct errors or omissions, that the information is forwarded to the director of investigation for deeper, formal probes. The director of investigation can either conclude that there was no integrity breach or breaking of a law, or can recommend that the director of corruption prosecution file charges against the individual.
The director of corruption prosecution is not bound by the investigator’s recommendation, but acts on the strengths of the investigative findings and the law. If the IC’s prosecutor goes off on a wild frolic, the director of public prosecutions (DPP) can exercise her constitutional powers to end a malicious prosecution.
On top of all of this sit the commissioners, five people of high integrity, including, always, two former judges – one of whom is the chairman.
Beyond the integrity of the current system, Mr Samuda’s proposal would create a bifurcated arrangement for integrity declarations by legislators. One set, those who are not members of the IC oversight commission, would make their statutory declarations to the commission. Committee members would send theirs to another agency.
“… If you are providing oversight, your files should perhaps go through to the director of information to be reviewed by FID, not the same entity that you are providing oversight for,” Mr Samuda said.
Apart from attempting to cure a mischief that doesn’t exist, Mr Samuda’s first choice as an alternative is likely to prove a pain point in any public discussion of the question. It will revive the contentious debate over Dennis Chung’s appointment in May 2025, to head the FID, after he had publicly raised questions about some of the IC observations and conclusions in an investigation into Prime Minister Holness’ finances.
Given the limitations of its own powers and resources, the IC had requested the FID, an agency of the finance ministry, to undertake further investigations of the prime minister. Dr Holness has challenged the IC investigative finding in court, as well as the constitutionality of elements of the illicit corruption law.
Perhaps these things should be allowed to be played out in court, without attempting to add new twists to the IC’s structure and operating regimes.
