Al-Quds newspaper

The scene that brings together the Lebanese and Iranian crises is no longer just a passing intersection of political circumstances, but has turned into an integrated model for managing conflicts through economic and financial tools. Current indicators reveal that the confrontation has moved from the ground arena to the cash flow arena, where numbers are used as strategic pressure tools that go beyond the traditional description of crises.

In the Iranian case, the estimated $400 billion economy is facing deep structural pressures resulting from the accumulation of US sanctions imposed since 2018. These sanctions have not only reduced foreign investment, but have also restricted Tehran’s ability to integrate into the global financial system and obstructed the transfer of vital oil revenues.

Although the Iranian trade balance recorded a nominal surplus ranging between 5 and 15 billion dollars, this number does not translate into tangible monetary stability. The main dilemma lies in the inability to immediately access or transfer these revenues, which creates a gap between the volume of exports and the availability of dollar liquidity in local markets.

This financial bottleneck has led to chronically high inflation rates and a sharp deterioration in the value of the local currency, which in turn has eroded the purchasing power of Iranian households. International powers are betting on this internal pressure to cause social tremors resulting from the stagflation that is hitting the joints of the state.

In Lebanon, the picture appears bleaker, with the GDP shrinking by more than 60% since the beginning of the crisis in 2019. The Lebanese pound has lost more than 85% of its value, putting public finances in a state of almost complete inability to meet the basic needs of citizens.

Recent military operations in southern Lebanon have caused massive damage estimated at tens of billions of dollars, at a time when the state is unable to secure minimum funding. In the south, Israel is pursuing a destructive policy reminiscent of what is happening in the Gaza Strip, which exacerbates the displacement crisis and living burdens.

Lebanon differs from Iran in that it does not have margins for maneuver or “economic circumvention,” as it depends entirely on foreign flows, aid, and remittances from expatriates. These flows remain conditional on radical structural reforms and restructuring of the banking sector, which puts the country in a state of dependence on international positions.

The paths between Beirut and Tehran intersect at the financial choke point. While Iran has resources that it cannot access, Lebanon needs resources that it cannot secure. The result in both cases is enormous pressure on the national currency and the stability of society, which makes political solutions alone insufficient without an economic base.

Reports indicate that the reconstruction of Lebanon requires annual financial flows ranging from 5 to 10 billion dollars for many years. This path requires a clear international political umbrella that guarantees the stability of financial channels and the flow of investments away from the equations of direct military conflict.

For Iran, easing economic pressures depends on the extent to which it can be reintegrated into the global financial system, which depends on political shifts in Washington. The question remains about Tehran’s ability to carve out a new regional role that allows its trade surpluses to be converted into actual liquidity that supports its exhausted economy.

Relying on an economic “scorched earth” policy aims to bring countries to the stage of social explosion from within. The numbers show that countries may bear political and military pressure for a while, but they cannot withstand the erosion of the currency and the collapse of living standards for long.

The irony is that people who are accustomed to sanctions may develop mechanisms for steadfastness, but the cost of this steadfastness increases with the passage of time and the accumulation of structural crises. In the absence of radical solutions, blocked economic channels remain the biggest obstacle to any sustainable stability in the region.

Ultimately, the numbers prove that any political settlement will not hold unless it is based on stable financial flows and a balanced currency. Wars may end with ceasefire agreements, but true stability requires opening economic channels and rebuilding confidence in the financial and banking system.

The link between the Lebanese and Iranian tracks reveals that the key to the solution lies in moving from the stage of crisis management to the stage of economic construction. Without this, the region will remain hostage to market fluctuations and pressure from major powers that use money as a weapon no less deadly than missiles.