Prime Minister Dr Andrew Holness’ aspiration to transform Jamaica into an economy akin to Singapore or Dubai is one that most Jamaicans would wish to see realised, although recent geopolitical tensions — including Donald Trump’s posture towards Iran — could place stress on the Dubai model.
However, translating this ambition into concrete achievements will require more than declarations of intent or the macroeconomic stability Jamaica has enjoyed for more than a decade, important though that is.
First, there must be a clear definition of the model being pursued, rather than hazy notions of high-rise buildings and wealthy people promenading along wide boulevards. This should be followed by strategic, measurable policy deliverables, supported by the requisite human and financial capital. Further, success will require genuine, functional partnerships between the Jamaican State and other sectors of the national economy, particularly education.
In other words, the vision outlined by Dr Holness must be grounded in a coherent industrial policy. That is not Vision 2030. Vision 2030 is precisely what it says — a vision, not a strategic programme or a set of development tactics.
In a speech at last Thursday night’s Jamaica Chamber of Commerce (JCC) annual awards function, Prime Minister Holness said, “Jamaica could become like Dubai or Singapore” — countries that leveraged strategic locations to become financial hubs, logistics centres, global playgrounds and, especially in Singapore’s case, centres of industrial production.”
Since its separation from Malaysia in the early 1960s, Singapore — with a population of just over six million on an island roughly the size of St Thomas — has transformed itself into one of the world’s wealthiest countries. The IMF projects its 2026 GDP at US$659.57 billion, with per capita income nearing US$108,000 — more than 13 times Jamaica’s.
Dubai, by contrast, is a semi-autonomous city-state within the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Its GDP was approximately US$140 billion in 2025, accounting for about a quarter of the UAE’s total output.
While there are similarities in the development paths of Dubai and Singapore, there are also important differences. Both began as underdeveloped territories and leveraged their strategic locations to attract global investment.
Dubai benefited from a natural resource advantage — oil — though in smaller quantities than some of its Gulf neighbours. It used early oil revenues to finance infrastructure such as ports and airports, enabling its transition into a modern finance and logistics centre, a tourism hub, and a regional outlet for more conservative neighbouring societies.
Singapore, on the other hand, lacked natural resources but benefited from strong, disciplined governance, sustained industrial policy, and relatively low levels of corruption. It began with low-wage manufacturing — similar to Jamaica in the 1950s and 1960s — and steadily moved up the value chain through successive industrial phases.
Whereas up to 90 per cent of Dubai’s roughly four million residents are expatriates, Singapore has largely built its development on domestic human capital, complemented by foreign expertise. This reflects its sustained emphasis on education.
For example, more than 40 per cent of Singapore’s 18–23 age cohort is enrolled in universities, and nearly two-thirds (64.4 per cent) of residents age 25 and over have some form of post-secondary qualification. Gross tertiary enrolment exceeds 97 per cent of the relevant age cohort, and approximately 25 per cent of each cohort enters technical and vocational education and training institutions annually.
Singapore therefore possesses a critical mass of skilled workers suited to a modern, technology-driven economy. Additionally, it spends just under two per cent of GDP on research and innovation — a target Jamaica aims to reach by 2035.
Since embarking on economic reforms in 2012, Jamaica has significantly reduced its debt-to-GDP ratio, from nearly 150 per cent to around 70 per cent. However, economic growth has remained sluggish, and productivity has declined by roughly one per cent annually. Weak education outcomes continue to constrain expansion in higher-value sectors, leaving the economy trapped in a low-wage, low-growth, low-value-added cycle.
Escaping this trap is unlikely to occur organically or rapidly. It will require a national conversation and consensus on realistic goals, timelines, and priorities, as well as agreement on the critical conditions needed for transformation. Central to this effort will be reforming the education system and shifting focus from individual productivity constraints to broader measures of total factor productivity.
That conversation — and the shaping of an appropriate industrial policy — must begin now.
