Estonia’s opposition parties are likely headed for an easy win in the next elections, but the price of that easy victory may be that governing later becomes difficult, notes Martin Mölder.
Estonians are a mild-mannered people in times of crisis. The very deep economic downturn of the late 2000s and high unemployment passed without protests. Similarly, the recent period of very high inflation also passed calmly. And now it seems that we are no less mild in political crises than in economic ones.
It is probably no surprise to anyone that Estonia is currently going through a rather exceptional political situation. For quite some time, we have had a government that essentially lacks the support of the electorate. Whether this also affects its mandate to govern is a somewhat more complicated question. As with economic crises, this unusual political situation has not been followed by any notable reaction from voters. Aside from calmly waiting for the next elections — likely hoping they might bring a 180-degree shift in power — there has been little response. Time will tell.
This situation is not inevitable. The current governing parties had opportunities to save themselves but chose not to take them. The Reform Party might have weathered the storm if Kaja Kallas had stepped down in the fall of 2023 in a statesmanlike manner, as President Alar Karis recommended at the time. Back then, the decline in the Reform Party’s support was not so much a problem for the party as a whole, but specifically tied to its leader, as her actions damaged both the party’s and the government’s overall reputation.
Perhaps the Reform Party could have improved matters even later if, well in advance of the 2027 elections, it had changed both its leadership and its political offering. But it now appears that some time ago a decision was made to go into the elections with the current leadership lineup, come what may.
Eesti 200 might have avoided collapse had it apologized for the Johanna-Maria Lehtme scandal, taken full responsibility, and completely replaced its leadership at the time. Perhaps that would have convinced enough of its disillusioned voters to keep the party near the electoral threshold. But history took a different course. Instead, they acted as if nothing objectionable had occurred — and that same attitude carried them to the bottom.
According to polls by Norstat and the Institute for Social Studies, the combined support for governing parties has been well below 20 percent for the past year and below 40 percent for the last two and a half years. The usual level has been between 40 and 50 percent, and since the fall of 2023, consistently fewer than 30 percent of voters have given a positive assessment of the government’s performance. Even fewer approve of the prime minister’s actions.
These are no longer temporary fluctuations; they are a stable condition we have grown accustomed to. Beyond voter trust, broader public confidence has also eroded, though in a more diffuse and less noticeable way. In hindsight, for example, the media tone became significantly more critical of the government in parallel with the Reform Party losing its footing.
Distrust toward certain government actions is no longer confined to EKRE. It has also become an implicit stance among other parties and even mainstream media. The activities of security institutions and the monitoring of citizens have entered public debate to a far greater extent and in a different tone than just a short time ago.
Government projects such as Rail Baltic or a sweeping green transition are likely to cease being “sacred cows” in the near future, as faith and trust in what the state does have diminished. Perhaps the state should do less in general, and the public should continue to approach state authority with much greater skepticism?
What might be the impact of such sustained low support and distrust? Whatever the next government looks like, it will not have an easy task — regardless of what it does or does not do, before or after the elections. It is possible that distrust has become ingrained not only toward the temporary occupants of Stenbock House, but toward governance itself. When distrust has persisted for a long time, rebuilding trust becomes more difficult.
In short, the new government will have to start in a situation where current governance has already trained voters for years to be distrustful and more cynical toward those in power. People have grown accustomed to the idea that someone they do not trust is steering the state — and that nothing can be done about it. Will voters abandon this habit after the elections? Perhaps. But perhaps not.
The ancient Greek king Pyrrhus won battles at such a cost that, by his own account, one more such victory would destroy him. Hence the term “Pyrrhic victory.” Estonia’s opposition parties are likely to face an easy win in the next elections — but the price of that easy victory may be that governing afterward proves difficult.
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