The Federal Supreme Court overturned an appeal ruling that ruled the death penalty for a defendant convicted of stabbing a woman to death using “scissors” and attempting to intentionally kill another person inside a residential building, deciding to refer the case to the Court of Appeal for further consideration.
The cassation ruling was based on the ruling’s violation of the accused’s right to defend, and its failure to respond to the fundamental defenses he maintained before the trial court.
The accused maintained the absence of intent to kill and criminal intent to take the life of the victim, and demanded that he be presented to a specialist doctor to prepare a medical report to diagnose his psychological state at the time of committing the incident, in addition to his adherence to the presence of an element of provocation against the victim.
The Public Prosecution had referred the accused to criminal trial, charging him with three charges. Firstly, he intentionally and aggressively killed the victim with premeditation by preparing the necessary plan for that. He bought the sharp-edged scissors used in the crime and hid them from her until he was alone with her in the corridor of the stairs leading to the roof of the tower in which he lived. When the opportunity came when there was no one in that place, he surprised her and stabbed her with the scissors in different parts of her body, intending to take her life. The injuries described in the anatomical report that claimed her life as shown in the investigations, and secondly that he attempted to kill another person by stabbing him with a sharp object several times on various parts of his body with the intention of taking his life, and he stopped the impact of the crime for a reason that had nothing to do with his will, which is that the aforementioned victim received treatment as shown in the investigations, and thirdly that he was a sane, voluntary, unprotected adult who committed an obscene act. Adultery with the victim, without suspicion of ownership, as indicated by the investigations, and the Public Prosecution requested that he be punished in accordance with the provisions of Islamic Sharia and the articles of the Federal Penal Code.
The court of first instance had unanimously ruled in his presence: to punish the accused with death by retaliation by the means available to the state, in the presence of his blood relatives or their representatives, for the premeditated murder charge charged against him, and to punish him with life imprisonment for the second charge of attempted murder charged against him, with his deportation from the state after carrying out the sentence, and to imprison him for a month for the third charge assigned to him, and ordered the confiscation of the instrument used in the crime (scissors) and obligated him to pay judicial fees, after The description of the last charge was amended to improve the sin.
Both the Public Prosecution and the convict appealed this ruling, and the Court of Appeal ruled unanimously to uphold the ruling to punish the accused with death, in the presence of his blood relatives or their representatives, for the premeditated murder charge attributed to him, and to punish him with life imprisonment for the second charge (attempted murder) assigned to him, with his deportation from the state after carrying out the sentence, and to imprison him for a month for the third charge assigned to him, and ordered the confiscation of the instrument used in the crime (scissors). He is obligated to pay court fees.
The convict appealed this ruling, and the Public Prosecution also appealed this ruling in cassation in accordance with the text of Article 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, requesting confirmation of the appealed ruling that issued the death penalty for the convict.
For its part, the Federal Supreme Court confirmed in the merits of its ruling, based on what was stated in Article 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that “without prejudice to the previous rulings, the ruling imposing the death penalty shall be considered appealed in cassation and its implementation shall be suspended until the appeal is decided.”
She explained that the meaning of this text is that any death sentence, regardless of its reason and the law under which it was issued, is considered to be appealed by force of law in order for the Supreme Court to extend its oversight over it, and to correct any error in the application, interpretation, or interpretation of the law, or any similar deficiency or corruption in reasoning, or a violation of the right to defence.
Also, the function of the Supreme Court, when it considers cassation appeals regarding death sentences, is of a special nature. It is required to exercise its oversight over all elements of the ruling, both objectively and formally. It decides to overturn the ruling if it becomes clear to it that it has been tainted by a defect, even on its own initiative, without being restricted in this by the limits of the grounds of appeal or the basis of the opinion adopted by the Public Prosecution in those rulings.
She pointed out that the person sentenced to death had maintained before the court the absence of intent to kill, and the absence of any of the aggravating circumstances (premeditation, premeditation, and conjunction) against him, and he requested that he be presented to a specialist doctor to prepare a report on his psychological condition, and to amend the record and description in support of the absence of special intent, and the presence of an element of provocation on the part of the victim. However, the contested ruling did not present these defenses and requests with justifiable reasons despite their essence.
It concluded that ensuring the right to defense, according to the goal sought by the legislator, is not limited to enabling the accused to express his defenses and requests, but also extends to include the court’s obligation to confront these defenses and requests whenever they are serious and influential in the face of the right to the lawsuit, or evidence that has an impact on forming the judge’s belief.
