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By Odeta Barbullushi and Marina Vulovic
Tirana Times, June 09, 2026 – A new proposal on enlargement was tabled by the French President Emmanuel Macron and the German Chancellor Friedrich Merz at the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Tivat, Montenegro, on June 5, 2026. Its timing could not be more strategic: just a fortnight ago, a letter by German Chancellor Merz, focusing primarily on Ukraine, proposed granting the country the status of an associate member in numerous EU institutions, such as the Council and the Parliament, as well as extending to Ukraine the security guarantees of Article 42 (7) of the Treaty of the EU.
The Tivat proposal aims to address two questions: first, what to offer to the Western Balkans when they are ready for accession, but are blocked by EU member states; and second, in the best-case scenario, when Montenegro and Albania cross the finish line and join the EU, what could be offered to the rest of the region and Moldova.
Though highly political, and what looks like a product of compromise between Germany and France, the proposal also satisfies the Commission’s legitimate demands that a ‘thin’ or ‘purely economic’ integration would require that the candidate countries comply with the entirety of the requirements of the EU acquis and stick to the strict conditions tied to the Fundamentals Cluster.
The proposal follows a long line of previous proposals coming from EU member states as well as from candidates themselves aiming at simplifying and accelerating the process of EU accession amidst geopolitical uncertainties. Gradual integration – an idea originating from think-tanks – was incorporated into Council Conclusions in 2023 and was translated into the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans the same year. However, those decisions were accompanied by the commitment to internal reforms that would simplify the EU’s voting procedures in a number of areas, including enlargement policy. Such a reform never quite materialised at the political level. In the absence of internal reforms, the Merz-Macron non-paper proposes a reform of the enlargement process itself.
Continuity of the Growth Plan – with a Twist
A first reading of the new Merz-Macron non-paper on gradual integration suggests a significant new push to bring the Western Balkans and Moldova closer to the EU before full membership. Yet a closer look reveals that many of its most prominent proposals are not new at all. They repackage, or further specify, measures already foreseen under the EU’s Growth Plan.
These include deeper participation in EU programmes and policies such as Creative Europe, Digital Europe, Erasmus+, Horizon Europe, SEPA, and the “Roam Like at Home” initiative. They also include further integration into the Transport Community, the EU energy market, the Emissions Trading System, green lanes, the Digital Single Market, and EU policies on critical raw materials. Likewise, measures aimed at facilitating trade – such as Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) status, more wide-ranging sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) agreements, Agreements on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAAs) and the reduction of non-tariff barriers between the EU and Western Balkan countries and Moldova – are already part of the Growth Plan agenda.
The non-paper does contain some additions. First, it proposes concrete modalities for participation in meetings with EU institutions as an observer. For the European Commission and European Parliament, participation would be linked to the submission of a membership application, thereby also including potential candidates like Kosovo. For the European Council and the Council of the EU, however, participation would be subject to stricter conditions. For example, attendance at meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council would require the provisional closure of Chapter 31 on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – a threshold that currently no candidate country has reached, even though some fully align with the CFSP.
Whether these new meeting formats would generate substantial added value remains an open question. Candidate countries already have numerous opportunities to engage with EU institutions through EU-Western Balkans summits, Growth Plan Summits, Stabilisation and Association Agreement meetings, intergovernmental conferences, and other established channels. The non-paper therefore raises a legitimate question: does multiplying meeting formats necessarily translate into faster integration or political socialisation with the EU?
Second, the non-paper proposes strengthening security and defence cooperation. Yet many relevant instruments are already in place for many of these countries. Security and Defence Partnerships (SDPs) have already been concluded with Albania, North Macedonia and Moldova. These partnerships cover cooperation with PESCO, cybersecurity, and other security-related areas. Almost all countries have status agreements with Frontex (except Kosovo), while cybersecurity cooperation is also addressed in both the Security and Defence Partnerships and the Growth Plan. Some proposals, such as membership in the EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), would create added value, despite requiring adjustments to existing membership procedures and legal criteria beforehand.
Third, the non-paper proposes a number of measures beyond the Growth Plan, including participation in PESCO projects, the proposed Youth Experience Scheme, EU pooling mechanisms for joint procurement, full access to the Technical Support Instrument, and stronger use of Twinning and TAIEX instruments in specific policy areas.
Taken together, however, the non-paper offers relatively little that goes substantially and technically beyond the Growth Plan – except the proposed European Economic Area+.
The European Economic Area+ as Incentive and Risk
The main takeaway from the non-paper is its final proposition of full participation in the Single Market based on a European Economic Area+ model. The requirements for access are the adoption and implementation of the acquis regarding Clusters 1 to 5 (i.e., the entire acquis) and provisional closure of the relevant negotiating chapters, without prejudice to transitional periods and safeguards.
The implications of this could be significant. In practice, the proposal would create a new stage between the completion of accession negotiations and full EU membership. For countries that are advanced in the accession process, this could provide tangible benefits at a crucial moment. Once negotiations are concluded with the European Commission and all relevant chapters provisionally closed, a candidate country could obtain access to the Single Market even before becoming a formal member of the EU.
This matters because the period between the end of negotiations and actual accession can be lengthy, as the cases of Bulgaria and Romania illustrate. The ratification of membership treaties in all EU member states can take several years and with the changing political climate in many EU countries might become increasingly difficult over time. Under the rationale of the non-paper, a country could participate in the Single Market while the accession treaty makes its way through 27 national ratification processes and enjoy the “four freedoms” before accession – a tangible benefit for the country’s citizens and businesses.
The proposal does not as such provide a discounted version of accession negotiations, nor an accelerated alternative to the ‘business as usual’. What it offers is a number of rewards and incentives once the technical conditions for the closing of negotiation clusters are fulfilled and before the accession treaty is approved. From the perspective of candidate countries, this new process would offer concrete rewards for reform efforts and reduce the uncertainty associated with lengthy ratification procedures over which they have little control. For the EU, it would provide a mechanism to anchor successful reformers more firmly within the European economic space even before formal accession takes place.
What the proposal does not offer, however, is access to funds beyond the Growth Plan to achieve this economic convergence, namely the EU’s Cohesion and Structural Policy – something that the Western Balkan governments have been requesting for several years. Navigating the competitive pressures of the Single Market without a significant influx of funds to mitigate structural disadvantages could prove difficult, especially for smaller economies. If the EEA model is to be followed, then the Western Balkans and Moldova would also be left out of the Customs Union (though the Growth Plan foresees closer customs cooperation), the Monetary Union, and the Agriculture and Fisheries policy. It remains to be seen whether Single Market accession would also entail the implementation of full rights of labour mobility.
Finally, the proposal raises a potentially problematic point: that, with full agreement among member states, the opening of all relevant negotiation clusters should proceed wherever the Commission recommends it. This may have implications for Serbia and opening its stalled Cluster 3, which the Commission has recommended but some member states have blocked due to concerns regarding serious democratic backsliding. This should be a warning sign. If the EU rewards superficial reforms (again) with advancements in the EU accession process, regardless of actual progress, it would yet again undermine its credibility and feed further distrust in the EU’s claim that accession is a merit-based process. Ultimately, even the strongest element of the new proposal, the European Economic Area+, could thus be interpreted as a substitute or an eternal waiting room for EU membership.
What the EU needs to do now is follow through with action and clarity and deliver predictable and plausible decisions – while maintaining the prospect of full EU membership for the region. This is impossible without internal reforms. In the end, EU enlargement has always been about reform and institutional transformation, of both the candidate countries and of the Union itself. Uncoupling transformation from economic incentives and security guarantees risks leaving EU enlargement what it currently is: unfinished business.
First published by BiEPAG (Balkans in Europe Policy and Advocacy Group)
