After Russia’s May 9 military parade, Vladimir Putin said that the end of the war is near. His press secretary later explained that Putin is prepared to meet with Ukraine’s president in Moscow or elsewhere, but only if the documents required for signing are ready. All of this creates the impression that Russia has somehow changed its position and is more willing to make peace than before. How do you assess the situation in Kyiv? Have we moved any closer to peace?
Russia has recently shown through its attacks just how interested it is in peace. We have been through an extremely difficult period. Russia does not want peace and is not ready for peace.
The May 9 ceasefire was needed solely for propaganda purposes. You will remember how weak Russia appeared before May 9. In essence, they were asking, even pleading with their partners to put pressure on Ukraine in order to secure a ceasefire for the period of the so-called parade.
So Russia is not interested in peace and, lacking an advantage on the battlefield, continues to attack civilians and infrastructure while also trying to destabilize our society. Ukrainians, however, have once again shown that they are a nation and that justice is on their side. This is our country, we are defending it and we are defending democracy.
We tell our partners that this is not only about Ukraine. This is an existential war not only for Ukraine, but also for Europe and all democratic countries. The consequences of this war will affect both the future security architecture and international law and order.
U.S. negotiators Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner had planned to visit Ukraine, but they have not done so yet, nor have they traveled to Russia. Does this mean the United States is prepared to end its mediation efforts altogether and withdraw from the peace process?
Ukraine’s strategic partners are both the European Union and the United States, and the role of the United States is extremely important. The previous rounds of negotiations, which are currently on hold because of the situation that has developed in Iran, demonstrated a certain degree of success. It was limited, but it was still progress. However, at a time when we see that the attention of U.S. negotiators is entirely focused on developments in the Middle East, the negotiations are unfortunately on hold.
For us, it is important that these negotiations continue because we are committed to the peace process. We are ready to meet in any format, but certainly not on Russian or Belarusian territory. We are prepared to work in a trilateral format as well as in other formats because we operate according to the principle of “nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine, nothing about Europe without Europe.”
We are doing everything possible to achieve a just peace, while Russia is sending no signals whatsoever in that direction. We very much hope that the visit by U.S. negotiators to Kyiv will take place, especially given the important role they play in bringing our fighters back from captivity. Therefore, I would like to once again emphasize both the role of the United States as Ukraine’s strategic partner and the important role it has in achieving a just peace.
What additional pressure can still be brought to bear on Russia?
Sanctions against the shadow fleet and the banking sector must be tightened, but most importantly, all avenues Russia uses to evade sanctions must be closed.
We must deprive Russia of the financial capacity to continue the war so that the cost of its aggression rises with each passing day. Therefore, there is only one solution: maximum pressure from the United States and other international actors on Russia to end its war against Ukraine and be held accountable.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy has described strikes deep inside Russian territory as long-range sanctions. Does that mean conventional sanctions have already exhausted their potential and that Europe can no longer do anything significant in this area because all possible restrictions have already been imposed and are working?
Not exactly. You will recall that the 20th sanctions package was adopted with a significant delay because of Hungary’s position. Today, thank God, €90 billion in aid has been released, the 20th sanctions package has been adopted and we are already working on the 21st package. However, all of this needs to be done much more quickly.
We are grateful to our European and other partners for coordinating sanctions, but they are often imposed according to the principle of “too little, too late.” Russia, meanwhile, is not standing still and reacts more quickly than the institutions responsible for imposing sanctions. Sanctions packages need to be adopted faster and coordinated among the EU, Canada, the United States and other partners.
We also have our own “long-range sanctions” — strikes deep inside enemy territory — because we have the right to defend ourselves under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. We must combine political pressure and the isolation of Russia with sanctions pressure and long-range strikes.
The defense capabilities of both Ukraine and the EU must be strengthened because, as I have already said, this is not only a war against Ukraine — Russia began a hybrid war against the West long ago.
Russia’s objective remains unchanged: to destroy Ukraine or bring it under its control. It will not succeed, but Russia has another goal as well — to divide the world into spheres of influence, with Ukraine serving as a buffer between Russia and the West. These revanchist and imperial ambitions therefore extend far beyond Ukraine’s borders.
How can we force Russia to make peace or at least bring an end to the fighting?
We have proposed mechanisms to our partners such as a coalition for ballistic missile defense and drone agreements. The goal is to combine our expertise with the capabilities of other countries’ defense industries. We need to think about what our security — and Europe’s security — will look like not only tomorrow, but the day after tomorrow and after the war ends.
As long as Russia is not held accountable for its crimes and justice is not served, Russian aggression will continue. All other dictatorships are watching closely to see how the war in Ukraine ends.
You speak about punishing Russia, but how can we punish it when the maximum outcome currently being discussed is a freeze in hostilities along the front line? The process of establishing a special international tribunal to investigate Russia’s crime of aggression was recently completed, but what can it actually achieve?
I do not agree with you. This is an extremely important decision, almost comparable to the Nuremberg Tribunal.
Last year, together with our partners, we made the political decision to launch the process of establishing a special tribunal for Russia’s crime of aggression under the auspices of the Council of Europe. Now, 37 countries have signed the expanded framework agreement establishing the tribunal’s steering committee. This is a historic decision that provides for practical work and we hope that within a year the special tribunal will be operating at full capacity.
This concerns the crime of aggression, which does not fall under the jurisdiction of either the International Criminal Court or the International Court of Justice. Aggression, however, is the primary crime that Russia began committing in 2014 when it temporarily occupied Crimea and parts of the Donbas.
Russia has deported more than 20,000 Ukrainian children from the occupied territories. Therefore, this decision is important from a political, legal and moral standpoint.
The EU is actively discussing the possibility of creating the position of a special representative for relations with Russia. Vladimir Putin has also supported the idea and suggested former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder for the role. It creates the impression that a decision to begin negotiations with Moscow has already been made and that all that remains is to find the right person and appoint a chief negotiator. Do you agree?
I do not agree with your assertion that such an impression already exists. However, we want to see Europe more involved in the peace process than it is at present — that is Ukraine’s position. Nothing concerning Ukraine and European security can be decided without Ukraine and without Europe, especially given that Ukraine is moving closer to Europe.
As for Schröder, he is simply a lobbyist for Russian interests. If we are talking about a representative as such, Europe itself will decide that issue in the future. The common goal of Ukraine and the EU is to achieve a just peace as quickly as possible. Time will tell, but for now the main task is to restore the peace process in its previous trilateral format (Ukraine, Russia and the United States — ed.).
So far, however, there are no signs that Russia has changed its objectives or intends to end the war. Perhaps Russia sees one threat in the fact that Ukraine is a democratic country seeking closer integration with the European Union. For Russia’s dictatorial regime, that represents a threat.
We understand this and will continue our work on the battlefield as well as at the political and diplomatic levels. Our goal is peace, but not peace at any price — rather, a just peace that includes Russia being held accountable. This is one of our red lines, as are our sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Another red line is the return of our people, both prisoners of war and civilians. Then there is the issue of returning the children — of the 20,000 children who were taken, only 2,000 have been brought back. So we welcome any negotiations that bring peace closer, but we will not accept an unjust peace.
What stage has Ukraine’s accession to the European Union reached? President Zelenskyy has said that it could happen this year or, if not, next year.
We understand that EU membership is our priority from both a security and values perspective because today we are defending democracy and security in Europe — and not only in Europe.
We very much hope that all negotiating chapters will be opened by the end of June. We know what our “homework” is and we know which reforms we must implement and complete. We are working toward that goal and hope that next year we will reach the stage of signing an accession treaty with the European Union.
Will that require holding a referendum? Estonia, for example, held such a public vote.
Membership in the EU and NATO is enshrined in our Constitution. Support for EU and NATO membership stands at around 90 percent.
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