The difficult dilemma of the opposition. to tell the world that there is no democracy in RA or to dictate the national agenda with all political levers? Abraham Gasparyan

Boycotting the work of the opposition, the parliament, or mass refusal of mandates does not lead to a weakening of the government, on the contrary, it strengthens the institutional positions of the ruling power. The opposition usually takes this step when it is convinced that the electoral process did not express the public will or when it wants to create a crisis of legitimacy. However, in practice, such tactics have rarely led to the resignation of the government or the appointment of new elections. With one exception: a total, systematic, disciplined, multi-layered, targeted, blitz rebellion carried out with the participation of interest and pressure groups, state bureaucracy and the masses of the people.

The seats of the forces that refused the mandates of the National Assembly are not automatically or by force of law transferred to other parties that have not passed the electoral threshold. The necessary and mandatory rule of “representation of 3 political forces” in the Parliament is applied at the stage of the initial distribution of mandates, not in the case of resignations after the elections. Let’s discuss two scenarios:

“Strong Armenia”, “Armenia” alliance and PAP, let’s conventionally call the collective opposition, refuse their parliamentary mandates with a complete list (it is a difficult issue, intra-party, intra-alliance iron discipline and vertical decision-making mechanism are needed), and only CP remains in the NA with the 61 mandates it received.

If the “collective opposition” takes the mandates, the National Assembly starts its work, the opposition renounces all the mandates from the very first session and the parliament remains without opposition.

If the three opposition forces refuse their mandates not only with elected deputies, but also with entire lists, then a serious constitutional and legal problem arises. Why? According to the RA Constitution, the institutional existence of not only the majority, but also the opposition must be ensured in the National Assembly. RA legislation stipulates that the formation of the National Assembly has nothing to do with the mandatory and actual presence of the opposition. The Constitution did not provide for such a state of collective boycott and a concrete solution to get out of it.

The worst option is when the opposition takes the mandates, the National Assembly starts work and then gives up the mandates. It turns out that the National Assembly has already been formed, the first session has been convened, the deputies have received mandates, the parliament has started exercising its powers. Then, if they refuse the mandates, they are first replaced by the next candidates from the same lists. If all subsequent candidates also refuse and the entire lists are exhausted, then the mandates remain vacant. The actual result remains: CP-61 deputies, 44 vacant seats, which means that the National Assembly is formed and the government does not have any problems.

What is the political consequence of all this?

If the CP has 61 deputies and the remaining 44 mandates are vacant, then.

CP will have a stable majority,

will not be able to pass important laws,

positions reserved for the opposition may remain vacant,

a deep crisis of legitimacy and political representation will be created,

the advantage of the constitutional majority, therefore, the legal and pseudo-legitimate packaging of the “peace deal” with Azerbaijan will remain an unrealizable dream.

International experience and possible steps of the opposition

If the CP has 61 deputies in the newly elected parliament, and all the mandates of the opposition forces actually remain vacant, then legally the parliament can continue to function, but politically, a serious crisis of representativeness and legitimacy will be formed. Such situations are rare in different countries, but international experience shows that mass boycotts of the opposition have usually been more a tool of political pressure than an effective mechanism for regime change or systemic change.

For example, Bangladesh’s main opposition force, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and a number of other opposition parties boycotted the 2024 elections. the election of the parliament, claiming that it is not possible to hold a free, fair and transparent vote under the conditions of the current government. The calculation of the opposition was as follows: by not participating in the elections, to show that the future parliament does not have real political representation and to question its legitimacy. However, the result was the opposite. The ruling Awami League retained power and continued to control parliament. The state administration system did not stop functioning, the process of adopting laws was not disrupted, and the opposition lost the parliamentary chair, representation in the commissions, and the possibility of daily control over the government. Talk of a political crisis continued, but institutionally, power became even more centralized.

In 2005 Venezuela’s main opposition forces decided to boycott the parliamentary elections, declaring that the electoral process does not guarantee equal competitive conditions. Their goal was to challenge the election results for the international community and show that the parliament does not reflect political pluralism. However, the consequences were quite severe for the opposition itself. The pro-government forces gained almost complete control of the parliament and were able to implement legislative and constitutional changes without serious political imbalance. Later, many leaders of the Venezuelan opposition themselves admitted that the boycott was a strategic mistake, because it actually gave the government the only institutional platform where it was possible to fight against it. After that experience, the opposition mainly returned to the field of electoral and parliamentary struggle.

In 2020 Before the parliamentary elections, a significant part of the Serbian opposition announced a boycott, arguing that the political competition is highly unequal and the media sphere is disproportionately controlled by the government. The logic of the opposition was that not participating in the elections would create a problem of legitimacy and increase international pressure on the authorities. After the election, however, the parliament was formed and started functioning without the presence of an influential opposition. The ruling camp gained almost unlimited control over the legislature. Although the international organizations registered problems of political competition, the functioning of the government was not affected by it. Within the opposition, the view that staying out of the parliament reduced their political influence and allowed the government to more quietly control the state system became widespread.

In the post-Soviet area, the experience of Georgia is more instructive. Here, the opposition did not participate in the election, but after participating, it refused to fully implement the mandates. In 2020 after the parliamentary elections, the main opposition forces declared that the results were falsified and refused to participate in the normal work of the parliament. However, even under these conditions, the parliament was formed and began to function with the majority of the ruling “Georgian Dream” party. A few months later, the opposition forces faced an important problem. the street struggle did not turn into a change of power, while they lost the leverage to influence the political agenda. As a result of European mediation and internal political negotiations, a significant part of the opposition returned to the parliament. In fact, it was accepted that even in the conditions of disputed elections, completely abandoning the parliamentary platform gives more dividends to the government than to the opposition.

In 2019 Albania’s main opposition parties, the “Democratic Party of Albania” and its allies, not only boycotted the parliament, but also about 60 deputies collectively resigned their mandates, demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Edi Rama and early elections. The calculation of the opposition was as follows: create a constitutional and political crisis, under which the government will have to negotiate new elections. But the parliament was not dissolved. The next candidates on the electoral lists received the mandates, a new parliamentary composition was formed, and the government continued its activities. The result was that the opposition remained without the levers of parliamentary influence for several years and later returned to the field of electoral struggle. This is an important example, because it was not just a boycott, but a massive surrender of mandates.

In Kosovo in 2014-2016. the opposition forces several times resorted to a long boycott of the parliament, and some leaders even renounced their parliamentary mandates, declaring that the parliament has turned into a body that legitimizes the decisions of the government. However, even under those conditions, the state system continued to function. The opposition was able to create political pressure, but not to a level that would lead to the removal of the government or the automatic dissolution of the parliament. Instead, the political crisis was resolved through negotiations, coalition rearrangements, or regular elections.

In fact, international practice shows that the mass resignation of the opposition usually causes three main consequences.

the government maintains the parliamentary majority and continues to exercise its powers,

the question of political representation and legitimacy deepens, especially if the opposition has received a significant vote of the electorate.

the opposition loses a number of tools for parliamentary control, legislative initiatives, investigative commissions and forming a political agenda.

Therefore, if in the described scenario the KP remains with 61 MPs and the other 44 mandates are vacant, from a legal point of view a management crisis will not necessarily occur, but the political system will appear in a state that is usually assessed in international practice as a weakening of competitive democracy and a crisis of institutional representation of the opposition. That is why the opposition forces in different countries, even in the case of disputing the election results, often return to the parliament after some time, considering that the possibilities of fighting from within are often more effective than a complete boycott.

P.S. The article does not discuss the questionable legitimacy of the election, the illegal procedures, the complicity of the CEC, mass election violations, unconstitutional government interventions, repressions, arrests, and in general, the anti-democratic nature of the election.

Abraham Gasparyan