This is the first in a three-part series in which the author, an I-Kiribati researcher, argues that Australia’s and New Zealand’s Pacific migration schemes are unfair to Kiribati. Part 1 sets out the census evidence.
I sometimes struggle to understand the way Pacific migration is designed in Australia and New Zealand. Australia’s Pacific Engagement Visa (PEV), for example, is a very good idea in principle, but the important question is how Australia decides who receives access, and in what numbers. I believe that decisions around these arrangements should be based on fairness and on objective indicators such as existing migration opportunities, historical census data and the real level of need.
This is why I find the inclusion of the Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands and Palau in the 2026-27 PEV so difficult to understand. Citizens of these islands already have a special pathway to the United States under Compacts of Free Association (COFA), allowing them to live and work there without needing a visa. I do not hold this against them, and I am genuinely happy whenever Pacific people have strong migration pathways and established diaspora in bigger developed countries. My question is for Australia: when countries that already have such a major migration door open to the United States are also given places under Australia’s very limited Pacific migration program at the expense of countries like Kiribati that have no comparable permanent pathway anywhere, how is that fair, and how does that make sense?
To me, it suggests that PEV is about much more than simply helping Pacific countries with the greatest migration needs and is instead viewed as a strategic and geopolitical tool. If Australia’s genuine objective is to help Pacific nations with the fewest opportunities, then it should increase these quotas for those that lack permanent pathways rather than giving them to those that do not need them.
The same principle applies to policies towards Tuvalu and Kiribati. My argument is not against Tuvalu, and I am genuinely happy for Tuvaluans: we share history, family connections, colonial experience, faith, ocean and the same existential threat from rising seas. My argument is for fairness — fairness based on evidence, not just diplomacy.
In the 2026-27 PEV, Kiribati and Tuvalu each receive 100 places, while each COFA country receives 50. Why are Australia’s limited permanent migration places not more clearly weighted towards countries with fewer existing pathways and larger unmet per capita need? If, as Australia says, allocations take into account “population size, diaspora in Australia [and] existing migration opportunities”, then Kiribati should matter much more in the PEV calculations.
Let me put some census data on the table.
Start with the big picture. According to the 2023 New Zealand Census, there were 4,659 people who identified as I-Kiribati living in New Zealand — a number that has quadrupled since 2006, showing that our people want to move when given the chance. But now look at Tuvalu. New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon, meeting his Tuvaluan counterpart in March 2026, said he was proud of the 6,500 Tuvaluans living in New Zealand — the largest Tuvaluan diaspora in the world. Tuvalu’s home population is approximately 11,000 people, while Kiribati’s is approximately 138,000. That means roughly 59% of Tuvalu’s home population has already settled in New Zealand alone, compared with only around 3.4% for Kiribati. Read those numbers again: 59% versus 3.4%.
The same stark disproportion is evident in every country with available data (census microdata on Pacific Web). According to the 2017 Fiji Census, there were 881 Tuvalu-born people living in Fiji — representing another 8% of Tuvalu’s population — compared to 1,225 Kiribati-born, which is less than 1% of ours. The 2011 Nauru Census counted 194 Kiribati-born versus 45 Tuvalu-born, and the 2021 RMI Census recorded 294 Kiribati-born compared to 36 Tuvalu-born. Adding the measured diaspora figures across Fiji, Nauru and RMI alone, Tuvaluans abroad represent roughly 8.7% of their home population, while I-Kiribati abroad represent just 1.3% of ours.
This is the core of my argument, and I want to state it plainly: Tuvaluans have been moving abroad in far higher proportions than I-Kiribati for decades, building their diaspora earlier, more extensively and across more countries. So, it is difficult for me to see the Falepili Union and every preferential migration pathway that Tuvalu has secured stand on the foundation of that long-established presence. Look at the New Zealand Pacific Access Category (PAC): it offers just 75 places per year for Kiribati citizens, the same number as Tuvalu — equal quota, wildly unequal populations. In per capita terms, Tuvalu receives 12 times more PAC slots relative to its population than Kiribati does. I first raised this injustice on social media nearly a decade ago, and nothing has changed.
For me, these numbers are not just statistics. As I discuss in my next article in this series, they match what I have seen with my own eyes.
In Part 2, the author turns from census figures to personal experience in Queensland, and to the Falepili Union between Australia and Tuvalu.
