The ongoing Middle East crisis has reinforced an uncomfortable truth for Taiwan: In an increasingly interconnected and volatile world, distant wars rarely remain distant.
What began as a regional confrontation between the US, Israel and Iran has evolved into a strategic shock wave reverberating far beyond the Persian Gulf. For Taiwan, the consequences are immediate, material and deeply unsettling.
From Taipei’s perspective, the conflict has exposed two vulnerabilities — Taiwan’s dependence on imported energy and the risks created when Washington’s military attention is diverted. Together, they offer a preview of the pressures Taiwan might increasingly face in an era of overlapping geopolitical crises.
Taiwan’s energy vulnerability is the most immediate concern. The nation imports most of its energy, with Middle Eastern suppliers accounting for a substantial share of crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG). Much of that supply transits through the Strait of Hormuz, now affected by conflict-related disruptions. The resulting spike in oil and gas prices underscores how quickly external instability can translate into domestic economic insecurity.
This is not merely about inflation or electricity costs. Taiwan’s economic model — anchored in advanced manufacturing and semiconductor production — is highly energy intensive. Sustained disruptions in LNG or helium supplies could impair sectors critical to Taiwan’s economy and global supply chains. Semiconductor firms have already urged the government to stockpile strategic materials and reassess reserve policies.
Taipei has responded by planning to expand LNG reserves and accelerate diversification toward suppliers such as the US and Australia. However, diversification is only a partial solution. Taiwan’s energy architecture remains structurally fragile, and a serious debate on long-term energy resilience — including nuclear power — can no longer be postponed.
If the economic risks are severe, the strategic implications are even more consequential. Taiwanese policymakers have watched with unease as the US has concentrated military resources and strategic attention on the Middle East. Carrier strike groups, missile defense assets and precision munitions have been redirected, raising concerns that prolonged operations against Iran might degrade Indo-Pacific readiness and strain inventories critical to any Taiwan contingency.
For Beijing, such moments present an opportunity. Taiwanese officials believe China has already begun probing for weakness. Since the middle of last month, after a temporary lull, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army has resumed large-scale air and naval operations around Taiwan, including crossings of the median line and expanded blockade-style exercises. Officials interpret these as deliberate tests of deterrence during a period of perceived US distraction.
Beijing’s strategy also extends to information warfare. State media and propaganda networks portray the Middle East conflict as evidence of US overextension and unreliability, repurposing footage to question US weapon effectiveness and cast doubt on whether Washington would be capable — or willing — to intervene decisively in a Taiwan crisis.
This is classic “gray zone” warfare — using information operations, psychological pressure and calibrated escalation to weaken confidence without triggering open conflict.
Such opportunism is not new. During past periods of US distraction — from the Iraq War to the Afghanistan withdrawal — China increased assertiveness in the South China Sea and across the Taiwan Strait. The current crisis fits a familiar pattern: When Washington is preoccupied elsewhere, Beijing expands pressure. Yet the strategic picture is not entirely one-sided.
China is also drawing lessons from the conflict. The rapid degradation of Iranian air defenses, missile systems and naval assets by US and Israeli strikes highlights modern long-range precision capabilities. For PLA planners, it underscores the vulnerability of large conventional forces.
That could temper, rather than accelerate, Chinese appetite for near-term military adventurism.
However, deterrence depends not only on capability, but on perception — whether those capabilities can be brought to bear at the necessary time and place. Even if the US remains militarily superior, perceptions of overstretch can erode deterrence. That is the core strategic danger for Taiwan.
The lesson is not that China is preparing for imminent invasion, nor that US commitment has fundamentally weakened. Rather, it is that Taiwan cannot assume crises would unfold sequentially. In reality, geopolitical flashpoints overlap, great powers are tested simultaneously and adversaries exploit distraction.
For Taiwan, resilience must become a whole-of-nation priority. Energy diversification should accelerate, strategic reserves expanded and infrastructure hardened. Defense spending should continue to rise, with procurement aligned to asymmetric deterrence rather than conventional prestige. Most critically, Taiwan’s polarized political class must recognize that resilience cannot be built amid domestic paralysis. Strategic ambiguity abroad is manageable; strategic incoherence at home is not.
The Middle East crisis might eventually de-escalate. Shipping lanes might reopen, US assets might rotate back to the Indo-Pacific region and energy markets might stabilize. However, for Taiwan the message is clear: In an age of cascading crises, its greatest vulnerability is not only military exposure or economic dependence.
It is the assumption that someone else’s war would remain someone else’s problem.
Shishir Priyadarshi is president of the Chintan Research Foundation and a former director of the WTO.
